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SURVEY
THE LONG, HOT SUMMER:

A LEGAL Vmw

I. Riot Prevention
A. Introduction
The number and severity of race-related disturbances has increased steadily
from 1961 to 1967.1 In the search for the causes of this violent civil disorder,
the conclusion most often reached is that the riots are a direct attack on the
conditions of slum ghetto existence.2 Therefore, the most effective anti-riot
legislation is undoubtedly that in the form of social and economic measures
designed to eliminate the root causes of poverty and discrimination.
However, as long as the conditions which spawn the riots exist, it is essential that law enforcement officials be prepared to suppress the disturbances
promptly whenever they occur. The purpose of this Note is to examine selected
legal problems that arise in the context of mass urban disorder and to suggest
possible solutions. First considered is an analysis of the legal foundations of
the police and military functions pertinent to riot prevention and control. Then,
the scope of the suppression power during the actual riot situation is delineated.
Finally, an in-depth treatment is offered on the possible sources of recovery for
riot victims who attempt to assert their claims in the aftermath of the disaster.
B. State Statutory Controls
1. State Powers and Duties
The primary responsibility for keeping the peace by the prevention and
suppression of disorder falls upon state and local law enforcement agencies. This
is in accord with the principle that the general duty of the administration of
1 For a comprehensive city-by-city outline of racial disturbance from 1961 to September
25, 1967, see P. Downing, "Race Riots, 1961 to September 25, 1967," Civil Disorder
(Legislative Reference Service of Library of Congress, Aug. 4, 1967). As of July 27th, 1967,
the total riot costs for the year 1967 were summarized as follows:
Number of riots:
Killed:
Injured:
Arrests:

Property Damage:

42
78
3,120
7,050

$524 million

These figures were gathered from newspaper reports and reprinted in 36 CONG. Q. 1707
(Sept 8, 1967).
2

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,

THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 37 (1967). See generally GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES RIOTS. VIOLENCE IN THE CITY - AN END OR A BEGINNING?
(1965). The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders has pointed out that one of
the most "bitter fruits" of "white racism" has been the formation of Black ghettos. These
ghettos are an integral part of the "explosive mixture which has been accumulating in our
cities since the end of World War II." NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CrvrL DISORDERS,
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
ed. 1968) (hereinafter cited as RIOT COMMISSION REPORT).
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criminal justice rests with the states.' The riot itself, and any crimes committed
during its course, such as murder, assault, arson, theft and vandalism, are all
violations of state law. Therefore, it is necessary to examine and evaluate the
existing legal machinery that states employ to cope with urban racial violence.
State provisions dealing with the riot situation generally follow a pattern
formulated by the common law. Three distinct common-law crimes pertaining
to the disruption of public order were recognized by Blackstone. "Unlawful assembly" occurred when three or more persons assembled with the common intention of performing an unlawful act in a violent and tumultuous manner.'
If action was taken to further this illegal cause, the activity was characterized as
a "rout..". "Riot" itself was committed when the mob actually employed force
or violence to accomplish its illegal purpose.' Several states have no statutory
provisions relating directly to riot7 and thus still rely primarily on these commonlaw definitions. Other states maintain the common-law crimes as a supplement
to their statutory enactments.8 These riot statutes themselves, although varying
in form, incorporate the common-law dichotomy between unlawful assembly
and riot.' The crime of rout is usually either abandoned or merged with unlawful
assembly." Thus, the fundamental state legal tools for the protection of the public
order from violence are based on the common-law conception, of riot, supplemented by statutory prohibitions against disorderly conduct and breach of the
peace."
2. State Statutory Scheme
a. Unlawful Assembly
Unlawful assembly statutes have as a basic requirement the assemblance
of at least two," and usually three," persons with the common purpose of
performing an unlawful act. The states are divided as to whether there must
be an intention to perform the planned activity in a violent manner. Many
states require the presence, or at least the threat, of force or violence disruptive
of public order. The Iowa statute is a typical example of this class:
When three or more persons in a violent or tumultuous manner assemble together to do an unlawful act, or, when together, attempt to do
an act, whether lawful or unlawful, in an unlawful, violent, or tumultuous
3 Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1943). See also United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 556 (1876); 41 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 313, 322-23 (1963).
4 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *146.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 For example, the laws of Mississippi, Tennessee, and Wyoming do not specifically
define and prohibit a "riot."
8 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Frishman, 235 Mass. 449, 455, 126 N.E. 838, 840 (1920).
9 E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 743.1 (unlawful assembly), § 743.2 (riot) (1950).
10 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 240.00-.10 (MbKinney 1967). Contra CAL. PENAL
CODE § 406 (West 1955).
11 Disorderly conduct and breach of the peace offenses are considered in the context of
demonstration controls in Part C see text accompanying notes 89-140 infra.
12 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 407 (1959); CAL. PENAL CODE § 407 (West 1955).
13 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 361 (1953); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.10 (McKinney
1967); ORE REV. STAT. § 166.040(2) (1959).
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manner, to the disturbance of others, they are guilty of an unlawful

assembly. ....14
In other jurisdictions, however, the element of force or violence need not be
present to sustain a conviction if the purpose of the assembly is unlawful. The
California unlawful assembly provision is representative of this latter category
of statutes:
Whenever two or more persons assemble together to do an unlawful act,
and separate without doing
or advancing toward it, ...such an assembly
15
is an unlawful assembly.
In addition to raising constitutional difficulties, 6 such a formulation tends to
obscure the basic common-law conception of unlawful assembly as an anticipatory
act to a riot.
The Supreme Court has upheld state legislation that prohibits assemblies
having as their purpose the execution of an unlawful act by means of force
or violence. In Cole v. Arkansa' the Court stated that there was "no abridgment
of free speech or assembly for the criminal sanctions of the state" to be fastened
upon persons "promoting, encouraging and aiding an assemblage the purpose
of which is to wreak violence.""' However, convictions under some of the statutes
containing vague terminology have been reversed on the ground that the statute's
overly broad language failed to establish adequate standards for distinguishing
between constitutionally permissible and constitutionally impermissible suppression." These difficulties usually arise when the offense of unlawful assembly is
employed in specific cases against conduct that does not pose an immediate
threat to public safety.2" Presumably, this argument would not be available to
participants who assemble with the intention of creating or furthering the type
of disorder that has characterized a modem urban riot.
Historically, unlawful assembly statutes were used chiefly to suppress the
violence that has often accompanied labor disputes. 1 During the early period
of the civil rights movement, at least one Southern state employed this sanction
against sit-in demonstrators assembling at lunch counters and department stores. 2
Although the terminology of most state provisions is broad enough to cover
almost any type of unruly gathering,23 the antiquated forms in which the statutes
are cast indicate that they were not intended to cope with modem mass urban
14 IowA

(1950).
(West 1955).
16 In State v. Bulot, 175 La. 21, 142 So. 787 (1932), an unlawful assembly statute was
struck down because the lack of a requirment for violence gave police officers too much
discretion in applying the provision to peaceful assemblies.
17 338 U.S. 345 (1949).
18 Id. at 353-54.
19 E.g., Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 292 (1963).
20 In the Wright case, the statute in question had been applied to six Negroes whose
"unlawful assembly" consisted of playing basketball in a public park that had traditionally
been segregated for "whites only." There was no evidence of any activity that could be
characterized as a breach of the peace. Id. at 285.
21 E.g., Cole v. State, 214 Ark. 387, 216 S.W.2d 402, aff'd, 338 U.S. 345 (1949).
22 See generally Pollitt, Dime Store Demonstrations: Events and Legal Problems of First
Sixty Days, 1960 DUKE L.J. 315, 334.
23 See the cases collected in Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 875 (1960).
15

CoDE ANN. § 743.1
CAL. PENAL CODE § 407
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disorder. However, by modernizing the language of the statutes, an effective
riot-prevention tool can be forged.
In the context of an urban riot, a modem unlawful assembly provision
should be so formulated so as to place a legal sanction on each member of a
mob that forms with the intention of doing violence. The special efficacy of such
a formulation is that it would enable the police to arrest violators for the offense
even before any violence actually occurs.24 For example, such a law would be
of great value in a situation where a demagogue exhorts a crowd of fifteen or
twenty persons in a slum area to stone a passing police car. Once the group
acquiesces in this common purpose, the people comprising the crowd can all
be held guilty of unlawful assembly, whether or not the project is actually accomplished.2 5
The recently adopted New York Penal Code incorporates an unlawful assembly provision that is specifically designed to achieve this purpose:
A person is guilty of unlawful assembly when he assembles with four
or more other persons for the purpose of engaging or preparing to engage
with them in tumultuous and violent conduct likely to cause public alarm,
or when, being present at an assembly which either has or develops
such
26
purpose, he remains there with intent to advance that purpose.
The Practice Commentary to the New York Penal Code states that the statute
is designed to make unlawful assembly an "inchoate or anticipatory offense"
with respect to an actual riot." Conceivably, the provision might have been
constitutionally strengthened by replacing the broad phrase, "likely to cause
public alarm," with a more explicit "clear and present danger" test, keying
upon the probability that grave violence would result if immediate action were
not taken. In this way, the first amendment rights of free speech and assembly
would be better insulated from abuse, and more emphasis would be placed on
the preventive nature of the law. However, even as it is presently phrased, the
New York statute illustrates the useful function that a modem unlawful assembly provision can perform in the prevention of urban disorder: it provides
legal authority to arrest each member of a threatening mob before violence
breaks out.
b. Riot
The statutory riot provisions have the same general purpose as the common
law upon which they are based: the maintenance of public order. The essence
of riot implies the idea of lawless mobs bent on accomplishing some object in
a violent and tumultuous manner.2" Although the statutes vary widely in form,
their basic framework is similar.
24 The actual commission of the intended violence is not an element of the offense of
unlawful assembly, but rather it is the distinction between unlawful assembly and the crime
of riot. BLACKSTONE, supra notes 4 & 6.
25 See Denzer & McQuillan, Practice Commentary, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.08, at 121-22
(McKinney 1967).
26 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.10 (McKinney 1967).
27 Denzer & McQuillan, supra note 25, § 240.10, at 122.
28 People v. Edelson, 169 Misc. 386, 7 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Kings County Ct. 1938).
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The essential elements of the crime as defined by statute are: (a) An
assemblage of three or more persons for any purpose; (b) use or attempted
use of force or violence against property
29 or persons . . . ; and (c) a
resulting disturbance of the public peace.
Although many of the statutes remain couched in archaic language, the
typical form is illustrated by the Minnesota provision:
When three or more persons assembled disturb the public peace by
an intentional act or threat of unlawful force or violence to person or
property, each participant therein is guilty of riot... 10
At least three states have varied this traditional pattern by placing the crime of
riot in the more explicit context of illegal mob action."- Here again, the primary focus is upon the preservation of peace and order. Mob action is defined
in the same terms as riot, but the penalties are structured so as to be 2most severe
3
when actual injury to persons or property results from the disorder.
There is no doubt that the states have the constitutional power to punish
individuals for participation in riotous assemblies. When the statutes have been
challenged on constitutional grounds, the main thrust of the argument has centered on the vagueness of the terminology as applied to a particular factual
situation. A three-judge federal district court in International Longshoremen's
and Warehousemen's Union v. Ackerman 8 held the riot statute of Hawaii unconstitutional because the criterion of "striking terror or tending to strike terror
into others"34 was necessarily one that must be "purely subjective and hence
objectionable."35 Such a rationale could cast doubts on nearly all state riot acts,
since "public alarm,"' "disturbing the public peace,"3 " or "terror" s is the
language commonly employed to differentiate riot from other types of permissible
assemblies. However, the Ackerman case was reversed on other grounds on
appeal without a discussion of the subjective standard point.3 9 More recently, in
Carmichael v. Allen,-" an attempt was made to secure a federal injunction to
prevent enforcement of the Georgia riot statute on the ground that it was "to
vague and uncertain to state any ascertainable standard of guilt."'" The threat29

State v. Winkels, 204 Minn. 466, 468, 283 N.W. 763, 764 (1939).
MINN. STAT. ANNOT. § 609.71 (1964).
31 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 609-A:1 (Supp. 1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:126-1 (1953);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3761.01 (Page 1954).
32 E.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §609-A:2,3 (Supp. 1967).
33 82 F. Supp. 65 (D. Hawaii 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 187 F.2d 860 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 859 (1951).
34 HAwAI REv. LAws § 11571 (1945), as quoted in 82 F. Supp. at 96 n.60.
35 Id. at 101.
36 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.05-.06 (McKinney 1967).
37 CAL. PENAL CODE § 404 (West 1955).
38 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 361 (1953).
39 International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Ackerman, 187 F.2d 860
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 859 (1951), rev'g on other grounds, 82 F. Supp. 65 (D.
awaii 1948).
40 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
30

41

Id. at 995. The state riot statute in question provided:
Any two or more persons who shall do an unlawful act of violence or any other
act in a violent and tumultuous manner, shall be guilty of a riot ....
GA. CODE
ANN. § 26-5302 (1953) (emphasis added).

Petitioner argued that the statute was unconstitutional in that there were many presumably
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ened riot indictment in this case came as a result of activities engaged in by the
petitioners during a violent racial disturbance in Atlanta on September 6th
and 10th, 1966. The court, in refusing to issue the injunction, held that the
acts charged in the indictment were obviously within the power of the state
to punish as a type of hard-core public misconduct that would be prohibited
under any construction of the statute.42 Thus, it appears that a constitutional
argument based on vagueness would not be available to participants in mass
urban violence who were being prosecuted under the standard form of riot
statutes.
As was the case with unlawful assembly provisions, the riot statutes have
traditionally found their most prolific application in the area of labor disputes."3
Although the common-law concept of riot embodied in the statutes is broad
enough to cover urban violence, the effective use of statutory riot provisions in
this field could be hampered by their archaic form.44 In the more recent racial
disturbances, it appears that there were relatively few prosecutions under the
riot statutes. Instead, most rioters were indicted for crimes that were committed
incidentally to the riot itself, such as arson, assault and battery, resisting arrest,
and larceny.45 Nevertheless, a well-drafted riot statute can still serve a vital
function in the context of modem urban disorder. Under such a provision, an
individual engaging in mob violence could be prosecuted for a felony offense
when it would be difficult to indict him personally for one of the more traditional incidental crimes committed during the course of the riot.
The new New York riot provisions are designed to accomplish this very
purpose. The crime of riot is divided into two offenses. The lesser offense, riot
in the second degree, focuses on riotous conduct that is terminated before actual
injury results, and it renders participants guilty of a misdemeanor.
A person is guilty of riot in the second degree when, simultaneously
with four or more other persons, he engages in tumultuous and violent
conduct and thereby intentionally
or recklessly causes or creates a grave
46
risk of causing public alarm.
The crime of riot in the first degree increases the penalty to a felony offense
if the proscribed conduct actually results in personal injury or property damage.
A person is guilty of riot in the first degree when (a) simultaneously
with ten or more other persons he engages in tumultouous [sic] and violent
conduct and thereby intentionally or recklessly causes or creates a grave
legal acts done in a violent and tumultuous manner that were beyond the power of the legislature to proscribe. However, the prosecution recognized this weakness in the statute and was
careful to charge only unlawful acts in the indictment. Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp.
985, 995 (N.D. Ga. 1967). See also Remarks of Lewis R. Slaton, Greenbrier Conference of
the National District Attorneys Association, Aug., 1967, printed in Riot Panel, 3 THE PROSEcuToR 282, 285 (1967).
42 Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985, 996 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
43 E.g., People v. Brown, 193 App. Div. 203, 184 N.Y.S. 165 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1920).
44 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-169 (Supp. 1967).
45 During the August, 1965 Watts riot in Los Angeles, 71% of the 3,438 adults and 81%
of the 514 juveniles arrested were charged with the crimes of burglary and larceny. GovERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES RIOTS, supra note
46 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.05 (McKinney 1967).

2, at 24.
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risk of causing public alarm, and (b) in the course of and as a result of
such conduct, a person other than one of the participants suffers physical
injury or substantial property damage occurs.47
As explained in the Practice Commentary to the New York Penal Code, this
latter formulation of the crime of riot is drafted to conform to the usual conception of a "genuine" urban riot. The minimum number of people required
to constitute a riot is increased from three to eleven, and the violence produced
must now result in actual harm." The phrase, "tumultuous and violent conduct," is described as meaning more than just loud noise or disturbance and
is designed to include "frightening mob behavior involving ominous threats of
injury, stone throwing or other such terrorizing acts."49 Presumably, "public
alarm" would also be construed in such a fashion that its existence would depend on grave danger to life and property, rather than mere annoyance or inconvenience. As such, the New York statute stands as an example of the
necessary function that a riot provision must serve: it shifts the emphasis from
retribution for the commission of some incidental crime and imposes a direct
legal penalty on intentional and active participation in the riot itself.
c. Inciting to Riot
An inciting to riot provision focuses upon the instigator of the disorder,
rather than upon the participants. Its function is to provide a legal basis for
silencing demagogues who create a clear and present danger of serious public
disorder by going beyond the boundaries of protected speech in an attempt to
stir an assemblage into the use of illegal force or violence. Action can be taken
against the agitator even before the requisite number of persons necessary for
5
unlawful assembly acquiesce in the proposed riotous activity s
Obviously, the major problem encountered in this area is defining the crime
of inciting to riot in such terms so as to take it out from under the free speech
guarantees of the first amendment. Although the Supreme Court has made it
dear that the fundamental rights of the first amendment are so vital that they
are to be accorded the utmost protection,51 the Court has recognized that there
are limits to the exercise of these liberties. Words which by their very utterance
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace have been placed in "welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment
of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem."5 2 Even
more explicitly, the Court stated in Cantwell v. Connecticut53 that
[n]o one would have the hardihood to suggest that the principle of freedom
of speech sanctions incitement to riot . . . . When clear and present
danger of riot, disorder, . . . or other immediate threat to public safety,
47 Id. § 240.06.

48 Denzer & McQuillan, supra note 25, § 240.06, at 121.

49 Id. § 240.05, at 118-19.

50 Id. § 240.08, at 121-122.
51 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see Dombrowski
v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965).
52 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
53 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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order, appears, the power of the state to prevent or punish is
peace, or
5 4
obvious.

The factual pattern in Feiner v. New York5" most closely approximates the
type of situation that is likely to occur in a modern urban ghetto. Feiner made
an inflamatory speech to a group of about seventy-five or eighty Negroes and
whites gathered on a city street. Both the thrust of his remarks and his manner
of speaking were directed at arousing the Negro audience to rise up in arms
and fight against the whites. When the crowd's reaction, both for and against
the speaker, threatened to erupt into violence, the police attempted to disperse the
assembly. Because Feiner refused to step down, he was placed under arrest for
the offense of breaching the peace. In upholding Feiner's conviction, the Court
noted that when a "speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and
undertakes incitement to riot,"5 the police are not powerless to act if "motivated
solely by a proper concern for the preservation of order and protection of the
general welfare." 57
Both Cantwell and Feiner were cited with apparent approval in a more
recent decision in Cox v. Louisiana." Although the Court in Cox distinguished
them on their facts, it pointed out that nothing said in the opinion was "to be
interpreted as sanctioning riotous conduct in any form." 55 Thus, it is clearly
within the power of the state to proscribe speech that intentionally threatens
to incite violence, provided that the customary test of "clear and present danger"
is satisfied.
State courts have not been hesitant to uphold convictions based on inciting
to riot against the agitators who played a part in the more recent urban disturbances. During a disturbance in Philadelphia in August, 1964, the defendant
in Commonwealth v. Hayes61 was observed leading a large crowd in directing
chants against the police and attempting to hinder the dispersal of an unruly
gathering. Evidently there was no violence when the defendant first appeared
on the scene, but after he began to lead the assembly, a witness testified that:
[E]verything just seemed to cave in at once. Bottles and bricks and whatever kind of missiles that could be thrown started to62 rain down from the
air, and windows started breaking all over the place.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that evidence of this nature
was sufficient to support a conviction of inciting to riot. Apparently this court
assumed that speech that is intentionally used to incite such illegal activity is
54 Id. at 308.
55 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
56 Id. at 321.
57 Id. at 319.
58 379 U.S. 536, 551, 554 (1965). Here, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, upholding the convictions of demonstrators under a breach of the peace statute and
an obstructing public passages statute, was reversed on the grounds that the statutes were
unconstitutionally applied and enforced. Id. at 552,558.
59 Id. at 559, 574.
60 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 505 (1951). See also Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298, 321 (1957).
61 205 Pa. Super. 338, 209 A.2d 38 (1965).
62 Id. at 342, 209 A.2d at 40.
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conclusively within the power of the state to punish, because it did not even discuss the conviction in the context of the first amendment. In Lynch v. State, 8
however, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, in upholding an inciting
to riot conviction, made a point of specifically distinguishing the type of remarks
that had been made by the defendant from the classes of speech protected by
the Constitution." Relying primarily on Feiner v. New York, 5 the court held
that such exhortations as "Rise up and unite white man and fight" following a
diatribe against Negroes, Jews, and other minority groups were a factor in inciting some of the estimated three thousand listeners to commit the acts of
violence which ensued."
It is interesting to note that in both Lynch and Hayes the arrests, which
were based not on statutes but on the common-law crime of inciting to riot,6"
were made after the speeches had brought about actual riotous conduct. By
pointing to this actual result, the courts could easily conclude that the language
employed posed a clear and present danger to public order. However, the eruption of violence after an inflammatory speech should not be a condition precedent to prosecution if the crime of inciting to riot is to serve as a preventive as
well as a punitive measure. A legal basis for silencing the intentional agitator
is created once a clear and present danger situation arises. Although dispensing
with the requirement that actual disorder must result from the inciter's activity
makes the offense more susceptible to arbitrary abuse, the Supreme Court has
recognized the need for such discretion and has upheld its exercise when performed with the sole motive of preventing serious violence."'
Many states have failed to enact an inciting to riot provision in addition to
the normal statutory prohibitions against riot and unlawful assembly. As has
been seen in Hayes and Lynch, there is a common-law basis for the crime that
can be employed in those states lacking a statutory prohibition. However, probably as a direct result of the widespread occurrence of racial violence, the distinct trend among these states is toward adoption of a specific inciting to riot
statute." The recent Georgia provision illustrates the form into which the offense
is usually cast:
Any person who, with intent to cause a riot, does an act or engages
in conduct which urges, counsels, or advises others to riot, at a time and
place and under circumstances which produce
a clear and present danger
70
of a riot, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Although there have been no reported cases under these new statutes, they
63
64
65

66

236 A.2d 45 (Md. 1967).
Id. at 48-54.
340 U.S. 315 (1951).

Lynch v. State, 236 A.2d 45, 43-54 (Md. 1967).

67 Id. at 55; Commonwealth v. Hayes, 205 Pa. Super. 338, 341, 209 A.2d 38, 39 (1965).
68 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 319 (1951).
69 E.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE § 404.6 (West Supp. 1967); GA. CoDa ANN. § 26-5304 (Supp.
1967); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.08 (McKinney 1967); TEx. PEN. CODE art. 466a (Supp.

1967).
70 GA. CoDE ANN. § 26-5304 (Supp. 1967). The General Assembly of Georgia is expected to increase the penalty for inciting to riot from a misdemeanor to a felony in 1968.
Remarks of Lewis R. Slaton, supra note 41, at 285.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Sympositum,

1968]

seem to emphasize sufficiently the preventive nature of an inciting to riot measure
and are couched in the judicially acceptable terms of clear and present danger.
d. Conspiracy
As yet, there is no evidence that some form of nationwide conspiracy has
been responsible for the planning and execution of the recent urban violence."
Nevertheless, on the local scene, various radical organizations have been quick
to seize upon discontent growing out of a spontaneous incident and to enkindle
it into full scale disorder. 2 Often the individuals in the organizations so involved do not take part in the actual riot activity, yet it is their behind-the-scene
manipulations that determine the course and extent of the violence. Such conduct falls within both the spirit and the letter of the law proscribing criminal
conspiracies.
In People v. Epton73 a conviction based on conspiracy to incite riot was
upheld by the New York Court of Appeals. Evidence produced at the trial
established that, during the Harlem riots of July, 1964, Epton and his co-conspirators did their utmost to stir into violence the unrest caused by the shooting
of a fifteen-year-old boy by an off-duty police lieutenant. The court clearly distinguished the conspiracy charge from the crime of riot itself:
The essence of a conspiracy is an agreement or plan among two or more
persons to commit a crime in the future. The crime of riot, however, is
not committed until three or more persons, actually assembled, have disturbed or immediately threatened the public peace. A previous agreement
or plan is not a necessary element of the crime. . . . One who agrees with
others to organize a riot sometime in the future and who commits an
overt act
pursuant to that agreement is guilty not of riot but of conspiracy
74
to riot.
Although Epton argued that his conviction could not stand because the
bulk of the evidence against him centered on his speech, this contention was
rejected as a misunderstanding of the gravamen of a conspiracy to riot charge. 5
It was not speech, but the illegal agreement that constituted the essence of the
crime. Furthermore, while recognizing the first amendment limitations tipon
prosecution for non-speech crimes when the evidence consists solely of speech.
the court concluded that the language employed fell outside the scope of constitutional protection. It created a "clear and present danger" of attempting or
accomplishing the prohibited crime. 6
71 RIOT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 202.
72 In People v. Epton, 19 N.Y.2d 496, 227 N.E.2d 829, 281 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1967), cert.
denied, 88 S. Ct. 824 (1968), the defendant, convicted of conspiracy to incite riot, was
president of the Harlem club of the Progressive Labor Movement. Id. at 501, 227 N.E.2d
at 831-32, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 12. Other radical organizations that advocate violence to achieve
desired goals include the Revolutionary Action Movement and the Nation of Islam. See
Excerpts from the Testimony of J. Edgar Hoover before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations, reprinted in 36 CONG. Q. 1711 (Sept. 8, 1967).
73 19 N.Y. 2d 496, 227 N.E.2d 829, 281 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1967), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct. 824

(1968).
74
75
76

Id. at 508, 227 N.E.2d at 836, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
Id. at 507, 227 N.E.2d at 835, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
Id., 227 N.E.2d at 836, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
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The case illustrates the useful function that a conspiracy charge can perform in the prevention of mass urban violence. This penal sanction can be applied to the activities of conspirators even before their illegal plan is executed.
The overt act required for a conspiracy indictment does not have to be the riot
itself, but can consist of any preliminary independent action performed by one
of the conspirators in order to bring the planned disturbance into existence."
If violence does erupt as a result of the agreement, the agitators can be prosecuted
both for the conspiracy and the substantive crime of riot, even though they
may not be physically present at the riot scene."
e. Emergency Powers
State legislatures often grant to cities various emergency powers that can
be employed to preserve public health and safety during periods of natural disaster or civil disorder." If the rioting in a city becomes intensive or threatens
to spread, authority can be found in these provisions for such tactical measures
as the imposition of a curfew, restrictions on the sale of gas and liquor, and a
blockade of the riot area.8 0 The local district attorney should keep a catalogue
of the emergency powers available to the various public officials in order to
insure that the required action can be taken without undue delay.81 As in the
other areas of riot legislation, the usefulness of many of these emergency powers
is hindered because they were not drafted to cope with the problems of mass
urban racial violence.12 One state, Ohio, has recently passed a statute that is
expressly designed to delegate to local authorities the power to impose necessary
restrictions during a period of riot:
The chief administrative officer of a political subdivision with police
powers, when engaged in suppressing a riot or when there is a clear and
present danger of a riot, may cordon off any area or areas threatened
by such riot and prohibit persons from entering such area or areas . . .
and may prohibit the sale ... or transportation of firearms or ... other
dangerous explosives in, to, or from such areas .... 83
77 Although something more than mere conversation among conspirators forming and
planning the riot would be necessary, one federal court has gone so far as to designate the
making of a telephone call as an "overt act" sufficient to sustain a conspiracy conviction.
Bartoli v. United States, 192 F.2d 130, 132 (4th Cir. 1951).
78 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-47 (1946).
79 E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.325 (1965):
(1) Not withstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the common
council of any city of the first class is empowered to declare, by ordinance or resolution, an emergency existing within such city whenever conditions arise by reason
of... riot or civil commotion ....
(2) The emergency power of the common council herewith conferred shall include
such general authority to order, by ordinance or resolution, whatever is necessary
80

and expedient for the health, safety, welfare and good order of such city in such
emergency ....
RIOT CoMMissION REPORT,

supra note 2, at 524-25. The National Advisory Com-

mission on Civil Disorders has recognized the efficacy of the measures and has recommended
that states adopt legislation that will specifically authorize their employment in emergency
situations. Id. at 524-27.
81 Remarks of Melvin G. Rueger, Greenbrier Conference of the National District Attorneys Association, Aug. 1967, printed in Riot Panel, supra note 41, at 287.
82 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53:169 (Supp. 1967).
83 O.1o REv. CODa ANN. § 3761.16 (Page Current Material Binder 1967).
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If properly implemented by local officials, such a statute appears to be
a legitimate exercise of emergency police power. Although freedom of movement
is probably not accorded the same degree of importance as the basic first amendment guarantees, it has received recognition as a significant right."4 Nevertheless,
considering the efficacy of a curfew and other related measures in riot suppression
and control, a vital state interest can be recognized in their utilization during
such disorders.8 5 The clear and present danger test incorporated into the
statute serves to insure a reasonable and acceptable standard by which the
necessity for the emergency restrictions can be judged.
3. Conclusion
The major defect hindering the effective application of state riot provisions
is the archaic terminology employed in the statutes. The existence of commonlaw formulations of the crimes in the statutes often results in one of two extremes: the wording is so vague as to be susceptible to constitutional challenge' s
or the elements are specified in technical terms that have little relation to the
factual pattern of a modern urban riot." However, by modernizing the language
of existing statutes and adding, when necessary, a well drafted inciting to riot
provision, a state can provide an adequate legal foundation for prosecuting those
who attempt to cause or actually participate in urban violence. Proper utilization
of the conspiracy and inciting to riot statutes can serve to silence agitators whenever their activity intentionally causes a clear and present danger of grave public
disorder. The unlawful assembly and riot provisions place a blanket legal sanction
on all who participate in mob action that threatens or in fact produces a riot
situation. Finally, in addition to the above offenses, a state can also indict a
rioter for any of the substantive incidental crimes, such as arson or looting, that
he may personally commit during the course of the riot."
C. State Power Over the Right to Demonstrate
1. Scope of Power
Although the majority of the recent riots were characterized as "spontaneous
84 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-27 (1958). See also Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160, 177-181 (1941) (concurring opinion of Justice Douglas).
85 Roadblocks and a curfew used in conjunction with massive force sweep tactics were
credited with an important role in bringing the August 11-17, 1965 Watts riot in Los Angeles
under control. GOVERNOR'S COMtMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES RIOTS, VIOLENCE IN THE
CITY-AN END OR A BEGINNING? 20, 21 (1965).
86 See International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Ackerman, 82 F. Supp.
65, 101 (D. Hawaii 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 187 F.2d 860 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 859 (1951); cf. Baker v. Binder, 274 F. Supp. 658, 661 (W.D. Ken. 1967).
87 E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 269, § 1 (Supp. 1966). The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders has recognized the need for updating and strengthening state riot
control statutes. RIOT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 523-24.
88 The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders concluded as a result of a
survey that there was "no basic lack of legal tools available to control disorders." RIOT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 522. The Commission has recommended, however, the
adoption of certain additional state legislation to cover specific problem areas. It cited the
need for measures designed to restrict the sale of firearms, proscribe the manufacture or
possession of incendiary devices ("Molotov cocktails") and prohibit forceful interference
with the work of firemen or other emergency workers. Id. at 522-23.
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outbursts,"8' 9 there have been instances when planned demonstrations have degenerated into mob action resulting in serious violence.9" The purpose of this
section is to outline the legal procedure that a state governmental agency can
employ to prohibit or control such demonstrations in racially tense areas. The
basic problem is structured by the conflict between first amendment rights granting freedom of speech and assembly and the police power of the state to preserve public peace and order.
There is no doubt that peaceful assemblies are protected under the Constitution. The ability to demonstrate en masse has proved to be a vital tool for
minorities wishing to air their grievances in public view. Such conduct has been
upheld, even when the views expressed by the demonstration were extremely
unpopular. 1 Often it is the only recourse for groups who find publication in the
mass media either ineffective or prohibitively expensive.92
Nevertheless, the right to demonstrate is not accorded the same privilege as
communication by "pure speech." In Cox v. Louisiana93 the Supreme Court
stated that
[W]e emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those
who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching,
and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments afford to
those who communicate ideas by pure speech.9 '
Obviously, when a demonstration loses its peaceful character, the state can
intercede and effect dispersal of the demonstrators. A more complex problem
results when the demonstration itself remains peaceful, but its presence in a
racially tense area incites spectators to violence. In such a situation, the general
rule is that the right of assembly cannot be abridged merely because of a hostile
audience reaction." Rather, it is the duty of the state to provide adequate police
protection to insure the safety of the demonstrators." However, if the magnitude
of the impending disorder poses a serious danger to life and property, suppression
or regulation of the demonstration may be warranted.9" Thus, whether it be the
89 PRESMENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TEE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 37 (1967).

90 The wave of violent demonstrations which occurred in Chicago during the summer
of 1966 is chronicled in City of Chicago v. King, 86 Ill. App. 2d 340, 343-49, 230 N.E.2d
41, 42-46 (1967). During 1966 and 1967, demonstrations in the following cities resulted in
riots or serious disorder: Birmingham, Ala. Jan. 11, 1966; Lorman, Miss. April 4, 1966;
Philadelphia, Miss. June 21, 1966; Jacksonville, Fla. July 18-19, 1966; Louisville, Ky. April 20,
1967; Houston, Texas May 16-17, 1967; Boston, Mass. June 2-4, 1967. 36 CoNG. Q., supra
note 72, at 1710-12.
91 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965). See generally H. KALVEN, JR., THE
NEGRO AND

THE FiRST AMENDMENT

140-60 (1965).

92 See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 50-51 (1966) (dissenting opinion of Justice
Douglas); Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 106 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
93 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
94 Id. at 555.
95 E.g., Pritchard v. Downie, 326 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1964); State v. Leary, 264 N.C.
51, 140 S.E.2d 756 (1965).
96 See the cases cited in note 125 infra and accompanying text.
97 See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939); Kelly v. Page, 335 F.2d 114, (5th
Cir. 1964); Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 110 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
98 See City of Chicago v. King, 86 Ill. App. 2d 340, 346-47, 230 N.E.2d 41, 44 (1967);
ef. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315-17 (1967).
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demonstrators themselves or the spectators who pose the threat of uncontrollable
riot, the essential questions remain the same: at what point in time, and by
what legal methods, can the state act to restrict freedom of assembly?
2. Timing of State Action
In Cantwell v. Connecticut" the Supreme Court pointed out that a state
has the power not only to punish, but also to prevent, immediate threats to
public safety, such as riots and similar disorders.' 0 Thus, if an otherwise legal
demonstration threatens to erupt into riot, it would seem that the state can act
to disperse it before the violence actually occurs. In an analogous situation occurring during a labor dispute, the Court sustained an injunction against all picketing, including that which was peaceful, when the past activity was marred by
violence that threatened to recur.1"' This is basically an application of the
"clear and present danger" test to the right of free assembly.
The major problem with the clear and present danger doctrine inheres in
its application to a specific set of circumstances. For example, in Terminiello v.
Chicago..2 both Justice Douglas speaking for the majority and Justice Jackson
in dissent agreed that the doctrine should be employed, but they differed as to
whether the particular conduct in question posed the requisite menace to justify
state action. 3 However, when a threatening urban demonstration is considered
in the context of the recent wave of serious disorders that have swept the country,
the need for state regulation is readily apparent. One commentator has suggested that a demonstration in such an area as the Watts section of Los Angeles
during a period of unrest could by its very presence induce violence.'
In such
a case, it would seem that the state could act to prevent or at least stringently
control that presence before any disorder occurred.
3. Methods of Control
a. Breach of the Peace Statutes
Statutes and ordinances proscribing breach of the peace or disorderly conduct have traditionally been the primary tools employed by the states to regulate
demonstrations. However, in a series of cases beginning with Edwards v. South
Carolina0 5 and culminating in Cox v. Louisiana,' the Supreme Court has
cast grave doubts on the constitutionality of these measures when they are used
for that purpose. The primary objection centers on the vague terminology used
in such statutes to define the offenses, because the language "sweeps within its
broad scope activities that are constitutionally protected free speech and assembly."'
It is important to note, however, that in the cases where the statutes
99
100
101

310 U.S. 296 (1940).
Id. at 308.
Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).

102 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
103 Id. at 4-5, 26. See Comment,Freedom of Assembly, 15 DEPAUL L. REv. 317, 321-23
(1966).
104 Note, Regulation of Demonstrations, 80 HAmv. L. Rav. 1773, 1774 (1967).
105 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
106 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
107 Id. at 552.
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were struck down, the conduct to which they had been applied was in fact
protected. The demonstrations were essentially peaceful, or at the least they
did not pose the clear threat of violence characterized by an urban riot.'
In the last few years there has been a shift in the philosophy of the Negro
movement. The theory of non-violence embedded in the early sit-in demonstrations has been replaced to some degree by the more militant views of the
vociferous advocates of "Black Power." The transition has been manifested by a
marked increase in "community harassment" and, in some cases, has led to
actual riot. °3 The question arising from this change in tactics is whether the
type of the breach of the peace statutes that the Court held void when applied
to peaceful civil rights demonstrations will also be struck down when employed
to regulate militant demonstrations threatening the more violent forms of the
recent urban disturbances.
As yet, the Supreme Court has not passed on this issue. But it would seem
that, even if the statutes were vague in wording, they would still be effective to
proscribe the hard-core conduct that is encompassed by even the strictest type
of statutory interpretation. In Carmichael v. Allen" a federal district court
employed this rationale to uphold Georgia's riot statute, but it declined to
afford the same treatment to a broadly worded municipal disorderly conduct
ordinance." 1 Although the conduct in question was clearly within the power of
the state to proscribe under the state riot statute, the court enjoined the employment of the municipal ordinance because its vague terminology readily permitted
the executive and judiciary "to make a crime out of what is protected
2

activity.""1

This decision suggests that the standard breach of the peace and disorderly
conduct provisions may be too vaguely worded to be an adequate tool in the
regulation of demonstrations, even when violence is threatened or actually erupts.
However, because of the broad spectrum of conduct that can validly be prohibited as a "breach of the peace," it is virtually impossible to draft the definitions in precise terms." 3 Thus, although states should reexamine the language
of such statutes in an attempt to eliminate the more obvious ambiguities, the
primary test of validity should turn on the conduct to which they are in fact
applied. A certain amount of discretion on the part of law enforcement officials
is a necessity. It is the state's responsibility to exercise this discretion in such a
manner as to prohibit only that type of activity that is clearly beyond the pale
of constitutional protection.

108 In both Edwards and Cox, the demonstrators engaged in singing and cheering, but
the Court made an independent examination of the record and found that the conduct
could not constitutionally be prohibited as a breach of the peace. Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229, 233-35 (1963); Cox v. Louisiana 379 U.S. 536, 545-51 (1965).
109 H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 298-99 (1967). See generally Costanzo,
Public Protest and Civil Disobedience: Moral and Legal Considerations, 13 LOYOLA L. REv.
21, 50-53 (1967).
110 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
111 Id. at 996, 997-99. See note 41 supra for the language of the state riot statute.
112 267 F. Supp. at 999.
113 DENZER & MCQUILLAN, Practice Commentary, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20(7), at 129
(McKinney 1967).
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b. ParadePermits
Many municipalities maintain ordinances requiring those who wish to
use the public streets for the purpose of staging a demonstration to acquire
prior approval in the form of a parade permit. Although the Supreme Court
upheld this type of regulation in Cox v. New Hampshire,1 4 it was careful to
delineate the exact limits of such authority. The undoubted power of the municipality to control the use of its streets for parades was recognized, but the inherent
discretion could only be exercised with a " 'systematic, consistent and just order
of treatment, with reference to the convenience of public use of the highways
....,"1115 It is important to note that the ordinance in Cox, as narrowly construed by the state court, was strictly a measure for traffic control. The city
had no power to deny a permit because of the content of the message that the
demonstration sought to convey."'
The rhetoric of "public convenience" in a parade permit ordinance could
conceivably be extended to authorize the denial of a parade permit because
the demonstration would create a clear and present danger of serious public
disorder."' However, such a determination would necessarily involve a subjective judgment on the part of the official issuing the permit. The Supreme
Court has been extremely reluctant to tolerate this type of administrative discretion on the grounds that it often results in either a prior restraint of the rights
of free speech and assembly or a denial of equal protection. In Cox v. Louisiana" the Court pointed out that
[ilt is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to determine which
expressions of view will be permitted and which will not or to engage in
invidious discrimination among persons or groups . . . by use of a statute
providing a system of broad discretionary licensing power . . .19
Hence, it appears that parade permits are valid insofar as they are restricted
to the purely empirical function of traffic regulation. But when an official has
the power to deny a permit because he believes that the demonstration will
cause a serious danger of riot, his decision necessarily incorporates a personal
appraisal of the content of the message to be conveyed. "' Such discretion is
clearly prone to the type of abuse condemned in Cox v. Louisiana.2' Thus,
although a state or city has the authority to suppress demonstrations that pose
a serious threat to public safety, this power should not be exercised by means
of the permit system. Because of the subjective elements involved, a more
114 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
115 Id. at 576, adopting the language of the New Hampshire Supreme Court in State
v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 143, 16 A.2d 508, 513 (1940).
116 312 U.S. at 575-76.
117 In Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), the Court, in discussing a
parade permit, implied that a properly drafted and enforced permit system could be employed
to prevent "public disorder and violence." Id. at 315-17. See notes 131-136 infra and
accompanying text.
118 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
119 Id. at 557.
120 See Hague v. 010, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), where a permit ordinance was held void
on its face partly because "[i]t enable[d] the Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere
opinion that such refusal will prevent 'riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.'" Id. at 516.
121 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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formal judicial process should be required for ascertaining the facts in each
case and weighing them in the context of the "clear and present danger" doctrine.
c. Judicial Control
The equity power of a court can be effectively employed as a means of
exercising state control over demonstrations. Upon a showing of clear and
present danger, a court can lay down specific regulations as to the size, place
and time of the proposed demonstration in order to insure that it can be kept
under proper police control. Such an injunction can be based either on the
power of the court to enjoin violations of a statute, such as a breach of the peace
provision,' 22 or on the general equity power to meet with an emergency situation."2 The validity of the decree will depend upon the extent to which it meets
the exigencies of the particular situation without needlessly infringing upon pro24
tected conduct.
Although the Supreme Court has continually stated that the exercise of
constitutional rights cannot be infringed because of hostile audience reaction,"2
there is some authority for the proposition that an injunction can be issued
when the magnitude of anticipated disorder threatens to exceed effective police
control. 2 6 Such a situation arose in Chicago during the summer of 1966. Civil
rights leaders had embarked upon a program of "creative tension," and the
result was several million dollars of property damage, the death of 27 persons
and injury to 374 others, including 61 police officers. 2 ' Much of this violence
seemed to emanate from mobs of spectators who constantly harassed the demonstrators, even though the police department strained to provide adequate protection. 2" Finally, the City of Chicago applied for and received a temporary
injunction severely limiting the size of future demonstrations, restricting them
to daylight hours (exclusive of rush-traffic periods), and requiring twenty-four
hours' advance notice of their location.'
In discussing the necessity of these
regulations, the Appellate Court of Illinois seemed impressed with the allegation unless the demonstrations were subject to such measures, the burden placed
122
123
124

See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 309, 315 (1967).
See City of Chicago v. King, 86 Ill. App. 2d 340, 353-54, 230 N.E.2d 41, 47-48 (1967).
E.g., Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 298

(1941).
125 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965); Wright
292-93 (1963); Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535
358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,
Pollitt, Free Speech for Mustangs and Mavericks, 46 N.C.L. REv.

v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284,
(1963); Cooper v. Aaron,
300 (1955). See generally
39 (1967).

126 City of Chicago v. King, 86 Ill. App. 2d 340, 346-47, 230 N.E.2d 41, 44 (1967);
cf. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967).
127 City of Chicago v. King, 86 Ill. App. 2d 340, 342-47, 230 N.E.2d 41, 42-45 (1967).
128 Chicago's Superintendent of Police, 0. W. Wilson, charged that in fact the demonstrators did not want adequate police protection.
I believe that it was the aim of these marchers to subject themselves to violence.
If the marches were conducted without incident, nothing would be gained. The
violence which occurs is in fact their bargaining wedge. If violence occurs, they
can make demands upon the city administration and in return for the granting of
those demands. agree to end the marches and thereby the violence. Otherwise they
have no bargaining power. For this reason, those in charge of the marches do not
really want adequate police protection . . . . Wilson, Civil Disturbances and the

Rule of Law, 58 J. CRmn.

L.C. & P.S. 155, 159 (1967).

129 City of Chicago v. King, 86 Ill. App. 2d 340, 342-43, 230 N.E.2d 41, 42 (1967).
See Pollitt, supra note 125, at 41-42; Note, supra note 104, at 1787 n.86.
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on the police department would seriously hinder its ability to preserve peace
and prevent crime throughout the entire city of Chicago."'
The point of discussing this case is not to call for a general reappraisal of
the "hostile audience" doctrine. The right to protest against the majoritypeacefully, but with force and vigor- obviously cannot be suspended because
of the existence of civil rights tensions in the major cities. However, when the
demonstrations that provoke the hostility are carried on in such a fashion as to
seriously endanger the safety of not only those who demonstrate, but also the
entire community, a state must be permitted to regulate such demonstrations
after balancing the interest of the individual against that of society itself."3 ' In
such a situation, it is both reasonable and necessary to allow a court to subject
a demonstration to stringent regulations designed to protect the rights of all
persons who are both directly and indirectly affected by the activity.
Once an injunction is granted, the demonstrators are bound to obey it until
its expiration or its dissolution through the ordinary methods of appeal. There
is no right to engage in the proscribed activity under the theory that the decree
was erroneous and then attack it collaterally when cited for contempt.' 3 2 This
familiar principle was reaffirmed by a severely divided Court in the recent case
of Walker v. City of Birmingham.' A state circuit court had granted an
injunction prohibiting the petitioners from violating a local parade ordinance
by engaging in unlicensed demonstrations. Alleging that the decree was clearly
unconstitutional, the petitioners proceeded to conduct their demonstrations as
planned and were later convicted of contempt. Justice Stewart, speaking for
the majority, conceded that the breadth and vagueness of the language employed
in both the parade ordinance and the injunction would certainly be subject to
substantial constitutional question. 4 However, after pointing out that the
state court clearly had jurisdiction over the petitioners and the subject matter
of the dispute, he refused to characterize the injunction as "transparently invalid
or [having] only a frivolous pretense to validity." ' Thus the contempt convictions were upheld because the litigants failed to test the injunction according
to the prescribed procedure for review. Although there may be doubts as to
the ultimate wisdom of the policy embraced by the majority,3 6 it does have the

advantage of forcing demonstrators whose conduct could validly be proscribed
to fight their battle in the courts and not in the streets.
130 City of Chicago v. King, 86 Il1. App. 2d 340, 345-46, 230 N.E.2d 41, 43-44 (1967).
131 See Wilson, supra note 128, at 159. The Chicago Police Superintendent attributed the
marked increase in crime in the entire city during periods of civil disorder to the fact that
"a tremendous amount of police personnel and effort had been diverted from crime fighting
to dealing with civil disturbances." Id. at 158.
132 Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922).
133 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
134 Id. at 316-17.
135 Id. at 315.
136 In dissent, Justice Brennan pointed out that
[w]e cannot permit fears of "riots" and "civil disobedience" generated by slogans
like "Black Power" to divert our attention from what is here at stake -not
violence
or the right of the State to control its streets and sidewalks, but the insulation from
attack of ex parte orders and legislation upon which they are based even when
patently impermissible prior restraints on the exercise of First Amendment rights,
thus arming the state courts with the power to punish as a "contempt" what they
otherwise could not punish at all. Id. at 349 (dissenting opinion).

[Vol. 43:913]

SURVEY

d. Police Discretion
There is no doubt that the police have the power to suppress a demonstration when it crosses the bounds of peaceful protest and erupts into violence." 7
The more subtle problem arises in those borderline cases in which actual disorder
has not yet occurred, but there seems to be a clear and present danger that some
violence will result. It is understandably difficult for police to make on-the-spot
distinctions between validly proscribed disorderly conduct and that form of
protected activity that "induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction
with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."'3 8 Nevertheless, the
decision to characterize a demonstration as illegal is first made at the scene by
the police, and they must be accorded the necessary discretion to act quickly in
the interests of public safety.
The importance of extensive tactical training for police in the field of
demonstration control cannot be overemphasized. 9 In the past, police activity
during demonstrations has been marred by incidents of serious abuse by some
police officers."4 A peaceful demonstration should not be looked upon with
disapproval by a police agency. Rather, it should be considered a safety valve
possibly serving to prevent a riot. The spark that could transform a peaceful
assembly into a violent mob could very easily be supplied by arbitrary and unwarranted police action. The power in the police to make on-the-spot decisions
is present by reason of necessity, the ability to make these decisions correctly is
just as essential.
4. Conclusion
The state has a valid interest in suppressing demonstrations that present
a clear and present danger of riot or other serious public disorder. However,
because of the first amendment rights involved, this authority cannot be employed
arbitrarily. There is no doubt that the state can take all reasonable measures
necessary to preserve public peace and safety. Nevertheless, unsubstantiated
claims of riot prevention will not justify excessive restrictions on assemblies that
are essentially peaceful in themselves, or do not pose an uncontrollable threat
to the safety of the state. Thus, the fundamental element in demonstration
control is the proper exercise of discretion in determining the need for regulation
and in fashioning restrictions to meet the specific circumstances of each situation.
D. FederalRiot Statutes
1. The Anti-Riot Statute
On April 10, 1968, the Congress passed H.R. 2516,"', a civil rights bill
137 E.g., Pritchard v. Downie, 326 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1964); State v. Leary,
51, 140 S.E.2d 756 (1965).
138 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
139 See RIOT CommissIoN RyPORT, supra note 2, at 328-29. See also Leary,
of the Police in Riotous Demonstrations,40 NoTRE DAME LAw-ER 499 (1965).
140 See Note, supra note 104, at 1785 n.75.
141 114 CoNG. REc. 2758-826 (daily ed. April 10, 1968). The entire bill, as
the Senate and adopted by the House, is reprinted in 114 CONG. REc. 2578-83
March 11, 1968).

264 N.C.
The Role
passed by
(daily ed.
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that included a provision making it a federal crime to use any facility of interstate commerce to incite or engage in a riot."4 2 This measure was signed into
law by the President on April 11, 1968.4" Whereas state laws center primarily
on the disturbance itself, the avowed purpose of the federal criminal statute is
to focus on the individual who crosses a state line for the purpose of enkindling
public disorder.' The section is patterned after the Anti-Racketeering Act"
and is intended to supplement local law enforcement by assuring federal investigative and prosecutive jurisdiction over "out-of-state" inciters.'46
The history of the anti-riot provision is rather intricate. Its nucleus can be
found in H.R. 421,47 which passed the House on July 19, 1967.4' H.R. 421
was strongly criticized by certain Congressmen who pointed out that, among
other defects, the definition of inciting to riot was so vague as to be unconstitutional under the first amendment.' 49 The Senate did not act on H.R. 421 as
such. However, when the Senate was in the process of strengthening the civil
rights aspects of H.R. 2516, proponents of an anti-riot statute were able to incorporate the basic features of H.R. 421 into the civil rights bill by means of
amendments." Although the present anti-riot statute closely parallels the provisions of H.R. 421,' an attempt was made in the Senate amendment to define
the crime in more precise language so as to avoid any constitutional challenges.' 2
Nevertheless, when the amended civil rights bill was returned to the House,
there were still strong reservations concerning the anti-riot measure.s However, because of the "realities of the parliamentary situation,""" which necessitated acceptance of the anti-riot amendment if the open housing and other civil
rights provisions were to be accepted, the measure was passed without prolonged
5
debate.
One of the underlying rationales behind the federal anti-riot statute
appears to be the assumption that outside agitators have played a major part in
causing modern urban disturbances. As yet, the proof on this issue has certainly
not been conclusive. There seems, however, to be no doubt that the immediate
cause of nearly all the recent riots has been a spontaneous incident, usually
involving police action in a ghetto area. 5 Once the rioting was under way,
certain extremist elements became active, but often as not these groups were
142 H.R. 2516, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 102, §§ 2101-02 (1968),
2101-02.
143 N.Y. Times, April 2, 1968, at 1, col. 1.
144 H.R. REP. No. 472, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
145 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951-54 (1964).
146

now 18 U.S.C. §§

H.R. REP. No. 472, supra note 144, at 3.

147 H.R. 421, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 102 (1967).
148 113 CONG. REc. 9010-11 (daily ed. July 19, 1967).
149 See, e.g., id., at 8953-54 (remarks by Rep. Conyers and Rep. Mathias and excerpt from
letter of Lawrence Speiser, American Civil Liberties Union).
150 On March 5, 1968, the anti-riot amendment was added to S. 2516 on the floor of the
Senate. 114 CONG. REc. 2220-32 (daily ed. March 5, 1968).
151 114 CONG. REC. 2764 (daily ed. April 10, 1968) (remarks of Rep. Celler).
152 Id. at 2815 (reprint of Memorandum on H.R. 2516 prepared by House Committee
on the Judiciary).
153 Id. at 2794-95 (remarks of Rep. Ryan).
154

Id.

155

Id. at 2758-826.

156 See

TICE, THE

PRESIDENT'S CoMMIssION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADIxINISTRATIoN
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SociETY

37 (1967).

OF Jus-
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locally based and the crossing of state lines was not involved.157 In the relatively
few cases where outside agitators were present,' 8 state criminal laws were adequate to proscribe their conduct. 59
Of course, even a few inciters traveling interstate with the intention to create
a disorder can produce tremendous harm. By being available in such situations,
the federal statute can play an important, but limited, role in dealing with riots. 8 °
Nevertheless, the great majority of street disturbances will probably not be
affected by the federal statute but will remain exclusively within the state's
criminal jurisdiction.
However, even putting aside doubts cast upon its constitutionality or utility,
the federal statute is still open to a basic objection. A criminal statute, whether
federal or state, cannot come to grips with the underlying causes of civil disorder.' 6 A truly effective congressional anti-riot act would aim at the real
problems behind urban riots, such as slum housing, unemployment, and inadequate educational and vocational training programs." 2 These root causes do
call for a program that is national in scope, whereas the less challenging task
of drafting local police statutes can be relegated to the more appropriate hands
of the states. It is to be hoped that Congress has not become distracted from its
real obligation by the specific anti-riot section in H.R. 2516, but will come to
realize that the most effective anti-riot measures in that law are the open-housing
and other civil rights provisions.
2. Control of Riot Reporting by Mass Media
Certain members of Congress also expressed an interest in holding hearings
what role the mass communications media plays in inciting and
determine
to
spreading the riots. Charges were leveled that early on-the-spot coverage of
the disturbances tended to foment further rioting.' Senator Hugh Scott suggested the formulation of a voluntary code under which the news media would
157 For example, the element of the Progressive Labor Movement that was active during
the Harlem riots of July, 1964, seems to have been locally based. See People v. Epton, 19
N.Y.2d 496, 501, 227 N.E.2d 829, 831-32, 281 N.Y.S.2d 9, 12-13 (1967), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct.
824 (1968).
158 In a survey of the twenty-six major race riots between April 1 and July 21, 1967, outside agitators were conclusively found to be present in only seven of the disorders. P. Downing, S. Schlesinger & F. Wyman, "Riots, April 1 to July 21, 1967," Civil Disorder, 1-14 (Legislative Reference Service of Library of Congress Aug. 4, 1967).
The seven cases where the presence of outside agitators was conclusively established are
as follows: Willie Ricks (Jackson, Miss., May 12-13, 1967). Id. at 2. Stokely Carmichael
(Nashville, Tenn. April 8-10, 1967; Houston, Texas, May 16-17, 1967; Prattville, Ala., June
11, 1967; Atlanta, Ga., June 18-21, 1967). Id. at 1, 3, 4, 7. H. Rapp Brown (Cincinnati,
Ohio, June 12-16, 1967; Dayton, Ohio, June 14-15, 1967). Id. at 5, 6. All the above-named
individuals are officers of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee.
159 See note 88 supra and accompanying text. Stokely Carmichael's attempt to secure
a federal injunction against state prosecution under the Georgia riot statute was thwarted in
Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1967). Notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
160 RIOT COMMiSSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 224.
161 Id.
162 See 113 CoNG. R:Ec., supra note 148, at 8945-49 (remarks of Rep. Conyers and Rep.
Ryan).
163 Representative Durward G. Hall stated:
A Stokely Carmichael calling for insurrection on a street comer soapbox is a
curiosity-a hippie talking to other hippies. But a Stokely Carmichael talking
face-to-face to millions of people (via television) is immediately transformed from
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balance the inflammatory statements of riot agitators by presenting at the same
time appeals from moderates and government officials."' Most executives in
the communications industry opposed any imposition of a code, but instead
stressed that the best guideline would be the professional judgment of responsible newsmen.16 At present, it does not appear that any congressional action
will be taken to impose restraints on the television or press coverage of riots.
Senator Scott has been reported to have abandoned further action on the matter,
since "his letters had perhaps served the purpose of causing the industry to
examine itself and that this introspection might be sufficient for the time being." '6
Some of the criticism leveled at the media, at least during the first wave
of riots, probably was justified since reporters were inexperienced in handling
such situations. The McCone Report, which attempted to dissect the causes
of the 1965 Watts riot in Los Angeles, pointed out a lack of balance in the
coverage of the early stages of that disorder." 7 Mayor Richard Daley, speaking
of disturbances in Chicago during the summer of 1966, claimed that the very
presence of the mass media tended to incite rioting. He stated that "in disturbances resulting from protest marches, the television cameras didn't seek the
violence, the violence sought the camera."16 s Public officials in Toledo, Ohio,
and Newark, New Jersey, also attributed to television a contributing role in their
riots.'

69

In an attempt to limit these adverse effects, certain principles of responsible
riot coverage have been articulated by the School of Journalism and the Department of Telecommunications of the University of Southern California. These
measures have been incorporated into a model code containing sixteen provisions that emphasize the common-sense factors of balanced coverage, inobtrusive presence and prudent reporting of inflammatory incidents. 70 Voluntary
adherence to such guidelines is probably the most effective method for insuring
that riots are reported in a reasonable manner. Moreover, any form of government-imposed regulations that are enforced by sanctions, such as suspension of
an oddball to a national figure. Reprinted in 36 CONG. Q. 1756 (Sept. 8, 1967).
Representative Torbert H. Macdonald expressed interest in learning whether news coverage operated to put police at a tactical disadvantage.
I . . . am very concerned whether or not spot coverage of riots tends to foment
further rioting. There is some question as to whether those intent on criminal
actions use the news media to ascertain where the police are-or are not. 113
CONG. REc. 11265 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1967).
164 Senator Scott's suggestion is reported in Younger, Roll a Car-You're on TV!, 3
THE PROSECUTOR 424, 425 (1967). See also 36 CONG. Q., supra note 163, at 1756.
165 See 36 CONG. Q., supra note 163, at 1757; Younger, supra note 164, at 425-26.
166 36 CONG. Q., supra note 163, at 1757.
167 Discussing a meeting widely covered by the press, radio, and television which occurred
immediately before the major outbreak of rioting, the Commission points out that
one Negro high school youth ran to the microphones and said the rioters would
attack adjacent white areas that evening. This inflammatory remark was widely
reported on television and radio, and it was seldom balanced by reporting of the
many responsible statements made at the meeting. GOVERNOR'S COMMIlSSION ON
AN END OR A BEGINNING? 13 '(1965).
THE Los ANGELES RIOTS, VIOLENCE IN THE CITY 168 Mayor Daley is quoted in Haddad, A Code for Riot Reporting, 6 COLUM. JOURNALISM
Rav. 35 (Spring 1967).
169 36 CONG. Q., supra note 163, at 1756.
170 Haddad, supra note 168, at 35. See generally RIOT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
2, at 362-86.
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the broadcasting license by the Federal Communications Commission,' 71 would
have to be very precisely drafted to avoid infringement of first amendment
rights. Therefore, it is submitted that the most practical course at the present
time would be to avoid imposing any restrictions that might hinder the media's
essential role of carrying news to the public accurately and to trust the media
to recognize its responsibility to the community in riot coverage." 2
II. Riot Control and Suppression
A. Introduction
It is essential that a state equip itself in advance for the quick and orderly
suppression of domestic violence occurring within its borders. The formulation
of a sound system of constitutional riot-control laws, however, is not, of itself,
sufficient equipment. Because laws are meaningless if not enforced, the state
must also be prepared to act surely and swiftly to quell any disturbance that
causes their breakdown. It must be prepared to protect or restore immediately
the operation of law and order.
An obstacle to the rapid implementation of control measures in riot situations has been the uncertainty fostered by the fact of federalism. The hazy distinction between state and federal responsibility leads to severe consequences in
terms of destruction of life and property. 3 Unfortunately, as the recent squabble
between President Johnson and Michigan's Governor Romney forcefully indicates,7 the confusion continues to exist. If needless destruction at the hands
of rioters is to be avoided, these problems of uncertain governmental responsibility - and the separate problems of command and control that arise once
must be reviewed and resolved in advance.
military assistance is utilized'This portion of the Note will address itself to such a resolution.
Suppression of riots and other domestic violence is primarily a state respon171 Suspension of licenses was suggested as a possible sanction by Evelle J. Younger, District
Attorney of the County of Los Angeles. Younger, supra note 164, at 426.
172 The positive aspect of riot reporting is often overlooked. rn a speech to the Rice
Institute in Houston during the week of Nov. 8, 1967, Deputy Attorney General Warren
Christopher noted that rumors were often instrumental in spreading the violence. He cautioned against unreasonable bans on reporting racial incidents, pointing out that "[flast
accurate reporting of the true state of affairs is probably the best antidote to poisonous
rumors in the ghetto." 2 C iu. L. RPTR. 2119 (1967).
173 The actions of the federal government have generally embodied the spirit of Theodore
Roosevelt's assertion that "twenty-four hours of riot, damage, and disorder" are preferable
to the illegal use of troops. Comment, Federal Intervention in the States for the Suppression
of Domestic Violence: Constitutionality, Statutory Power, and Policy, 1966 DUKE L.J. 415,
460 n.162. It is alarming to note that the confusion as to responsibility appears to leave
only these unhappy alternatives.
174 The following newspaper articles report the history of the Detroit riot and the ensuing
controversy: N.Y. Times, July 24, 1967, at 1, col. 6; id., July 25, 1967, at 1, col. 8; id.,
July 30, 1967, § 1, at 1, col. 2, & at 1, col. 3, & at 52, col. 1.
175 Note, Riot Control and the Use of Federal Troops, 81 HARv. L. Rnv. 638, 642 (1968).
The importance of advance planning and carefully developed systems of command and
control was highlighted recently by the experience of events at Watts, Newark, Detroit and
Milwaukee. HousE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, REPORT OF SPECIAL SUBCOMza. TO INQUIRE
90th
INTO THE CAPABILITY OF THE NATIONAL GUARD TO COPE WITH CIVIL DISTURBANCES,
Cong., Ist Sess. 5662 (December 18, 1967) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON NATIONAL
GUARD CAPABLrrY].
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176
sibility, because riots and their incidental crimes are violations of state law.
Moreover, since state officers are constitutionally obliged to support the Constitution and to uphold federal laws, 7 ' the suppression of riots continues to be
a state responsibility despite the fact that federal laws may in some way become
involved in the riot or its consequences.' 78
In contrast to the states, the federal government does not have the general
power or duty to maintain public order. It is not, however, totally without responsibility in this regard. The constitutional provision that "[t]he United States
shall guarantee to every State... a Republican Form of Government, and shall
protect each of them . . . against domestic Violence"' 79 provided the basis for
an early Supreme Court decision' which held that "[i]f a State cannot protect
itself against domestic violence, the United States may... lend their assistance
for that purpose."''
In addition to this power to assist a state in suppressing
domestic violence, the federal government can act when it is itself the target
of insurrection, or when unlawful obstructions or assemblages hinder the execution of federal laws or threaten federal property.8 2 The constitutional foundation in these instances is the responsibility of the President to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed.'
The statutes that implement these constitutional provisions and thereby form the basis for federal aid in domestic disturbances 8 are discussed below in the context of federal intervention.'85 For
present purposes, it is only necessary to understand that the primary responsibility for riot suppression rests with the state, that the state must plan its riotcontrol operation before any riots break out, and that such planning must
recognize and provide for the delicate problems caused by federalism. The
necessity of this basic degree of preparation has been acknowledged by a special
subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services' 86 which conducted

41 Op. Arr'y GEN. 313, 324 (1963).
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958).
41 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 313, 324 (1963).
179 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
180 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
181 Id. at 556.
182 F. WIENER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAW 43 (1940). For a detailed
historical study of federal military aid, see S. Doc. No. 263, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1922).
183 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
184 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-34 (1964).
185 See notes 229-348 infra and accompanying text.
186 The subcommittee expressed the view that
law enforcement and maintenance of law and order in individual communities
remain the primary responsibility of State and local officials. Therefore, the subcommittee cannot emphasize too strongly its view that State and local law enforcement agencies must review and agree upon acceptable plans for contingencies that
may arise in the event of future local disorders. Included in this preplanning must
be adequate provision for the integration of police and military forces, communications problems, protection of firefighting personnel, handling of prisoners, and a
myriad of other details which are essential if a State is to have a truly effective
contingency plan for meeting local disorders.
176
177
178

State planning for these contingencies must envision the utilization of Federal
support only as a last resort. These plans must nonetheless contemplate the utilization of Federal support in extraordinary contingencies . . . . REPORT ON NATIONAL
GUARD CAPABILITY, supra note 175, at 5663.
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hearings that touched on several areas of civil disturbance' 8
A succinct statement of this need was given at a recent conference of the National District
Attorneys Association:
Riots-mob violence -insurrection - call it what you will, everyone
should be aware of the fact that virtually every community is vulnerable.
Thus although the potential problem is not pressing, it is incumbent on
18
each one of us to at least prepare for the eventuality.2
B. Civilian Law Enforcement Measures
Since local law enforcement agencies constitute the first line of defense
against outbreaks of domestic violence, planning should be initiated at the local
level. In the formulation of a city plan, problems of command are virtually
nonexistent. The mayor is the chief executive; his orders are enforced by the
city police force under the immediate direction of the chief of police. The
chain of command that normally operates in the city continues to prevail in
the riot situation.
The police force is the basic law enforcement agency of any city. This
agency is subjected to strenuous demands when a riot occurs, because it must
provide sufficient force to calm the disorder while still carrying on its ordinary
function of crime prevention throughout parts of the city not struck by violence.
This demand for manpower flexibility requires the implementation of specific
riot procedures carefully tailored to fit the needs and circumstances of the particular city.' 80 Proper utilization of the task force concept,' ° by which a specially
trained and equipped task force of police officers can be moved into a given
area on short notice, would seem to maximize flexibility. This concept has the
added advantage of providing a "continuity and unity of command and the
solidarity which hastily gathered forces lack."''"
The city plan should further attempt to alleviate any anticipated manpower shortage by providing for assistance to the police from other municipal
resources such as the Fire Department, the Public Utilities Department, the
Highway Department, and the Department of Health. However, despite these
and other means of supplying additional manpower,' 2 there are certain physical
limits on every local police department which must be recognized.
187 Hearings Before Special Subcomm. to Inquire into the Capability of the National
Guard to Cope with Civil Disturbances of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 90th Cong.,
lt Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on National Guard Capability].
188 Remarks of Melvin G. Rueger, Greenbrier 'Conference of National District Attorneys
Association, Aug., 1967, printed in Riot Panel, 3 TnHE PROSECUTOR 282, 286 (1967).

189 Conscious of manpower requirements, President Johnson's Riot Commission prepared
model plans, adaptable to varying local needs and circumstances, for police mobilization and
operations, and recommended that the Department of Justice disseminate them to police

throughout the country. RIoT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 485-88.
190 For a discussion of Chicago's implementation of the task force concept, see Wilson,
Civil Disturbances and the Rule of Law, 58 J. CRim. L.C. & P.S. 155, 157 (1967). This
article also contains a definition of the police role and an excellent discussion of police tactics
and techniques in civil disturbances. Id. at 156-58.
191 Id. at 157.
192 Wilson also suggests the possibilities of "requiring men to work into the next watch,
canceling days off, and putting the force on 12-hour shifts." Id.
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Riots can reach proportions that exceed the control capabilities of local
law enforcement agencies. Therefore, it is essential that a city plan beyond
its own limited resources. It can eliminate a great deal of indecision by making
an advance determination of the emergency powers of the governor, the county
sheriff, the state police force, the National Guard, and the federal troops.'9 3
Likewise, the assistance available from other state and county sources should
be ascertained and catalogued during the planning stage. Advance cooperation
agreements should be arranged with law enforcement agents of neighboring
political subdivisions. While these agreements must necessarily remain somewhat flexible, they should be specific at least on the point of assigning tasks to
the personnel of the cooperating agencies. Insofar as it is possible, such "borrowed" personnel should be utilized in the nonviolent areas of the city. They
should assume the routine functions of the local police, such as directing traffic
and manning police lines to isolate the affected area. This peripheral use observes
the important designation of riot-control as a local responsibility by freeing the
local police to participate in the actual suppression of the disturbance. This
procedure also simplifies control by leaving suppression of the riot to police officers
who are familiar with the area and simplifies command by leaving it to commanders and forces who are used to working with each other.
Another possible means of localizing the force employed in a riot to the
greatest extent possible is the use of a posse comitatus. It was early recognized
that a sheriff has the power to summon the entire population of his county to
assist him in keeping the peace.'" Those summoned were bound to participate
under pain of fine and imprisonment. " Although this ancient power has had
only infrequent use in present-day America, its recent attempted revival in Cook
County, Illinois, by Sheriff Joseph Woods9 6 has caused considerable interest
in its vitality as a riot-control measure. 9 ' In Illinois, a sheriff is vested with
the power to summon a posse comitatus "when necessary" to keep the peace.9 8
Stressing his "legal right in the time of emergency to deputize a posse comitatus,"' 9 0 Sheriff Woods' plan to train the posse in advance but not to deputize
it "until 'Detroit-type' trouble occurs"2 ' seems to stretch the statutory requirement of necessity beyond permissible limits. Not surprisingly, the plan has been
ruled illegal as being violative of a number of Illinois constitutional and statu193

Remarks of Melvin G. Rueger, supra note 188, at 287. Although this determination

must be made on an individual state basis, the Riot Commission generally found state police

or highway patrol to be of little practical assistance. In addition to their lack of experience
and training in the control of civil disorders, most state police forces cannot be mobilized
in significant numbers because their primary duty to police the entire state has already diluted
their strength. RIOT COMmISSiON REPoRT, supra note 2, at 496-97.
194 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *343.

195 Id. at *343-44.
196 This plan envisioned a volunteer force of 1,000 men. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1968,
at 26.
197 Law enforcement officials from six counties in six different states have contacted
Woods seeking information about his plan. Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 20, 1968, at 3, col. 3.
198

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 125, § 18 (Smith-Hurd 1967)

199
200

To keep the peace, prevent crime, or to execute any writ, warrant, process,
order or decree, he [sheriff] may call to his aid, when necessary, any person or the
power of the county.
Chicago Sun-Times, Feb. 20, 1968, at 3, col. 1.
Id.

provides:
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tory provisions and Sheriff Woods has been permanently enjoined from recruiting
any persons for use in such a posse.2" 1 In addition, the concept has been widely
20 2
criticized as "unnecessary," "vigilante," and the prelude to a "blood bath."
Another serious drawback is that such a plan would cause difficult problems in
the determination of liability for civil and criminal violations by members of
the deputized posse. The objections and resentment to Sheriff Woods' plan
clearly outweigh its obvious benefit as a ready source of additional manpower.
Therefore, regardless of the usefulness of a pre-trained posse comitatus, the
utilization of recognized state law enforcement agencies, the National Guard
or even federal troops would still seem to be a more desirable solution to the
problem of riot control."0 '
Although assistance from state and local law enforcement agencies can be
separately arranged between political subdivisions, a state-level assistance plan
offers the advantage of insuring assistance to all local areas including those that
have failed to make any prior arrangements. California has led the way in this
area by the implementation of its Mutual Aid Law Enforcement Plan, 0 4 and
many of the other states are either presently formulating state assistance plans of
their own or revising their existing plans. 0 5 Additionally, some conditions may
lend themselves to the adoption of mutual assistance programs between two or
more states. Interstate compacts would seem to be particularly appropriate
where large metropolitan areas extend across state borders. Indeed, analogous
precedent for the execution of such interstate agreements is found in the congressionally approved military aid compact signed by New York, New Jersey,
and Pennsylvania."'
The important objectives of all state and interstate plans are to establish
procedures for requesting assistance and to define authority for granting such
assistance. Although the same specific procedures may not be suitable for every
state, some basic policies would seem to be of universal application.
Control over state resources must be centralized. Authority to dispatch
state assistance should therefore reside in the governor of the state from which
assistance is sought, and all requests by local officials should be made directly
to him. The plan should further provide for the state-wide or interstate coordination of law enforcement operations and planning and for the coordinated
transportation of law enforcement personnel and equipment to local areas in
response to requests for assistance. It should develop and outline a system of
accountability for law enforcement personnel and equipment. A communica201 Id., March 1, 1968, at 2, cols. 1-4. The Illinois State's Attorney's office has indicated
that it does not intend to appeal this order. Id., March 13, 1968, at 10, col. 3.
202

NEwswEEK, supra note 196, at 26.

203 Speaking for the Urban League, Deputy Director Alvin J. Prejean expressed the
feeling that "professional police matters are best left to professional people." Chicago SunTimes, Feb. 16, 1968, at 22, col. 2.
204 See Letter from Major General Glenn C. Ames, Adjutant General of the State of
California, to the House Committee on Armed Services, Sept. 1, 1967, in Hearings on
National Guard Capability, supra note 187, at 6144, 6150.
205 See Letters from Adjutants General of the various states, concerning their ability to
cope with local disorders, to the House Committee on Armed Services, in id., at 6135-255

passim.

206 Act of June 4, 1956, ch. 365, 70 Stat. 247, amending Act of July 1, 1952, ch. 538,

66 Stat. 315.
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tions system should be established for the transmission of pertinent law enforcement information between local, state, and federal officials. Finally, the plan
should resolve the command and control arrangements that will apply upon
the occurrence of the contingency. In this latter regard, it is necessary that
some degree of operational control remain in the local officials because of their
familiarity with the affected area. The exact arrangement will be dependent
upon the structure of the local government and upon the capabilities of the
individual officials involved. Whatever arrangements are finally made, all
participants should have advance knowledge of who is to make what decision
and when, and under whose control and direction forces are to be employed.
A final nonmilitary measure of state law enforcement would be the establishment of a defense force, in addition to, or as a substitute for, the state
National Guard, for use within the jurisdiction of the state."' In view of the
present National Guard strength and availability,"' however, this tool appears
to be of little practical value. When the riot reaches a stage beyond the control
of civilian law enforcement agencies at the state level, the obvious step is to look
to the military for assistance.
C. Martial Law
An analysis of the declaration and effect of martial law will provide a
helpful background against which to consider the use of military force to quell
domestic violence. Such an analysis must necessarily define the framework in
which the term "martial law" is used in this Note, because the term
has been justifiably criticized as obscure. However, its dominance in lay
and legal parlance makes acceptance of any other terminology seem hopeless. The trouble lies in the fact that "martial law" has been employed to
cover the entire spectrum of use of military for civil purposes, from total
subversion of civil government to selling tickets at football games.209 (Citations omitted.)
It will facilitate a grasp of the concept to draw a basic distinction between
"absolute" and "qualified" martial law. Absolute martial law refers to the
replacement of every civil instrumentality by a corresponding military agency. 10
By definition, therefore, civil courts do not function in a state of absolute martial
law; military tribunals function in their stead. Qualified martial law, on the
other hand, exists when military instrumentalities carry on certain governmental
activities, but civil courts continue to operate. 11 One authority has noted that
the "vast distinction" between the two is that absolute martial law
replaces the former civil law whereas military aid [qualified martial law]
207 States are authorized to enact such legislation by the provisions of 32 U.S.C. § 109
(1964).
208 See REPORT ON NATIONAL GUARD CAPABILITY, supra note 175, at 5647-52.
209 Note, Rule by Martial Law in Indiana: The Scope of Executive Power, 31 IND. L.J.
456 n.3 (1956). For an excellent discussion of the various meanings that are attached to
"martial law," see F. WIENER, supra note 182, at 6-15.
210 F. WIENER, supra note 182, at 11.
211

Id. at 12.
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furnishes no body of law whatsoever but merely the force of arms to ensure
that the civil law will remain supreme and not degenerate into military
jurisdiction over offenses
rule. Thus the military forces exercise no legal
212
committed by civilians or over their persons.

Much of the confusion that has typified the treatment of martial law by
the commentators and by the courts seems to result from their failure to observe
this distinction. Decisions and treatises alike have gathered widely differing attributes into the general category of "martial law."2 ' Looking beyond the label,
however, the message is clear and consistent. It is that instances of absolute
martial law will, and should, be rare."-' The reasons for abhorring the imposition of such a state are diverse and compelling. They are an outgrowth of the
attitude of a free society that is historically reluctant to give military tribunals
the authority to try civilians for non-military offenses.n 5 A study of the birth,
development, and growth of our governmental institutions reveals that the
extension of military jurisdiction to try civilians charged with crime is foreign
to our political traditions and our belief in the procedural safeguards of a jury
trial. 6 Such an attitude and tradition has caused the American people to regard
"[t]he substitution of military, for the civil law, in any community ... [as] an
extreme measure. Socially, economically and politically, it is deplorable and
calamitous."21
This is not to say that absolute martial law should never exist in our society.
Necessity remains the basis and the justification for martial law,218 whether
absolute or qualified. In the event of a sufficiently dire necessity, absolute martial
law may be warranted. 21 The determination of necessity is a question of fact;
the exact degree required to justify the imposition of martial law is difficult to
predict. It is clear, however, that the substitution of military tribunals for civil
courts should be the last and most extreme step taken to suppress domestic dis220
turbances and that such a step is not justified as long as the courts are open
212 Farrell, Civil Functions of the Military and Implications of Martial Law, 22 U. K.N.
Crry L. Rxv. 157, 159 (1954).
213 Compare language of Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866):
[Tihere are occasions when martial rule can be properly applied. If, in foreign
invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on the theatre of active military
operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute
for the civil authority . . . ; and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed
to govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free course. (Emphasis
added.)
with language of Note, Riot Control and the Fourth Amendment, 81 H~Av. L. Rnv. 625, 632
(1968): "[S]tatutes provide that the governor may declare any county to be under martial
law, thus effecting a partial suspension of civil government .... ." (Emphasis added.)
214 F. WIENER, supra note 182, at 13.
215 Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 232-33 (1959).
216 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 319-24 (1946).
217 Ex parte Lavinder, 88-W. Va. 713, 716, 108 S.E. 428, 429 (1921).
218 This point is universally conceded by courts and commentators. See, e.g., Duncan v.
Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 335 (1946) (concurring opinion of Chief Justice Stone); Ex
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 126-27 (1866); F. WIENER, supra note 182, at 16; 45
MiH. L. Rxv. 86, 87 (1946).
219 Ex parte Lavinder, 88 W. Va. 713, 719, 108 S.E. 428, 430 (1921).
220 Frederick Wiener elaborates, saying that "'open' and 'closed' must be understood as
referring not to the mere physical condition of the court house but to the execution and
effectiveness of process . . . ..F. WIENER, supra note 182, at 120. Applying this definition,
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and able to operate. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that martial law was never intended to supersede the civilian courts,
but only to assist the government in keeping those courts open.2" Frederick
Bernays Wiener, a leading authority on martial law, has expressed the belief
that no case in the history of the United States has presented a situation of sufficient necessity to warrant the imposition of absolute martial law.2 2' His contention is strongly supported by the Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte
Milligan223 that military commissions set up to try civilians during the Civil
War - certainly this country's hour of most drastic need - were without
jurisdiction."
Speaking for the Milligan Court, Justice Davis used strong
language in rejecting the validity of that attempt to institute absolute martial
law:
It is claimed that martial law covers with its broad mantle the proceedings of this military commission. The proposition is this: that in a
time of war the commander of an armed force (if in his opinion the
exigencies of the country demand it, and of which he is to judge), has the
power, within the lines of his military district, to suspend all civil rights and
their remedies, and subject citizens as well as soldiers to the rule of his will;
and in the exercise of his lawful authority cannot be restrained, except
by his superior officer or the President of the United States.
If this position is sound to the extent claimed, then . . . the commander . . . can, if he chooses, within his limits, on the plea of necessity,

with the approval of the Executive, substitute military force for and to the
exclusion of the laws, and punish all persons, as he thinks right and proper,
without fixed or certain rules.
The statement of this proposition shows its importance; for, if true,
republican government is a failure, and there is an end of liberty regulated
by law. Martial law, established on such a basis, destroys every guarantee
of the Constitution, and effectually renders the "military independent of
and superior to the civil power ..... Civil liberty and this kind of martial
law cannot endure together; the antagonism
is irreconcilable; and, in the
225
conflict, one or the other must perish.

Qualified martial law is far more acceptable to the people because it does
not deprive them of their constitutional rights under civil law. On the contrary,
in its ordinary characterization as the intervention of National Guard or federal
troops to suppress domestic violence, qualified martial law is intended as a means
of protecting constitutional rights by keeping the civil courts open.12
Its use
in this capacity has not been infrequent in recent years,227 a fact that bears
testimony to its effectiveness as a riot-control measure and to its general acceptability within the limits of necessity that demand and justify its imposition.
he goes on to say that trial of civilians by military tribunals would seem to be proper "where
conditions are so thoroughly disturbed that the courts are not only closed but there is no
likelihood of their opening in the immediate future .... " Id.
221 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946).
222 F. WIENER, supra note 182, at 120.
223 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
224 Id.
225 Id. at 124-25.
226 In re McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 476, 143 P. 947, 954 (1914).
227

See REPORT ON
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supra note 175, at 5648-49.
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A governor's power to declare martial law is a local question with each

state.22 In this regard, state constitutional and statutory provisions are in a
state of hopeless confusion. In Indiana, for example, the state attorney general
has stated that the governor's power to declare martial law is implied from
other specific mandates outlined in the state constitution,22 9 namely that the
governor is commander-in-chief of the armed forces.. and, as such, is chargeable
with the execution of state law.2"' Contrary to this position, it has been asserted
that the governor does not have the power to declare martial law in Indiana.2 2
This latter argument views the statutory responsibility for execution of the laws
as giving the governor power to use troops in civil disturbances and requiring
him to use as much force as is necessary to quell the lawlessness, but denies that
3s
it encompasses the "power to suspend civil government."
In some states, statutes specifically bestow upon the governor the power to
declare martial law2 3' and stipulate that this declaration must be made by proclamation.2 3 5 Even under such statutory authorization, general confusion results
from a failure to attribute one definite meaning to the "martial law" label.
Attorneys and government officers cannot expect any general certainty in this
area; they can only try to ascertain the construction given the elusive term by
the courts and legislatures of their particular state.
It is suggested that the rule of necessity provides the only touchstone common
to all states in this realm of martial law. If this rule were accepted as a binding
criterion - and it should be for the sake of uniformity and certainty - state
statutes requiring the formal proclamation of martial law would not be necessary. 3 6 Under the rule of necessity, "martial law proclaims itself."2 37 The
proclamation is unnecessary where there is necessity, and useless where there is
none.
Whether his power is by implication, by specific statutory provision, or
by basic rule of necessity, the governor is the person responsible for the institution
of martial law at the state level. The amount of legal significance to be accorded
to his declaration has long been the subject of controversy. A series of Supreme
Court cases23 ' had established and upheld the "doctrine of conclusiveness" as
to the use of the military by a governor in quelling civil disorders. In disallowing
judicial review of the governor's actions, this doctrine proved to be particularly
228 Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 395-96 (1932).
229 1967 INn. ATr'y GEN. Op. No. 66, § III, at 8.
230 IND. CoNsT. art. 5, § 12, provides: "The Governor shall be commander-in-chief of
the military and naval forces, and may call out such forces, to execute the laws, or to suppress insurrection, or to repel invasion."
231 IND. CONST. art. 5, § 16, provides: "He [the Governor] shall take care that the laws
be faithfully executed."
232 Note, supra note 209, at 473.
233 Id.
234 E.g., N.J. REv. STAT. § 38A:2-3 (Supp. 1967) provides:
Whenever the militia, or any part thereof, is employed in aid of civil authority,
the Governor, if in his judgment the maintenance of law and order will thereby
be promoted, may by proclamation, declare any county or municipality, or part
thereof, in which the troops are serving to be subject to martial law.

235

Id.

236 F. WIENNR, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAW 19-20 (1940).
237 Id. at 20.
238 Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S.
(1849); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
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obnoxious to American beliefs in a republican form of government and undoubtedly caused added invective to be written into the Court's opinion in
Ex parte Milligan."9
The doctrine of conclusiveness first appeared in 1827 in the Supreme Court
decision of Martin v. Mott."' In that case conclusive legal effect was accorded
the exclusive discretion of the President to call out the militia in cases of actual
invasion or the imminent danger of invasion.24' Twenty-two years later, the
Court extended the doctrine to state officials in the celebrated case of Luther
v. Borden.4 ' In Luther a group acting under the leadership of a man named
Dorr set itself up under a claim of rightful authority in competition with the
established government of Rhode Island. A series of arrests, including the arrest
of one of the rebels in his own home, followed the declaration of martial law
by the older government. In this resulting action in trespass, the Court avoided
a decision as to which government was lawfully in power on the ground that,
as a political question, it was not proper for judicial review.243 The Court did
say, however, that a state could
unquestionably . . . use its military power to put down an armed insurrection, too strong to be controlled by the civil authority. The power is
essential to the existence of every government, essential to the preservation
of order and free institutions, and is as necessary to the States of this Union
as to any other government. The State itself must determine what degree
of force the crisis demands. And if the government of Rhode Island
deemed the armed opposition so formidable, and so ramified throughout
the State, as to require the use of its military force and the declaration of
martial law, we see no ground upon which this court can question its
authority.2 "
In Moyer v. Peabody24 the Court, in language that "went altogether too
far,"
upheld the conclusiveness of a governor's declaration that an insurrection existed.2 47 It chose to test the governor's liability for the arrests made as a
precaution against domestic violence by inquiring into his good faith in ordering
the arrests rather than by examining their reasonableness. Applying this test of
"good faith," Justice Holmes announced for the Court that "[p]ublic danger
warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process"248 and denied
the lower court jurisdiction. 4 9
The dangerous precedent established by Moyer gave unbridled license to
state executives to use the military as a means of accomplishing their own designs.
As was predictable in light of the weakness of human nature, the governors
24

239

240

See quotation set out in text accompanying note 225 supra.

25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 29-32 (1827).

241 Id. at 29. In now famous dicta, the Court stated that this power "is to be exercised
upon sudden emergencies, upon great occasions of state, and under circumstances which
may be vital to the existence of the Union." Id. at 30.
242 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
243 Id. at 47.
244 Id. at 45.

245

212 U.S. 78 (1909).

246
247
248
249

F. WI-NE, supra note 236, at 109.
Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 83 (1909).
Id. at 85.
Id. at 86.
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patently abused this privilege. Indeed, before the trend was checked, the "overexuberant rhetoric" employed by Holmes in Moyer was "relied upon to justify
what may with moderation be called some of the most curious pages in American
jurisprudence."25
The controversy was finally put to rest in Sterling v. Constantin."' In
that case, the governor declared martial law in certain Texas counties in which
the plaintiffs had oil interests. By making this dedaration and directing the
National Guard to assume supreme command over the area, he attempted to
reduce the depletion of oil reserves by the plaintiffs. Acknowledging a governor's
discretion to determine the existence of an exigency requiring military aid, the
Court nevertheless held that the reasonableness of his determination is a proper
matter for judicial review.252 The decision incorporated, to an extent, the "good
faith" test of Moyer by allowing a governor a "permitted range of honest
judgment!' as necessary to the timely exercise of his duty to maintain peace. 5 s
The real significance of the case, however, derives from its recognition that this
discretion cannot be unlimited. The decision reversed the snowballing doctrine
of conclusiveness by declaring that "the allowable limits of military discretion,
and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial
questions."2" 4
In upholding the propriety of reviewing a governor's exercise of discretion,
Sterling and later cases that reaffirmed it2 5 recognized that the rights guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution must be protected against unchecked gubernatorial
actions that were possible under the conclusiveness doctrine. These cases complemented the "good faith" test of legality enunciated in Moyer with a "direct
relation" test.25 6 The latter test requires a balancing of the purpose of the action

and the reasonableness of the means employed against the gravity of the resulting
invasion of individual rights. Because martial law is so drastic and oppressive a
measure, the cases require
a high degree of necessity to carry the balance in
57
favor of its justification.
The Sterling decision also makes actions taken by a military commander
pursuant to a declaration of martial law subject to judicial review. Such actions
no longer remain lawful simply because martial law was properly declared. The
criterion for legality, as always, is necessity; it is framed in the context of
"whether or not the particular act in question was required by the public
safety."25 In the suppression of civil disorders, only reasonable force can be used
and military commanders are liable for excesses.25 9
The application of the reasonableness test presents a danger of confusion
F. WIENER, supra note 236, at 110.
251 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
252 Id. at 400-01.
253 Id. at 399.
254 Id. at 401.
255 For a citation and discussion of cases reaffirming Sterling, see 41 OP,. ArT'Y GEN. 313,
320 n.2 (1963).
256 Note, supra note 213, at 634.
257 Note, supra note 209, at 472.
258 Anthony, Hawaiian Martial Law in the Supreme Court, 57 YALE L.J. 27, 54 (1947).
259 Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 173, 55 A. 952, 955
250

(1903).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Symposium, 1968]

spawned by another misuse of labels.26 Courts have carelessly referred to
martial law situations interchangeably as "war" or "insurrection" despite the
fact that the two concepts are clearly distinct, and differing degrees of authority
26
are allowed to a military commander under each. ' "Insurrection" is not "war,"
and costly pitfalls may await the military officer who equates the two. The
safest course for military personnel employed in aid of civil authority is to
recognize the limitations on their power. According to Wiener, any attempt
to justify the use of war powers in an insurrection would never stand the test
of review in the Supreme Court. 6' On the other hand, although it is persuasively
argued that the word "insurrection" itself is not technically accurate'' as a
description of the circumstances justifying the use of the military,2 " this seeming
error in terminology has been largely ignored as a practical matter. In determining the lawfulness of the military force used to quell a domestic disturbance, courts are not troubled by whether or not the disturbance was literally
an insurrection. If sufficient necessity is present, military force will be upheld.
This discussion of martial law has attempted to show that the subject is
fraught with misunderstanding. In summary, it may be said that a few definite
principles stand out. Marital law is justified by necessity. Necessity confines it
in area and limits it in duration. Necessity, therefore, provides the measure by
which the courts determine the lawfulness of a governor's declaration of martial
law and its subsequent implementation by the military. In its absolute form,
martial law is a most extreme measure because it suspends civil courts in favor
of military tribunals. As such, it is warranted only in a most extreme necessity;
indeed, the requisite degree of necessity arguably has not been experienced in
the history of this country. A qualified form of martial law, however, which
consists in the supplanting of some governmental agencies by military counterparts, does have substantial precedent and can be prudently utlized by state
governors in times of civil disorder. It is in this latter context that subsequent
references to "martial law" should be understood.
D. The National Guard
"There is no substitute for force in quelling civil disturbances, and if the

police are unable to provide the manpower to restore normalcy, then there
is no alternative but to put in a call for the National
Guard 2 65
quickly as possible." This is my view in a nutshell.
260

and as

The confusion originates in dicta used by the Supreme Court in Luther. In finding

that Rhode Island rightfully used military power to "put down an armed insurrection," the
Court said: "It was a state of war; and the established government resorted to the rights
and usages of war to maintain itself, and to overcome the unlawful opposition."

Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 45 (1849)
261

Luther v.

(emphasis added).

For a general discussion of the differences between war and insurrection, see F.
236, at 28-35.

WIENER, supra note

262

Id. at 78.

263 Wiener contends that the Civil War, the Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island, and the
Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania present the only instances of actual insurrection in this

country's history. Id. at 30.
264 State prescriptions for the utilization of military force against civil disorder usually
allow it, inter alia, "to suppress insurrection." E.g., IND. CONST. art. 5, § 12, set out in note
230 supra.
265 Wilson, Civil Disturbances and the Rule of Law, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 155, 157
(1967).
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This tribute to the National Guard by Orlando Wilson, one of the country's
leading criminologists, suggests that state and local authorities would be wise
to familiarize themselves with the capabilities of their state militia and the procedures by which they can summon its assistance.
The National Guard is the modem descendant of the original militia
reserved to the states by the Constitution."'s Although it is federally equipped
and its members are federally compensated, the National Guard is a state
force subject to the control of the governor in accordance with state law and
is ordinarily administered by the state adjutant general.26 Its officers are officers
of the state and not of the United States.26 The Constitution makes no provision
for a state to use its own militia, but it has been made clear that a state may do
so for the purpose of suppressing riots:
While a State has no right to establish and maintain a permanent
military government, it is not to be inferred that it has no power over the
militia resident within its borders. Unquestionably a State may use its
military power to put down an armed insurrection too strong to be controlled by the civil authorities. The power is essential to the existence of
every government . . . and
269 is as necessary to the States of this Union as
to any other government.
The use of the National Guard as an emergency force available to a state
governor for the maintenance of law and order is not without restriction. Indeed, state use has been partially preempted by federal statutory provisions that
"2
permit federalization of the National Guard in the interests of national security
O
1
or to suppress insurrections." During the periods when Guard units are federalized, they are subject to control solely by the federal government and their
members are governed by federal law. 2 They revert to state status under the
authority of their governor only upon their discharge from active federal
service. 272
Additional encroachment upon the historical use of the National Guard
as a state resource seems to have occurred through recent legislation that shapes
the force structure of the National Guard and other reserve components pri266 Maryland ex rel. Levin v. United States, 381 U.S. 41, 46, vacated on other grounds,
382 U.S. 159 (1965).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, provides in part:
The Congress shall have Power ...
To" provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of this Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States,
reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers and the
Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

267 Maryland ex rel. Levin v. United States, 381 U.S. 41, 47, vacated on other grounds,

382 U.S. 159 (1965).
268 United States ex rel. Gilett v. Dern, 74 F.2d 485, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1934).

269

270
271
272
Gillett

S. Doc. No. 263, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., 219 n.a (1922).

32 U.S.C. § 102 (1964).
10 U.S.C. §§ 331-33 (19641.
Cf. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
v. Dern, 74 F.2d 485, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1934).

273 Id.

1, 16 (1820); United States ex rel.
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marily according to federal requirements.2 "' However, a special subcommittee
appointment by the House Committee on Armed Services believes that "appropriate recognition and support of State mission requirements is completely compatible with the concept of establishing the National Guard force structure based
initially upon only Federal mission requirements." ' 5 The subcommittee's view
indicates that the Guard will be as available to the state as it has traditionally
been; apparently, only the presumption as to its first duty has changed.
The capability of the National Guard as a riot control force appears to
be more than adequate in terms of personnel strength. This factor is borne out
by experience. A study of state use of the National Guard between 1957 and
1967 revealed that, on the average, only nine percent of the available force
was deployed for the purpose of suppressing a local disorder.2" 6 More significant,
perhaps, is the fact that only twice during that period were more than fifty
percent of the state troops employed.27 In addition, the states themselves generally believe that their respective National Guard forces are sufficient to handle
local problems. 7 '
Thus, there seems to be no need for any increase in the existing strengths
of the various National Guard units," 9 despite the fact that any given riot might
conceivably exceed the presently existing capability margins. The excess requirements could be easily handled by assisting forces from neighboring states
pursuant to interstate mutual aid compacts,28 or by calling in federal troops.
It would be unrealistic and unnecessary to try to achieve a situation in which
each state could handle every possible contingency that might arise, especially
since the same end can be simply and less expensively accomplished by cooperation and joint planning with neighboring states.
The National Guard's capability to control civil disturbances reaches beyond
mere manpower considerations. The special subcommittee found, on the basis
of a study made of thirty-eight representative cities, that an average of fifty-nine
percent of the states' strength is located within a hundred mile radius of metropolitan areas.281 This proximity of the bulk of National Guard strength to the
probable centers of disorder indicates that the state forces are in a good position
to respond rapidly to local urban problems. In fact, the National Guard can
generally be committed in significant force within four to six hours after the
274 REPORT ON NATIONAL GUARD CAPABILITY, supra note 175, at 5646.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 5649. For a table depicting the use of Army National Guard by states in civil
disturbances from 1957-1967, see id. at 5648-49.
277 The two instances were the 1965 Watts riot when sixty-two percent of the California
strength was used and the 1967 Detroit summer when eighty-five percent of the Guard
strength was utilized. In the latter situation, however, twenty to twenty-five percent of the
forces sent to the city were never committed. It is further significant to note in this regard
that in the recent riots in Newark and Milwaukee, only thirty-one and forty-three percent
of the available state force were used respectively. Id. at 5649.
278 Id. at 5650.
279 The internal composition of the National Guard, however, could be profitably changed
by immediately increasing the number of Negro Guardsmen. The Riot Commission found
that one significant factor that contributed to the superior effectiveness of the army troops in
Detroit vis-A-vis the National Guard was that the former had a proportionately greater number
of Negroes. RIOT ComIIssIoN REPORT, supra note 2, at 499.
280 Congressional acts approving an existing agreement of this sort between New York,
New Jersey and Pennsylvania are cited at note 206 supra.
281 REPORT ON NATIONAL GUARD CAPABiLiTY, supra note 175, at 5651.
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time it is alerted.2 2 Furthermore, the response will be increasingly effective with
each passing month as a result of nationwide implementation of an intensified
training program for Guard personnel in civil disturbance and riot-control
techniques." 3
In light of the Guard's mission in instances of civil disorder, there must be
prior planning for the call-up and use of the National Guard. It was dramatically
illustrated in Watts that "the goal of the military is to complement rather than
replace civil authority"2' ' and that the military is to assist in maintaining law
and order, but is not to "take over" as a means to accomplishing that end.
The riot-control plan must necessarily stipulate procedures whereby local
authorities can initiate a call for National Guard assistance. Accordingly, the
plan should vest certain local officials with authority to directly request such
assistance, and should designate the governor, or another individual in his
absence, as the proper authority to grant the request. A general policy decision
should be made and implemented in the plan to assist the governor in the
exercise of his discretion in employing the state force. It is obvious that the
National Guard, as an organized and trained riot-control unit, should be committed to assist at the scene of the riot only when the uprising increases beyond
the control of local law enforcement agencies. Within this very general guideline,
however, the governor should understand that the containment of civil disorders
of the type that have recently rocked major cities throughout this country is
utterly dependent on the judicious early commitment of adequate National
Guard forces.28
Also in this regard, the plans should provide phases of preparation for the
Guard so that the amount of the time lapse before its readiness for commitment
will be minimized. There must necessarily be an alert phase in which the Guard
is first notified to proceed toward a state of readiness. There may then be subsequent intermediate phases, each indicative of a higher stage of preparation than
the prior one. Finally, there must be the commitment phase, which involves the
actual engagement in riot-control activities. The decision on this final phase
is subject only to the discretion of the governor or other appropriate official. To
assure that Guardsmen will be available upon, and protected by, the governor's
call, it should be made a legal requirement of each state that an employer grant
a leave of absence to a Guardsman called to active duty because of a civil disturbance. Moreover, the states should require that the Guardsman's rights as
an employee not be jeopardized in any way.28
282 Id. at 5652.
283 Id. at 5655. For a discussion of the requirements for and reaction to this new training
program, see id. at 5655-57.
284 Hearings on National Guard Capability, supra note 187, at 5982.

Perhaps the most important lesson [of the Watts riot] for military and civil authorities alike is that troops can actually be committed in such [large] numbers, during a
disturbance of this nature, with local law enforcement agencies remaining in full
control of the situation. Id.
285 This view was strongly expressed by the subcommittee and every knowledgeable witness that appeared before it. REPORT ON NATIONAL GuARD CAPABILITY, SUpra note 175, at
5652.
286

Cf. IND. ANN. STAT. § 59-1022 (1961) which provides:
Any person who, as a reserve member of the armed forces of the United
States, is called upon to receive temporary military training, shall be entitled to a
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Separate support plans should be drawn up by the National Guard under
the direction of the state adjutant general. These support plans should allocate
responsibility among the different Guard units for the support of every locality
within the state. At that point, each Guard unit should prepare its own plans
based on the plans of the city or area that it supports. These plans must remain
flexible so that Guard units can be moved with facility to other support areas,
as needed.
This prior planning should include the actual utilization of National Guard
troops once they have been committed to a riot situation. Since the military
mission is one of cooperation to insure execution of the law, the military must
operate within strict legal limits." 7 In this regard, the troops should be employed only in the immediate vicinity of the riot area, or in those areas that
serve as potential targets for the rioters. Their purpose is to aid in quelling the
disorder; it is not to police the entire city.
The uncertainty as to the exact relationship between the military commander
and state law enforcement personnel during last summer's rioting in Detroit 28
dictates the necessity of solving the problem of command in advance. If the
National Guard is federalized, it is subject to control by federal military superiors,,
and command is no longer a state responsibility. When acting as a state force,
however, the Guard or any part thereof may be placed under the direction of
any state or local officer designated by the governor for that purpose. 289 As a
general rule, command over the Guard unit should be placed in the hands
of local civilian leaders because their familiarity with local conditions best suits
them for the job.
A related problem arises when the National Guard and federal troops are
simultaneously called to the scene of a riot. In such a situation, the two military
forces act independently. 290 Neither force has authority to order the other, although they cooperate as a matter of comity and in the common interest of
rapidly and efficiently suppressing the disorder. They will observe each other's
rank in a superior-subordinate relationship only if and when the Guard is
federalized.
temporary leave of absence from his employer, not to exceed fifteen [15J days in
any one [1] calendar year: . . . . Upon his return, such person shall be restored to
his previous, or similar position, with the same status as he held before leaving
for his training period. Such leaves may be granted with or without pay in the
discretion of the employer.
Any temporary leave of absence so granted shall not affect the rights of the
person to vacation leave, sick leave, or other normal benefits of his employment.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 59-1023 (1961) provides:
Any employer who refuses to grant an employee a temporary leave of absence,
as provided in section 1 [§ 59-1022] of this act, shall be subject to a suit in damages for any damages sustained by the person denied such leave of absence.
While these statutes obviously differ from those proposed in the text both in purpose
and in the extent of protection for the Guardsman, they nevertheless suggest a direction for
the statutory enactment of pertinent requirements and sanctions.
287 Note, Rule by Martial Law in Indiana: The Scope of Executive Power, 31 IND. L.J.
456, 469 (1956).
288 REPORT ON NATIONAL GUARD CAPABILITY, supra note 175, at 5663.
289 Although the Riot Commission made no recommendation in this regard, it did emphasize that any plan of overall command must insure the utilization of National Guard units as
units, each of which remains under the immediate command of a National Guard officer.
RIOT CoMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 2, at 518-19.
290 F. WIENER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAW 53-54 (1940).
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Almost of equal importance with the early commitment of the National
Guard is its rapid withdrawal from the area once the riot has been effectively
subdued. Request for removal of the Guard should be directed to the governor
pursuant to a decision by local authorities, who act on the advice of the
military commanders. The withdrawal may be staggered, but its rapidity is
essential to easing tension in the area. Despite the immediate need for military
force as a police auxiliary when rioting occurs, the value of its assistance is soon
forgotten by the average citizen, and a continued military presence is upsetting
and unwanted after order has been restored. It would appear advisable, however, to maintain the National Guard at an intermediate phase of readiness
at a staging area not too distant from the recently disturbed city until the riot
fever has had sufficient opportunity to cool. This provides a reserve force readily
available to help suppress any further outbreaks that might occur.
Finally, the problems of liability that might arise from the commitment of
the National Guard to suppress civil disorder must be reviewed and resolved in
advance. A determination must be made as to the civil and criminal liability
of the individual Guardsman under state law. This determination should reflect
a policy consideration that the Guardsman, while performing his military duty,
should be protected to the greatest possible extent within reasonable limits.
Indeed,
[t]o deny this privilege is to create a state of apprehension about fulfilling
and carrying out the orders of superiors in time of riot which will necessarily
inhibit the guardsman's effectiveness. We should not ask a guardsman
291
to protect the state if the state is unwilling to protect the guardsman.
A state can and should protect its Guardsmen, first of all, by enacting
legislation that requires the state to provide legal counsel for a Guardsman who
is sued for his actions while on active state duty. Nevada statutes typify what
is needed in this regard,2 92 and other states have adopted similar legislation.29
The obvious inequities of requiring a Guardsman to act in the state interest,
while subjecting him to the concomitant threat of a possible civil or criminal suit
at his own expense, would seem to obligate all states to provide such statutory
relief.
Although many states further protect their Guardsmen by granting them
statutory immunity from criminal liability for activities done in the line of their
291
292

1967 IND. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. 66, § VI, at 18.
Nav. Rnv. STAT. § 412.740 (1963) provides in part:

2. When a suit or proceeding shall be commenced in any court by any person
against any officer of the militia for any act done by such officer in his official
capacity in the discharge of any duty under this chapter, or against any soldier
acting under the authority or order of any such officer, or by virtue of any warrant
issued by him pursuant to law, the attorney general shall defend such officer or
soldier.
3. Where the action or proceeding is criminal the adjutant general shall designate the judge advocate general or one of the judge advocates to defend such
officer or person.
293 E.g., CAL. Mn.. & VET. CODE § 393 (West Supp. 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 129,
§ 220.90 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967).
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military duty,29 such a degree of protection seems to go beyond the balance that
must be struck. Placed in the hands of some Guardsmen, immunity from criminal
liability can amount to license for committing otherwise illegal acts. If granted
to Guardsmen, who despite their training in riot-control are not professional
soldiers, it can have the dangerous effect of supplying approval to their
natural reaction in the tension of a riot situation to counter any opposition with
excessive or even deadly force. Rather, actions by the Guardsmen should be
subject to review by the courts for a determination of liability based on the common-law tort notion of "reasonableness under the circumstances." Furthermore,
immunity is not a proper solution to those who accept the seemingly better view
that the use of military force against domestic disturbances amounts to the undeclared institution of a state of qualified martial law. 295 Consistent with basic
martial law principles, use of the military to assist the civil authorities is reviewable29 and can be justified only by necessity.297 When the force applied exceeds
the necessity, it becomes unreasonable; military personnel are not allowed to
escape liability for such excesses. 99
E. Federal Intervention
Although the suppression of domestic violence is primarily a responsibility of
the individual states, the federal government is also constitutionally responsible
in this regard. 99 This federal obligation is implemented by a series of statutes
that prescribe the circumstances under which federal forces may be used to
control riots,"' and by a separate statute that imposes limitations on the use
of federal forces. 0 1
1. The Request Statute
If the dimensions of an urban riot expand beyond the state's capability to
control, the state can request federal assistance under section 331 of title 10 of
the United States Code. 2 Whether or not federal assistance will be granted upon
294
E.g., CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 392 (West 1955); Nav. RBv. STAT. § 412.740(1)
(1963); N.Y. MIL. LAw § 235 (McKinney 1953).
295 See the general discussion under "Martial Law" in text accompanying notes 209-264
supra.
296 Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
297 See note 218 supra and accompanying text.
298 Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 173, 55 A. 952, 955 (1903).
299 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 provides:
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot
be convened) against domestic Violence.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 provides in pertinent part: "[Hie [the President] shall take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed ...
"
300 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-34 (1964).
301 Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1964) provides:
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the
Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air
Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
302 10 U.S.C. § 331 (1964) provides:
Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against its government, the
President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor if the legisla-
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receipt0 ° of a proper state application rests within the sole discretion of the Presi3
dent
An issue that arises in connection with the use of federal troops under this
statute is that their use is authorized against "insurrection," whereas the constitutional basis for the statute uses the broader language of "domestic violence." 3 '
Although one commentator finds this is to be the basic issue,' °s it presents little
practical difficulty. As a matter of precedent, any combination of words used
to indicate widespread violence and disorder has generally been regarded by
Presidents as sufficient for the dispatch of troops.""6 This problem of semantics
was further lessened in late 1967 when Attorney General Ramsey Clark wrote a
letter to state governors advising them of the "legal requirements for the use of
federal troops in case of severe domestic violence .... ,sot (Emphasis added.) The
practical result is that, as with martial law statutes,0 8 "insurrection" is a label

and not a literal prerequisite for the implementation of the statute.
The procedure whereby federal troops are sent to assist in putting down a
riot under section 331 can be reduced to four distinct steps. For a full understanding of the workings of section 331, it will be helpful to consider the prerequisites and legal requirements that attach to each of them.
a. Application by the State
The state should apply for federal aid only when it is experiencing a condition of severe domestic violence that "cannot be brought under control by the
law enforcement resources available to the Governor, including local and State
police forces and the National Guard." ' 9 This prerequisite reflects the basic
concept that riot control is primarily the responsibility of the state, and if the
prerequisite is not satisfied before application is made the President will not
be favorably inclined to honor the request.
The application must be made by the legislature of the state or by the
governor in the event that the legislature "cannot be convened." ' 0 As a practical
matter, the overwhelming difficulties of convening the legislature while a riot
is in progress eliminate the former alternative, and the duty to make the request
thus falls upon the governor by default. Current federal guidelines indicate that
the gubernatorial request will ordinarily suffice. 1
The request from either the legislature or the governor should be in writing
and should set out the details that provide its justification. This requirement
of writing is not an absolute essential, because the President will entertain an
ture cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the other
States, in the number requested by that State, and use such of the armed forces,
as he considers necessary to suppress the insurrection.
303 Letter from Attorney General Ramsey Clark to the governors of the separate states,
Aug. 7, 1967, in REPORT ON NATIONAL GUARD CA"ABiLrry, supra note 175, at 5669, 5670.

304 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. See note 299 supra for the language of this section.
305 Poe, The Use of Federal Troops to Suppress Domestic Violence, 54 A.B.A.J. 168,
169-70 (1968).
306 Note, Riot Control and the Use of Federal Troops, 81 HARv. L. REv. 638, 644-45
(1968).
307 Letter from Attorney General Ramsey Clark, supra note 303, at 5669.
308 See text accompanying notes 260-4 supra.
309 Letter from Attorney General Ramsey Clark, supra note 303, at 5669.
310 10 U.S.C. § 331 (1964).
311 Letter from Attorney General Ramiey Clark, supra note 303, at 5669.
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oral request in the event of extreme emergency. 12 If the application is made
orally, however, a written communication to the President should follow immediately to furnish him support for the issuance of his proclamation pursuant
to federal law. s" s While this final formal request should be addressed to the President, the state should direct all preliminary communications to the Attorney
General. 14 Observance of this procedure will relieve the President of detailed
and unnecessary burdens, but will nevertheless keep the federal government informed of current developments so that it can save valuable time by taking
such preliminary steps as placing troops on alert.
Another requirement is that the language used in the request be unconditional. This will preclude a presidential decision not to send troops on the ground
that the application is inadequate, as has been the case on the few occasions
when the requesting governor used language that was less than unequivocal. 1 5
The justification for this requirement is not altogether clear, but it seems to be
an extension of the policy that underlies the basic statutory requirement of a
formal request. It recognizes, first of all, the advantages of providing local
solutions to local problems. Further, the probability of cooperation between
federal troops and state authorities is increased if the former operate in the riot
area at the positive request of the latter. But the most important justification
seems to be a political one - "a desire to have the governor on record as unthe nature
deniably calling for federal aid so that he can not later recharacterize
316
of his request and criticize the President for sending troops."
b. Exercise of PresidentialDiscretion
Following the President's receipt of a state request, he must deliberate as
to whether the request merits federal intervention. A preliminary consideration
revolves around both the form and substance of the request received. It has
already been suggested that political considerations might cause the President
to deny a conditional request or a mere recommendation that he send assistance.
He must also evaluate the validity of the state's assertion that it is unable to
control the riot, and he must do so with an awareness that
[b]oth the Constitution and statute [section 331] recognize it to be the right
and duty of the State to preserve its own order. The State's duty to itself
as well as its duty to the United States requires that application be made
for Federal assistance only when the strength of the State is exhausted or is
inadequate.... The growing strength of the National Guard in each of
the States warrants the belief that occasions for the employment of Federal
against a State will be less frequent in the
power to suppress insurrection
3 17
future than in the past.

312 Id. at 5670.
313 10 U.S.C. § 334 (1964) provides: "Whenever the President considers it necessary to
use the militia or the armed forces under this chapter, he shall, by proclamation, immediately
order the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes within a limited time."
314 Letter from Attorney General Ramsey Clark, supra note 303, at 5670.
315 Note, supra note 306, at 641. For a comparison between language used in state requests
that have been granted and state requests that have been denied for inadequacy, see id. at
641 n.31.
316 Id. at 641.
317 S. Doc. No. 263, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., 318 (1922).
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The requirement that a state be unable to control a riot despite the utilization
of all of its force is a prerequisite to an affirmative decision to send federal troops.
Its purpose
is to limit the number of occasions for federal intervention upon the assumption that the unnecessary commitment of federal troops would discourage the states from using their own peace-keeping forces. The requirement also reflects a general distaste for using the army as a police force. 3 s
Once the President has verified the state's claim of inability to control the
riot, he must consider such factors as the size of the force required, when it
should be sent, and whether to federalize the National Guard instead of, or in
addition to, sending federal troops. 9
c. Issuance of Proclamation
The above steps constitute procedural and substantive requirements that
must be met before federal troops can be dispatched pursuant to section 331.
Once the President has made an affirmative decision in regard to a state's
request for federal assistance, he must issue a proclamation as required by
section 334 of title 10 of the United States Code 20 This proclamation is clearly
distinguished from a proclamation of martial law, and its issuance must not
be considered an imposition or justification of martial law measures. Although
a requirement of law, this proclamation is void of legal effect; it is required as
a means of giving notice of the dispatch of federal troops to the scene, and of
emphasizing the seriousness of the situation. 2 ' Hopefully, as a final warning
to the unlawful elements, it may help to successfully avoid the necessity of using
federal troops.
d. PresidentialDispatch of Troops
Finally, the President causes formal instructions to be given to the commander of the Army troops or federalized National Guard units that he has
selected to commit to the riot in response to the request. These instructions
should provide guidance for the conduct and command of the troops at the
scene of the riot.
The problems of control in such a situation are particularly difficult and
delicate. Federal troops are an integral part of the military organization of the
United States and, as such, are responsible to the President as their Commanderin-Chief. It would seem, therefore, that the President should retain control of
the federal troops in the hands of their own military superiors, despite the fact
that local control undeniably offers the unique advantage of familiarity with
the riot area. First of all, federal control would seem to be dictated by the
fact that the state failed in its attempt to successfully contain the riot and thus
necessitated the presence of the federal troops in the first place. Because the
troops of the United States have been sent in a discretionary response to the
318
319
320

Note, supra note 306, at 645-46.
Letter from Attorney General Ramsey Clark, supra note 303, at 5670.
10 U.S.C. § 334 (1964). See note 313 supra for the language of this section.

321

F. WIENER, supra note 290, at 50-51.
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state's request, the state can really neither demand nor expect to control them.
Furthermore, armed forces personnel and federal officers are presently without
the protection of federal law, since current federal statutes do not prescribe
criminal sanctions against rioters. 22 It seems, therefore, that the federal government is under a non-delegable duty to control them. Since it offers no
statutory protection for its personnel, it should afford them the only remaining
protection that it can-the exercise of proper and responsible command. A
separate argument for the federal retention of control over federal troops is
grounded in a desire to save the President the political embarrassment of being
able to approve the requests for federal troops from only those governors to
whom he feels he can safely entrust command of the federal troops. 2 ' This
federal command would also prevent the possible misuse of federal troops by
a partisan governor."2 4 Although close cooperation between federal and state
agencies must characterize the operation, the balance of the competing considerations clearly favors the retention of federal control over the federal forces.
2. The Non-Request Statutes
The federal government has an important interest of its own in the preservation of its property and the execution of its laws and cannot be totally dependent on the will of state governors to protect those interests. The Supreme Court
has recognized that the national government has a constitutional power and
responsibility to compel obedience to law and order:
We hold it to be an incontrovertible principle, that the government
of the United States may, by means of physical force, exercised through its
official agents, execute on every foot of American soil the power and functions that belong to it. This necessarily involves the power to command
obedience
to its laws, and hence the power to keep the peace to that
25
extent.
In addition to this judicially recognized constitutional power, Congress has
granted the President specific statutory power to deal, on a non-request basis,
with civil disorder occurring within a state. The relevant statutes are sections
33226 and 33327 of title 10 of the United States Code.
322 REPORT ON NATIONAL GUARD CAPABILITY, supra note 175, at 5665. This is a deplorable situation, and the subcommittee strongly recommends the enactment of legislation
enabling the federal government to criminally prosecute rioters for assaulting federal personnel who are acting in an official capacity to quell the disorder. Id.
323 Note, supra note 306, at 642.
324 Id. For a capsule discussion of the misuse of federal troops by the Idaho Governor
during the Coeur d'Alene mining dispute of 1899 and the subsequent effects of that misuse,
see id. at 642 n.33.
325 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 395 (1880).
326 10 U.S.C. § 332 (1964) provides:
Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or
assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State or Territory by
the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such
of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.
327 10 U.S.C. § 333 (1964) provides:
The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any
other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a
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No state application for the use of federal troops is necessary for the operation of these statutes. Once the President decides that the execution of federal
laws or the protection of constitutional guarantees is being hindered or obstructed, his duty to "take care that the Laws be faithfully executed" '28 authorizes
him to dispatch federal troops to enforce those laws and guarantees, and he
may do so even over protest by the state. 29 Upon an affirmative decision to
act under either of the non-request statutes, the President is required to issue
a proclamation pursuant to section 334.S30
Section 332 and the second clause of section 333 clearly authorize the use
of federal troops in a situation where domestic violence is interfering with the
enforcement of a court order. The obvious illustrations of such an instance were
the school desegregation cases in Little Rock, Arkansas, and Oxford, Mississippi,
where federal troops were sent by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, respectively, to subdue any possible mob violence that might prevent the execution
of federal court injunctions ordering integration. These instances point out the
necessity for non-request statutes, because the court orders sought to be enforced
were directed against the governors themselves.
The use of federal troops under these statutory provisions can conceivably
be extended to situations other than the enforcement of court orders, 3 ' but such
an extension is beset with doubts and difficulties. 32 Because of these difficulties
and because the first clause of section 333 seems a more promising justification
for the presidential exercise of discretion under a non-request statute, sections
332 and 333(2) should generally be limited to use as a means of guaranteeing
the enforcement of federal court orders.
Section 333 (1), on the other hand, is a broad discretionary provision that
may be employed by the President when the state is deemed to have denied
the equal protection of the laws, and the federal objective is to accord that
protection. As such, this provision is readily adaptable to situations where
rioting is racially motivated. Specifically, the President can dispatch troops
under this section to
any State in which a civil disturbance not only impedes the administration
of Federal and State laws but also has the effect, as a consequence of a

329

State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if
it(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United
States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a
right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured
by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fai or refuse
to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or
(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States
or impedes the course of justice under those laws.
In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied
the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
REPoRT oN NATIONAL GuAp
CAPABILITY, supra note 175, at 5668.

330

10 U.S.C. § 334 (1964). See note 313 supra for the language of this section.

328

331 For a discussion of theories of presidential action under these sections without a court
order, see Note, supra note 306, at 649.
332 Id.
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default on the part of a State, of depriving inhabitants thereof of certain
rights secured to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States.us
Section 333 (1) has been said to contemplate circumstances "where there has
been such a complete breakdown of law and order that civilian law enforcement
measures are overwhelmed and use of the armed forces is required.

3

34

This

characterization likens it to section 331, but in apparently assuming that state
inability is a prerequisite to its operation, this view seems too limited to be entirely
accurate. 3 5 By its terms, federal troops may be dispatched to a state by the
President under this section when state authorities "are unable, fail, or refuse"3 38
to protect the constitutional rights of state citizens.
Section 333 (1), in mitigating the harshness of the "state inability" requirement of section 331, broadens the area of permissible use of federal troops far
beyond the contemplation of section 331. Furthermore, because the President
can act under the former statute without having to await a state invitation,
the obvious argument is made that it should be used as an alternative to the
request statute to avoid problems of delay that can mean added bloodshed."3
Equally meritorious is the argument that the state's failure to protect the constitutional rights of its inhabitants "constitutes grounds for taking appropriate
remedial action." '
However, caution must be advised against too free a use
of section 333(1). The President must bear in mind that since Sterling, actions
that he takes to use federal troops under this or other statutes are subject to
judicial review and, if not justifiable thereunder, constitute a violation of the
Posse Comitatus Act. 39 Also, he will naturally be reluctant to act too hastily
in sending federal aid because of the likelihood of resulting criticism, such as
charges of "federalism" in an area of state responsibility, which mirror the deeprooted expectations of local autonomy and the traditional civilian distrust of
the military supplanting civil authority. 4
Most importantly, the President
should remember that suppression of disorder is primarily a state responsibility,
and that if the federal government too frequently acts to protect constitutional
rights in this manner, it will encourage the states to ignore that responsibility.
Some speculation exists as to the meaning of the "any other means" that
the President can utilize to suppress domestic violence under section 333.
Although the term may suggest the use of federal civil officials such as agents
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, such a construction is not in keeping
with the "salutary policy that the agents . . . shall not be used as a national
police . . . .""' One of the "other means" contemplated is the use of United
333 REPORT ON NATIONAL GUARD CAPABILITY, supra note 175, at 5668-69.
334 Letter from Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to Representative
John Lindsay, July 30, 1964, in 110 CONG. REc. 18662 (1964).
335 Contra, Comment, Federal Intervention in the States for the Suppression of Domestic
Violence: Constitutionality, Statutory Power, and Policy, 1966 Dux. L.J. 415, 419 n.20.
336 10 U.S.C. § 333(1) (1964) (emphasis added). See note 327 supra for the full text
of this section.
337 Poe, supra note 305, at 170.
338 Id.
339 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1964). See note 301 supra for the language of this section.
340 Comment, supra note 335, at 459-60.
341 41 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 313, 328 (1963).
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States marshals. A United States marshal has the power to appoint deputies .2
and to summon a posse comitatus.5" Generally, in executing federal law, he
may exercise those same powers that a sheriff may exercise in executing state
law. 44 In this latter regard, the marshal's exercise of power to keep the federal
peace within a state has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court." 5
Marshals would seem to be useful in instances where only a relatively small
amount of force is necessary to enforce a federal court order or to preserve the
peace. But where their strength is insufficient, and time does not permit the
effective enlistment of the citizenry to assist them in their efforts to maintain law
and order, it would seem that resort must be had to the use of federal troops.
A federal force that is likely to see action in future disorders is a specially
trained Army unit whose existence has recently been reported in testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee."' Under this scheme,
seven special task forces of Regular Army troops - more than 15,000
men - have been assigned as an elite service to cope with urban disruption.
The riot forces will be dispatched only if the National Guard - which
has been undergoing special riot training since its woefully inept performances in Newark and Detroit last summer - cannot do the job.3 47
Although this force will ultimately be available to quell riots, the Army is seeking to lessen the chance of its being needed by establishing special schools in
civil disorder for Guardsmen and by arranging to supply them with special
riot-control equipment.3" These plans commendably preserve responsibility
for the suppression of domestic violence in its proper perspective, by supplying
a federal reserve to be used only after a much improved state force has demonstrated its inadequacy.
3. Criminal Jurisdiction Over Federal Troops and Federalized Guardsmen
Once a National Guardsman or a regular member of the armed forces of
the United States has been released from active federal service, he is no longer
subject to trial by federal court-martial. The de-federalized Guardsman may
be tried by court-martial under his state law, but the usual forums for trying
alleged offenses committed by such troops while in active service for the federal
government are the appropriate civilian courts. 49
342 28 U.S.C.A. § 562 (Supp. 1967) provides: "The Attorney General may authorize a
United States marshal to appoint deputies and clerical assistants. Each deputy marshal is
subject to removal by the marshal pursuant to civil-service regulations."
343 28 U.S.C.A. § 569(b) (Supp. 1967) provides: "United States marshals shall execute
all lawful writs, process and orders issued under authority of the United States.... and
command all necessary assistance to execute their duties." For an early analysis of the power
of a United States marshal to summon a posse comitatus, see 6 OP. ATT'Y GaN. 466 (1856).
344 28 U.S.C. § 570 (Supp. 1967) provides: "A United States marshal and his deputies,
in executing the laws of the United States within a State, may exercise the same powers
which a sheriff of the State may exercise in executing the laws thereof."

345 Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 394-96 (1880).
346 TrmE, Feb. 23, 1968, at 20.
347

Id.

348 Id.

349 Letter from Martin F. Richman, First Assistant, Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, to Representative F. Edward Hebert, Chairman of Special Subcommittee
on Civil Disturbances, House Committee on Armed Services, Sept. 1, 1967, in REPORT ON
NATIONAL GuAsD CAPAaILrrY, supra note 175, at 5666.
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More difficult problems arise in the case of a regular soldier or a Guardsman who is in federal military status when charged with a criminal offense
committed while on federal duty. Such an individual may clearly be tried by
federal court-martial, but unless the civil courts are closed as a result of the
improbable imposition of absolute martial law, this military jurisdiction is not
exclusive. Civilian courts also have jurisdiction; however, it is important to note
that unless civil authorities actually make the arrest of a defendant soldier, this
jurisdiction can attach only after a decision by the military to honor the request
of state officials that such defendant be made available for civil trial."' 0 In the
deliberations pursuant to such a request, the defendant himself is without a
voice - "he is not entitled to demand either trial by court-martial or trial by
a civil court to the exclusion of the other." ' ' The military is not required to
grant such a request, but a decision to do so recognizes that the offense may be
a violation of state law, punishable by the courts of the state. In this light, the
granting of this request would seem proper as a general matter of comity. Furthermore, an affirmative response to the request will not deprive the military
of its court-martial jurisdiction. Because the same act may offend both state
and federal law, it is clear that a defendant may be tried by federal court-martial
and also by a state tribunal without violating the double jeopardy clause of the
fifth amendment.352
Yet laws that allow a defendant to be twice tried and twice sentenced for
a single act seem offensive to the public's sense of equity, notwithstanding the
fact that the same act violated two sets of laws. The injustice seems even stronger
in a situation where the defendant is subjected to state punishment for an
offense he would not have been in a position to commit but for the inability of,
or refusal by, that state to cope with a local problem that necessitated his presence
there as part of a federal force. While the federal military laws may be criticized
for lacking the jury trial as a procedural safeguard, this alleged drawback certainly does not work to the state's detriment in the sense of preventing the exaction of proper retribution from the defendant. Until there is a change in the
present state of the law that allows this possibility of double trial, it would seem
an advisable policy for the military to generally deny these state requests, particularly in instances of riot-connected offenses, and to try the federal offender
once and for all by a court-martial.
Moreover, the applicable legal standards would be substantially the same
in either a state civil court or a federal military tribunal. Standards of sound
military conduct are prescribed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice.353
The basic rule of military law is the rule of martial law - that troops may use
whatever force is reasonably necessary to effectuate their orders to suppress
unlawful violence. In employing such force as is "reasonably necessary," military
personnel are allowed a "permitted range of honest judgment" but the reason350 Id. at 5667. Article 14 of the UNIFoRM CODE OF MnLrTARY JUSTICE, 10 U.S.C. § 814
(1964), provides that "a member of the armed forces accused of an offense against civil
authority may be delivered, upon request, to the civil authority for trial."
351 Letter from Martin F. Richman, supra note 349, at 5667.
352 Cf. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
353 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964), as amended.
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ableness of their actions is nevertheless properly reviewable by the courts. 4
What is justifiable under this basic rule cannot be articulated with a high degree
of precision, but must be decided on a case-by-case basis in light of the circumstances as they appeared to the actor at the time of his action."' It is generally
understood, however, that

[i]n the context of a domestic riot, it may be necessary to use greater force
than could lawfully be exerted for ordinary law enforcement purposes;
this conclusion naturally follows from the fact that the military is not
called upon in such cases until the resources of conventional law enforcement have proved inadequate to suppress the violence. 58
Perhaps the largest area of protection given an individual soldier against
criminal liability is the defense of good faith obedience to orders. The courts
have even excused homicide when it was committed in obedience to an order
that was fair on its face. 5 ' However, unlawful orders will not justify their
execution when, to a reasonable man, they would clearly exceed the basic rule
58
of necessary force.
If prosecution is brought in a state court, either directly or by military
release, against anyone in the military service of the United States for an act
done under color of his office, such a suit may be removed to the appropriate
federal district court. 55 The "color of office" test means that the act complained
of must somehow have been related to the defendant's official duties in such a
way that it was thereby within the general scope of his authority as an officer
or soldier. In the event that the military decides to follow the harsh policy of
releasing soldiers to state jurisdiction, this allowance of removal is essential to
insure the defendant a fair trial, free from local prejudice. In addition to this
statutory protection, the federal government should also support military defendants by providing them with counsel when their alleged offenses are found
by the district courts to have been done under color of office. According to
recent indications from the Department of Justice, this legal assistance will
ordinarily be given."' Yet even with these protective measures, the trial of
military personnel under state law for offenses that simultaneously violate
354 Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932).

355 Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 134 (1851).
356 Letter from Martin F. Richman, supra note 349, at 5667.
357 E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 55 A. 952 (1903).
358 E.g., United States v. Bevans, 24 F. Cas. 1138 (No. 14,589) (D. Mass. 1816) (orders
given were to kill a man who had used opprobrious language).
359 Removal jurisdiction may be claimed under the applicable provision of either of two
statutes. 28 U.S.C. § 1442a (1964) provides in pertinent part:
A civil or criminal prosecution in a court of a State of the United States against
a member of the armed forces of the United States on account of an act done
under color of his office or status, or in respect to which he claims any right, title,
or authority under a law of the United States respecting the armed forces thereof,
may .. . be removed for trial into the district court of the United States for
the district where it is pending ....
28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1964) provides in pertinent part:
(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against
any of the following persons may be removed by them to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or person
acting under him, for any act under color of such office ....
360 Letter from Martin F. Richman, supra note 349, at 5668.
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federal law presents a poor alternative to the simpler and seemingly fairer justice
afforded by a single trial in a military court.
III. Procedure and Practice of Law Enforcement Agencies During a Riot
A. Force Used in Quelling a Riot
Perhaps the first and most crucial problem faced by state and municipal
officials when masses of urban ghetto dwellers take to the streets bent on violence
and destruction is the question of what amount of force may be practically
and lawfully utilized to suppress the disturbance. The problem is compounded
for the conscientious official who is aware of the practical need to restore calm
to the community while avoiding the harsh measures that may only lead to
future riots. This latter consideration is especially significant in view of the
fact that the conduct of the police in dealing with suspected lawbreakers has
been the initial spark and motivating factor in many of the ghetto riots.3 6' As
one public official has pointed out: "The major civil disturbances in this country, Watts, Detroit, Jersey City [Newark], arose not out of a demonstration
getting out of hand but rather out of law enforcement incidents." 6 2 Thus, in
addition to the legal questions that will be treated in this Note, local officials
must consider the far more serious social ramifications of their response to urban
rioting.
If any generalizations can be made about so complex and unsettled an
area of the law, they would be that "[i]n making an arrest, an officer may use
whatever force is reasonably necessary" ' 3 and that the standard of reasonableness involved is that of the ordinarily prudent and intelligent person faced with
the same situation as the policeman.3 64 However, the policeman will run the
risk of civil and/or criminal liability 65 should he use more force than "... reasonably appears to be necessary, or subject the person arrested to unnecessary
risk of harm." '66 But it has further been recognized that this standard of reasonableness includes an additional consideration when the officer is acting under
color of duty because
361 See, e.g., Ransford, Attitudes of Negroes Toward the Los Angeles Riot, 3 LAw ir;
TRANsrrIoN Q. 191 (1966).
When asked [of Los Angeles Negroes], "What do you think caused the riot?"
42% named police brutality, 24% named police methods or bad police treatment.
The fact that 66% of the total sample mentioned either police brutality or poor
methods as a cause is a remarkably high proportion, when considering that the
question was open-ended; that is, mention of the police was completely spontaneous.
Id. at 193.
The report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder listed the first and
most intense grievance of ghetto dwellers as police practices. RIOT CommissioN REPORT,
supra note 2, at 143.
362 Comments by Louis Ancel (Corporation Counsel for the Village of Maywood, Illinois),
Illinois State Bar Association Midyear Meeting, Symposium: Riots and Mass Demonstrations: The Problem and the Law, in Chicago, Illinois, January 25, 1968. A copy of this
presentation is on file in the office of the NOTRE DAbiE LAWYER.
363 Breese v. Newman, 179 Neb. 878, 140 N.W.2d 805, 808 (1966).
364 Id.
365 Noback v. Town of Montclair, 33 N.J. Super. 420, 428, 110 A.2d 339, 343 (1954).
366 City of Miami v. Albro, 120 So. 2d 23, 26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
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[plolice officers are not volunteers. They are armed and required to act to
enforce the law. They may err in their judgment and exceed their authority
in the sense that they misjudge the need for extreme measures or their right
to resort to them. Yet, where the purpose is to comply with duty, it would
be unreasonable to impose the measure of criminal responsibility applicable
to the citizen whose involvement does8T7not originate in a legal compulsion
to act and who is free to turn away.
Perhaps the primary distinction between the peace officer and the ordinary
citizen with regard to the force that they may impose is that the police officer
is under no duty to retreat when effecting an arrest. He may become the
aggressor and use all reasonable force to overcome what resistance the arrestee
may offer.

68

1. Force Against Misdemeanants
Although the standards governing the use of force are often confusing,
some rules are quite dear. It has long been recognized at common law that a
peace officer could not kill a misdemeanant in order to effect an arrest."' 9 The
reason for such a rule is that
[t]he law values human life too highly to allow an officer to proceed to
the extremity of shooting an escaping offender who in fact has committed
only a misdemeanor
or lesser offense, even though he cannot be taken
3 70
otherwise.

That the law on this point is quite settled was aptly demonstrated in Noback v.
7 1

Town of Montclair.1

Police officers must learn, if they are not already aware, that there
are definite limitations upon the amount of force that may be used by
them in arresting a citizen charged with a crime or with a violation of
the Disorderly Persons Act; that they may be held liable, both civilly and
criminally, for the use of excessive force either in making a lawful arrest
or in attempting to capture a fleeing offender; and that the law will not
countenance the shooting or killing of a fleeing offender charged merely
with a misdemeanor,
breach of the peace, or violation of the Disorderly
372
Persons Act.

This rule has even been extended as far as to hold a policeman liable for wounding a suspect after the suspect assaulted the officer and began to retreat. 373 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts supports the general proposition. 74
367 State v. Williams, 29 N.J. 27, 36, 148 A.2d 22, 27 (1959).
368 Id. at 39, 148 A.2d at 28.
369 Davis v.Hellwig, 21 N.J. 412, 416, 122 A.2d 497, 499 (1956). See also Moreland,
The Use of Force in Effecting or Resisting Arrest, 33 NEB. L. RBv. 408, 419 (1954).
370 Davis v. Hellwig, 21 N.J. 412, 419, 122 A.2d 497, 499 (1956).
371 33 N.J. Super. 420, 110 A.2d 339 (1954).
372 Id. at 428, 110 A.2d at 343; accord, Wimberly v.City of Paterson, 75 N.J. Super.
584, 594, 183 A.2d 691, 696 (1962).
373 Padilla v.Chavez, 62 N.M. 170, 306 P.2d 1094 (1957).
374
In the absence of legislative authority, neither a peace officer nor a private person
is privileged to use force against or impose confinement upon another for the purpose
of preventing the violation of a statute or a municipal ordinance or a continuance
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These limitations on the use of force in dealing with misdemeanants are
especially significant in the area of riot control since a substantial number of
the persons apprehended during civil disturbances are merely misdemeanants.
In the Detroit riot of 1967, of the 7,223 persons arrested, 1,652 were arrested
for misdemeanor offenses37 and 743 out of 3,356 arrests in the Watts riot of
1965 were for misdemeanors."' However, the law does recognize that under
certain limited conditions a police officer, for his own protection, may be forced
to resort to the use of more serious force than would otherwise be allowed377
and that emergencies may arise ". . . when the officer cannot be expected to
exercise that cool and deliberate judgment which courts and juries exercise
afterwards upon investigations in court."37 Likewise, the officer is privileged
to threaten deadly force to deter and apprehend misdemeanants by firing warning shots so long as he does not intend to actually shoot the suspects79 and exercises extraordinary care in the use of his firearms. s
Thus, when dealing with those suspected of, or in the act of, committing
misdemeanor offenses, the police are strictly bound by the tradition that "[i]t
is more in consonance with modern notions regarding the sanctity of human
life that the offender escape than that his life be taken, in a case where the
extreme penalty would be a trifling fine or a few days imprisonment," ' unless
the circumstances are such that the officer must defend himself or his fellow
officers against an attack by the misdemeanant.
2. Force Against Felons
Where the police are confronted with a felony offender, the law takes a
much more liberal position with regard to the amount of force that may be
used to effect his arrest. There are three basic approaches possible in analyzing
or commission of a misdemeanor other than an affray or equally serious breach
of the peace.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 140 (1965). When a breach of the peace is concerned,
the Restatement goes further:
Either a peace officer or a private person is privileged to use force against another
or to impose confinement upon him for the purpose of terminating or preventing
the renewal of an affray or an equally serious breach of the peace which is being
or has been committed in the actor's presence or of preventing such other from
participating therein, if
(a) the other is or the actor reasonably believes him to be participating or
about to participate in the affray, and
(b) the confinement or force is not intended or likely to cause death or
serious bodily harm, and
(c)
the actor reasonably believes that the force or confinement is necessary
to prevent the other from participating in the affray or other equally serious breach
of the peace. Id. § 141 (emphasis added).
375 Cahalan, The Detroit Riot, 3 THE PROSECUTOR 430, 432 (1967).
376 See Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 1965 ANNUAL REPORT 21 (1966). In a
much smaller riot in Cincinnati, Ohio, July 3 through July 5, 1967, there were approximately
400 arrests, generally for misdemeanors. Remarks of Melvin G. Rueger, Greenbrier Conference
of National District Attorneys Association, Aug., 1967, printed in Riot Panel, 3 THE PROSECUTOR 282, 287 (1967).
377 E.g., People v. Wilson, 36 Cal. App. 589, 172 P. 1116 (1918); Hutchinson v. Lott,
110 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Fugate v. Commonwealth, 187 Ky. 564,
219 S.W. 1069 (1920); Padilla v. Chavez, 62 N.M. 170, 306 P.2d 1094, 1095 (1957) (dicta).
378 Mead v. O'Connor, 66 N.M. 170, 344 P.2d 478, 480 (1959).
379 Hutchinson v. Lott, 110 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
380 Wimberly v. City of Paterson, 75 N.J. Super. 584, 600, 183 A.2d 691, 699 (1962).
381 Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REv. 798, 814-15 (1924).
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the permissible force that can be used against a felon.3 2 The first approach is
that deadly force is allowed whenever the officer reasonably believes that a
felony has been committed and reasonably believes that the person against
whom the force is to be applied has committed it. 3 This view has received
only limited judicial support. In reversing and remanding a judgment rendered
against the city of Miami for damages caused by a police officer when he shot
and killed a fifteen-year-old burglary suspect, the Florida District Court of
Appeals said:
The fact that the person has not actually committed a felony or that no
crime of any sort has been committed makes no difference, as long as the
appearances are such as to lead a police officer to reasonably believe that
a felony has been committed and the person he is about to arrest or apprehend is the person who has committed the felony.

Having reasonable grounds to believe J. C. Nelson had committed a
felony, the officers were entitled to use force which was reasonably necessary to capture him, even to the extent of killing or wounding him.3 84
But the dangers inherent in this approach are such that it generally is, and
should be, rejected. 8 5 It would give a policeman the discretion, based on his
reasonable belief, to use whatever force he felt necessary under the circumstances.
This would have the ultimate effect of allowing police to respond in numerous
apparent felony cases, which are in fact either misdemeanors or no crimes at
all, with86the degree of force that has been traditionally reserved for felony
offenses.
The second approach for considering the use of force against felons holds
that "[k]illing is privileged if a felony has been committed and the arresting
officer reasonably believes that the person killed committed the felony.'"38 This
more widely accepted test was adopted in Petrie v. Cartwright3 s which stated
that "... where there is only a suspicion of a felony the officer is not warranted
in treating the fugitive as a felon."38 9 Thus, the officer must know that a felony
actually was committed and then must reasonably believe that the suspect
actually committed it before he can resort to the use of deadly force.
By far the most severe restriction on the use of force by the police is that
imposed by the third approach. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted
this approach in the celebrated case of Commonwealth v. Duerr,,.. which, like
Petrie, insisted that a felony must have actually been committed before deadly
382 94 U. PA. L. Rav. 327, 328 (1946).
383 Id.
384 City of Miami v. Nelson, 186 So. 2d 535, 537-38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). See also
Dixon v. State, 101 Fla. 840, 132 So. 684 (1931); Note, Killing a Suspected Felon Fleeing to
Escape Arrest, 38 Ky. L.J. 618, 619-21 (1950).
385 E.g., Petrie v. Cartwright, 114 Ky. 103, 70 S.W. 297 (1902). See also Note, Killing a
Suspected Felon Fleeing to Escape Arrest, 38 K . L.J. 609, 612 (1950).
386 See Note, supra note 385, at 616.
387 94 U. PA. L. Rv. 327, 328 (1946) (footnote omitted).
388 114 Ky. 103, 70 S.W. 297 (1902).
389 Id. at 109, 70 S.W. at 299. See also Moreland, supra note 369, at 409-10.
390 158 Pa. Super. 484, 45 A.2d 235 (1946).
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force may be used. The court, however, went one step further by holding that
"[t]he right to kill an escaping offender is limited to cases in which the officer
knows that the person whom he is seeking to arrest is a felon and not an innocent party." ' ' (Emphasis added.)
Although the rule allowing the use of deadly force in dealing with all felony
offenses is still followed by most jurisdictions, there is a rising trend of, and
call for, modification of the rule to preclude such force in instances of minor,
non-atrocious felonies. 92
3. Force in Riot Situations
Under riot conditions, the courts seem to take a much more lenient attitude
in regard to the permissible amount of force that may be employed by peace
officers. Just as in a non-riot situation, should police officers find their lives
endangered by lawless conditions existing on the streets, they are always privileged
to use whatever force is necessary to protect themselves and their fellow officers."' s
This same right is extended to those military forces called in to aid in the restoration of order. 94 Thus, it would certainly appear that the officers are clearly
justified in the proper and reasonable use of deadly force to deal with snipers
and other rioters who are intent on inflicting serious bodily harm on the officers.
Even in dealing with the large street-crowds which may be looting or
destroying during a riot, the police and military are justified, under the law, in
using more force than would be allowed in dealing with like criminal offenses
under ordinary, non-riot conditions. An extreme application of this proposition
was seen in Commonwealth v. Stewart, 95 where a lower Pennsylvania court
upheld the actions of the police in quelling a small civil disturbance by pointing
out:
391 Id. at 492, 45 A.2d at 239.
392 See Moreland, supra note 369, at 412-15. That the law seems to be heading in just
such a direction is demonstrated by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 143 (1965).
(1)
Either a peace officer or a private person is privileged to use force against
or impose confinement upon another which is not intended or likely to cause death
or serious bodily harm for the purpose of preventing any felony which the actor
reasonably believes the other is committing or is about to commit if the actor
reasonably believes that commission or consummation of the felony cannot otherwise
be prevented.
(2)
The use of force or the imposition of confinement intended or likely to
cause death or serious bodily harm is privileged if the actor reasonably believes
that the commission or consummation of the felony cannot otherwise be prevented
and the felony for the prevention of which the actor is intervening is of a type
threatening death or serious bodily harm or involving the breaking and entry of a
dwelling place. Id.
393 E.g., Gordy v. State, 93 Ga. App. 743, 92 S.E.2d 737 (1956) (dicta) which states:
"A person making a lawful arrest is justified in killing under the fears of a reasonable man
that a felony is about to be committed upon himself or his fellow officers." Id. at 739.
394 Manley v. State, 62 Tex. Grim. 392, 137 S.W. 1137 (1911), aff'd on other grounds
on second appeal, 69 Tex. Grim. 502, 154 S.W. 1008 (1913). Speaking of the rights of
National Guardsmen, the court said:
If in the performance of his [National Guardsman's] duties his life becomes
endangered, or it appeared to him under all the facts and circumstances in evidence
that some person was about to assault him with the intention of killing him, or
doing him some serious bodily injury, he would have the right to act in selfdefense. 137 S.W. at 1141.
395 58 Dauphin County Reports 209 (Ct. of Quarter Sessions of Dauphin County, Pa.
1947).
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In Commonwealth vs. Martin, 9 Kulp 69, it is said, with reference
to the amount of force that may be used:
Those who attend a sheriff in order to suppress a riot may take
such weapons as are necessary to effectuate the purpose, and they may
justify beating, wounding, or even killing such rioters as shall resist
or refuse to surrender.
The policemen of the city of Harrisburg have the same authority as
a sheriff under such circumstances. 3
Hopefully, courts today would not be so inhumane, but it does appear that,
at least in Pennsylvania, the police are authorized to use the utmost force in
suppressing a riot.
An earlier Pennsylvania decision adopted this same position with regard
to the amount of force that the military may use in the suppression of rioting.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall,9 7 which upheld the action
of a National Guardsman on riot duty in his killing, pursuant to orders, a person
who ignored his repeated commands to halt, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reasoned that
. . . while the military are in active service for the suppression of

disorder and violence, their rights and obligations as soldiers must be
judged by the standard of actual war. No other standard is possible, for
the first and overruling duty is to repress disorder, whatever the cost, and
all means which are necessary to that end are lawful. The situation of
troops in a riotous and insurrectionary district approximates that of troops in
an enemy's country, and in proportion to the extent and violence of the
overt acts of hostility shown is the degree of severity justified in the means
of suppression. 98 (Emphasis added.)
The harsh result reached in Shortall has received some support from one of the
leading commentators on martial law, Frederick Bemays Wiener, who said:
We may disagree with much of what the court said and still approve the
decision. Dynamiters do not respond to sweet reasonableness, and the
disturbed situation in the community while not amounting to a state of
war or even calling for the application of the rules of war, certainly justified
drastic measures.3 99 (Footnote omitted.)
Even if one rejects the undesirable conclusion reached in Shortall that under
riot conditions the National Guard enjoys war powers and adopts the more
moderate view that the troops acting in aid of civil authorities to suppress a
riot have only the powers of the local peace officers, 00 troops in Pennsylvania

396
397
398
399
400
Mich.
Fluke

Id. at 218.
206 Pa. 165, 55 A. 952 (1903).
Id. at 174, 55 A. at 956.
F. WIENER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL o1 MARTIrAL LAw 73 (1940).
See Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 134 S.W. 484 (1911); Bishop v. Vandercook, 228
299, 200 N.W. 278 (1924); State v. McPhail, 182 Miss. 360, 180 So. 387 (1938);
v. Canton, 31 Okla. 718, 123 P. 1049 (1912).
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would possess virtually the same amount of power under the doctrine advanced
in Commonwealth v. Stewart."1
Fortunately, until the current rash of ghetto riots, the United States had
not experienced enough civil disorder for the courts to demonstrate whether a
more enlightened view of the law will reject the legal theories arising from
Stewart and Shortall. But it does seem obvious that the law will allow greater
force in the suppression of riots than in the control of ordinary crime. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which is ordinarily most reluctant to sanction
the use of force in controlling criminal conduct," 2 has adopted in section 142 a
rather permissive standard with regard to the amount of force authorized in
riot control.
(1) Either a peace officer or a private person is privileged to impose
confinement upon or use force against another for the purpose of suppressing a riot or preventing the other from participating in it if
(a) the other is or the actor reasonably believes him to be participating or to be about to participate in the riot, and
(b) such force or confinement is not intended or likely to cause
death or serious bodily harm, and
(c) the actor reasonably believes that the riot cannot otherwise
be suppressed or the other's participation in it otherwise be prevented.
(2) The use of force or the imposition of a confinement which is
intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm for the purpose of
suppressing a riot or preventing the other from participatingin it is privileged if the riot is one which threatens death or serious bodily harm.403
(Emphasis added.)
That the Restatement does countenance the use of deadly force in the suppression of riots, such as those this country has experienced in the urban ghettos
during the past several summers, is made quite clear by comment g to subsection 2 of section 142:
If the riot itself threatens death or serious bodily harm, it is sufficiently
serious to justify the use of deadly means to suppress it. It is not necessary that the avowed purpose of the riot be to inflict such harm. It is
enough that the conduct of the rioters is such as to create the probability
or even the possibility of such consequences. Thus a riot the purpose of
which is the wholesale destruction of structures or chattels usually involves
something more
than a bare possibility of serious bodily harm to persons
4 4
in the vicinity.
Hence, for better or for worse, there has been, and will probably continue to
be, a tradition in the law of allowing a most severe use of force against rioters.

401

58 Dauphin County Reports 209 (Ct. of Quarter Sessions of Dauphin County, Pa.

1947).
402
403
404

(1965).

See notes 374 & 392 supra.
142 (1965).
OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 142, comment g at 257

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

RESTATEMENT
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B. Arrest ProceduresDuring a Riot
1. Power to Arrest
During a major ghetto riot, large numbers of persons are arrested and
detained by civil and military law enforcement officials. In the first of the major
riots of this type, Watts in 1965, the Los Angeles Police Department reported
that 3,356 persons were arrested.4 0 5 In the week-long rioting in Detroit in 1967,
7,223 citizens were arrested."0 Faced with the likelihood of such an inordinately
large number of arrests, officials charged with the suppression of violence and the
of order must determine when and whom the law permits them to
restoration
7
arrest.

40

In the area of arrest without a warrant, the law again makes a distinction
between felony and misdemeanor offenses. Generally, it can be said that "[a]n
officer can make an arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant only when the
offense is attempted or committed in his presence." 48 According to its strictest
interpretation, the requirement of an officer's presence means that "... . the acts
constituting the offense become known to him at the time they are committed
through his sense of sight or through other senses."4 Practically speaking, the
requirement that the misdemeanor must have been committed in the officer's
presence should not cause much difficulty for riot arrests. During a riot, the police
confront the persons whom they will arrest directly on the city streets and can
learn of the crime only through their senses. In Detroit, for example, most of
the 1,652 misdemeanor arrests were for curfew violations 1 0 which clearly must
be committed in the presence of the police if they are to be detected.
405 See Los ANGELES PoLIcE DEPARTMENT 1965 ANNUAL REPORT 21 (1966).
406 Cahalan, supra note 375, at 430.
407 It is sufficient here to note that there are certain differences in the law with regard to
arrest with and without a warrant. However, under riot conditions it is unthinkable that
the police and military officers would be able or disposed to obtaining warrants to arrest
persons they confront on the streets. Therefore, the discussion may safely be limited to situations in which arrests are made without the use of a warrant.
408 Coakley, Restrictions in the Law of Arrest, 52 NW. U.L. Rv. 2, 11 (1957) (footnotes
omitted). It might also be noted that often there is an additional requirement for arrest without
a warrant in the case of a misdemeanor, namely, that the offense must involve a breach of
the peace. Commonwealth v. Gorman, 288 Mass. 294, 297, 192 N.E. 618, 619 (1934);
Comment, The Law of Arrest, 17 MERCER L. REv. 300, 303 (1965). However, such a requirement is meaningless during actual riot conditions since riot-related offenses, by their
very nature, involve a breach of the peace. This is made quite clear by examining what constitutes a breach of the peace. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has said:
As to what constitutes a breach of the peace within the meaning of the rules
which authorize an arrest without a warrant in such cases, the better reasoned
authorities emphasize the necessity of showing as an element of the offense a dis-

turbance of public order and tranquility by act or conduct not merely amounting
to unlawfulness but tending also to create public tumult and incite others to break
the peace. State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E.2d 100, 104 (1954).
The RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS defines a breach of the peace as ". . . a public
offense done by violence, or one causing or likely to cause an immediate disturbance of public
order." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 116 (1965). From the definitions advanced by
these authorities, it would be difficult to envision any riot-related offense that would not be
a breach of the peace, with the possible exceptions of loitering and curfew violations (which
may be considered "likely to cause an immediate disturbance of public order," when done
in the context of a riot).
409 State v. Pluth, 157 Minn. 145, 151, 195 N.W. 789, 791 (1923).
410 Cahalan, The Detroit Riot, 3 THE PROSECUTOR 430, 432 (1967). Furthermore, most
states now authorize a peace officer to arrest without a warrant for any offense committed in
his presence. Comment, supra note 408, at 304.
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The arrest requirements for a felony offense are somewhat more permissive; they give the police greater freedom as to whom they can arrest and on
what basis. These less stringent requirements for felony arrests take on added
significance when it is remembered that the majority of those arrested in the
course of a riot are charged with felonies. 1' The basic requirement for such an
arrest is that it be made only upon probable cause which "... exists if the facts
and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing
that the offense has been committed."4 1 Mere ". . . suspicion is not enough
for an officer to lay hands on a citizen," 413 although "[e]vidence required to
establish guilt is not necessary."41 4 One commentator has stated:
With respect to felony offenses, therefore, the officer can act upon the
complaint or report of reliable citizens, or upon information from reliable
informants, and upon observed facts and circumstances which, although
short of the actual commission of a crime, give rise to reasonable cause to
believe that the suspect did commit a felony offense. 15
Thus, if the officer has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed and that the suspect committed it, he is entitled to arrest without a warrant. There is no indication that this legal principle would be any different
during a riot.
However, there is some authority for the proposition that the rules governing arrest without a warrant may be relaxed, in some undefined manner,
for military forces charged with, or aiding in, the suppression of a civil disorder.
As Wiener has pointed out, there are three schools of thought on the powers that
may be exercised by the military in controlling a riot. 16 On one extreme is the
theory that under such conditions, military forces enjoy the powers they would
have in conditions of actual war." 7 This appears to be the approach adopted
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v.
Shortall,4 1 s where the court said that "... while the military are in active service
for the suppression of disorder and violence, their rights and obligations as
soldiers must be judged by the standard of actual war. No other standard is
possible ... .""' Such a position has received support in several equally antiquated cases from other jurisdictions.42 It grants troops the same flexibility
411 In the Detroit riot, 5,571 of the 7,223 arrests were for felonies. See Cahalan, supra
note 410, at 430, 432. And in the Watts riot, of the 3,356 persons arrested, 2,613 were
charged with felonies. See Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 1965 ANNUAL REPORT 21
(1966).
412 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959).
413 Id. at 104.
414 Id. at 102.
415

Coakley, supra note 408, at 12. See also Comment. supra note 408, at 302-03.

416 F. WIENER, supra note 399, at 74-78.
417 Id. at 77, 78.
418 206 Pa. 165, 55 A. 952 (1903). Although Wiener, without any stated reason, says
that the case does not confer such power, F. WEINER, supra note 399, at 77 n.61.
419 Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 174, 55 A. 952, 956 (1903).
420 United States ex ret. Seymour v. Fischer, 280 F. 208 (D. Neb. 1922) where it was said:
When a state of war or insurrection exists, and the Governor has legally called
into action the military forces of the state, the will of the commander becomes the
controlling authority in the occupied territory, so far as he chooses to exert it,
subject to the laws and usages of war. Id. at 210 (emphasis added).
See also Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 81 S.E. 533 (1914); Ex parte Jones, 71 W. Va.
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to respond to the riot situation according to the severity of the disorder as if
they were engaged in the occupation of enemy territory."2 Apparently, this
approach would give the troops unlimited discretion in making riot arrests.4 2
Fortunately, 2 s such a position would not likely be accepted today because
...it is believed that this issue [military having war powers to suppress
riots] is erroneous and unsound and that- perhaps more to the pointit will never stand the test of review in the Supreme Court of the United
States. Pending . . . authoritative precedent, it is suggested that it is
potentially both dangerous and costly for military personnel employed
in aid of the civil power to imagine themselves
at war. The safer course
42 4
is to regard their powers as not unlimited.
On the other extreme is the view that military men answering the call to
control domestic disorder have no greater power than that of the civil peace
officers.421 This position likewise has received some smattering of support as was
demonstrated by State v. McPhail which stated that "... whatever the Governor does in the execution of the laws, or whatever members of the militia do
under such authority, must be as civil officers, and in strict subordination to
the general law of the land. ' 42' At least one commentator has adopted this
position by saying: "In carrying out their mission the troops are bound to
follow legal procedures. The extent of their power is that of any peace officer
acting under similar circumstances."' ' Were such a restricted standard adopted,
the federal troops and National Guardsmen would be compelled to abide by
the same arrest requirements as do the local police.
However, the more generally accepted approach is to regard the military
as having powers somewhere in between those of actual war and those of the
local police. 9 The Supreme Court of Iowa exemplified the majority position
in State ex rel. O'Connor v. District Court"' where it said:
567, 77 S.E. 1029 (1913); State ex rel. Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S.E. 243 (1912).
421 Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 174, 55 A. 952, 956 (1903).
422 Although the cases do not explicitly spell out the effect of war powers on the ability
of the military to make arrests, this unlimited arrest power is implicit in the decisions. See id.;
United States ex rel. Seymour v. Fischer, 280 F.208 (D. Neb. 1922); Hatfield v. Graham, 73
W. Va. 759, 81 S.E. 533 (1914); Ex parte Jones, 71 W. Va. 567, 77 S.E. 1029 (1913); State

ex rel. Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S.E. 243 (1912).

423 The possible horrors of such a position were graphically demonstrated by Charles
Fairman when he said:
Other jurisdictions have gone to the opposite extreme and conceded war powers to
the governor. Paint Creek takes on the importance of Manassas, and militia officers
controlling longshoremen at Galveston or strikers at Nebraska City are assimilated to
Glorious Ben [appropriately nicknamed "Beast"] Butler in the plentitude of his
exuberant military government in New Orleans in 1862. Fairman, The Law of
Martial Rule and the National Emergency, 55 HARV. L. Rxv. 1253, 1273 (1942) (footnotes
omitted).
424 F. WMNFR, supra note 399, at 78. See also Fairman, supra note 423, at 1273-74.
425 F. WMNEa, supra note 399, at 74-76.
426 182 Miss. 360, 180 So. 387 (1938).
427 Id. at 371, 180 So. at 390. See also Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 134 S.W. 484
(1911); Bishop v. Vandercook, 228 Mich. 299, 200 N.W. 278 (1924); Fluke v. Canton,
31 Okla. 718, 123 P. 1049 (1912).
428 Note, Rule by Martial Law in Indiana: The Scope of Executive Power, 31 IND. L.J.
456, 473 (1956).

429 Fairman, supra note 423, at 1274.
430

219 Iowa 1165, 260 N.W. 73 (1935).
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. . . we think that overwhelming weight of authority does extend to the
military officers under such [riot] conditions much greater latitude in the
exercise of their discretion as to what means it is necessary and proper
for them to employ than is possessed by civil officers in time of peace.4 3 '
The commentators, for the most part, agree that the military does enjoy increased
powers in dealing with domestic violence."3 2 In the area of actual arrest procedure, this additional power remains undefined"' and the actions must be
judged on a case-by-case basis until the courts do announce the applicable
standards.
2. Identification of Arrestees
Because of the large number of persons who may be arrested during a
major riot, an arresting officer would be unable to remember the surrounding
circumstances under which he arrested each of a number of persons.' 4" Therefore, it has been suggested by several prominent prosecutors that the police
obtain Polaroid cameras so that on-the-spot pictures may be taken of the officer
and the arrestee for future reference. 3
This procedure was effectively utilized
during the Detroit riot in 1967.
The police knew that the individual police officer could not possibly
remember all the persons whom he had arrested and the loot with which
such persons were apprehended and the circumstances of the arrest when
it came time to testify in court. In many precincts, therefore, the arresting
officer and the accused were photographed with a Polaroid camera side
by side with the loot piled on the floor before them. On the back of the
photo, particulars of name, location of arrest, etc. were noted. These
photos were placed in the police file folder of the case and were referred
to by the arresting officer just before his taking the witness stand for the
purpose of refreshing
his recollection. They proved an invaluable aid to
436
the police officers.

The use of such a procedure violates none of the constitutional rights of
the accused. In Holt v. United States43 7 Justice Holmes said of fifth amendment safeguards:
[Tihe prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness
against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion
431 Id. at 1187, 260 N.W. at 84. See also Herlihy v. Donohue, 52 Mont. 601, 161 P. 164
(1916); State ex rel. Roberts v. Swope, 38 N.M. 53, 28 P.2d 4 (1933).
432 F. WiENaa. supra note 399, at 76, where he states ". . . a broader scope of action is
permitted to the troops, and acts which if done by police officers would be without authority
of law are considered legal when done by the military in situations involving violence." See also
Fairman, supra note 423, at 1274; Fairman, MartialLaw, in the Light of Sterling v. Constantin,
19 CORNELL L.Q. 20, 32-33 (1933).
433 However, there is some authority for the proposition that the military will be granted
the power to detain rioters until the disorder is suppressed. This topic will be discussed later
in text accompanying notes 487-97 infra.
434 Cahalan, supra note 410, at 430-31.
435 See Remarks of Melvin G. Rueger, Greenbrier Conference of National District Attorneys Association, Aug. 1967, printed in Riot Panel, 3 THE PRosE CuToR 282, 287 (1967);
Remarks of Donald L. Knowles, id. at 286.
436 Cahalan, supra note 410, at 430-31.
437 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
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to extort communications from 48him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.
This reasoning has been developed in the law to mean that the privilege protects
only against the compelling of the person to give'evidence "... . of a testimonial
or communicative nature.." 39 Finally, the Supreme Court has ruled that 1 ...
it [fifth amendment] offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification ...." 0 (Emphasis added.)
However, in United States v. Wade,"" the Supreme Court, after accepting
the proposition that such practices as photographing the defendant do not violate
fifth amendment rights,44 2 vacated and remanded a conviction because the
defendant's sixth amendment rights were violated." 3 Defendant's counsel was
not present at a lineup where witnesses identified the defendant in a manner
that could not be adequately challenged in court and could have been warped
by the circumstances., 4 This identification procedure was deemed a "critical
stage of the prosecution." 445 But it was further stated that the defendant need
not have counsel present at non-critical stages where "... . there is minimal risk
'
that his counsel's absence ... might derogate from his right to a fair trial.""
It would appear obvious that this suggested initial photographing is such a noncritical stage since there would be no meaningful function for counsel to per4 47

form.

A practical problem that may be confronted, however, arises from the
fact that slight shifts in camera position or the relative distances of the photographed persons from the camera and from the surroundings may greatly distort the photograph." 8 Therefore, the police should receive prior training in
the proper use of the camera; for example, the suspect should be photographed
beside the arresting officer so that any distortions would be obvious when they
appear in court. This policy would avoid any problems that may be raised by
Wade.

438 Id. at 252-53.

439 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (footnote omitted).
440 Id. at 764; accord, Kennedy v. United States, 353 F.2d 462, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1963); United States v. Amorosa, 167
F.2d 596, 599 (3d Cir. 1948); Williams v. State, 239 Ark. 1109, 396 S.W.2d 834, 837 (1965);
Graef v. State, 1 Md. App. 161, 228 A.2d 480, 484 (1967); 0. MCCORMIcK, TREATIsE oN
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 126 (1954).
441 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
442 Id. at 223.
443 Id. at 227-39.
444 This could occur, for example, in cases where all participants in the lineup except
the suspect are known to the witness, the other lineup participants are "grossly dissimilar" to
the suspect, only the suspect is made to wear the distinctive clothing worn by the actual
criminal, and where the police inform witnesses that the actual criminal has been arrested.
Id. at 233.

445 Id. at 237.

446 Id. at 228.

447 Haworth, The Right to Counsel During Police Identification Procedures, 45
REv. 504, 515 (1967).

TEXAs

L.

448 For an example of the photographic distortions possible from such shifting, See M.
HouTs, FROM EvmENcE TO PROOF, 182-83 (1956).
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3. Riot Arrests: Gideon449 and Miranda450
Although there is some support for the proposition that "[d]ue process
of law depends upon circumstances and varies with the subject-matter and the
necessities of the situation . .. ""' the strong wording of the Supreme Court
4 52 leaves no doubt that
in Miranda
the specified procedural safeguards must be
applied in riots as well as in normal circumstances.
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the privilege [freedom from self-incrimination under the fifth
amendment] which might be devised .... However, unless we are shown
other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the... safeguards must be observed."'
In view of this language, if it became impossible, as a practical matter, to give
the specified Miranda warnings in the manner prescribed, the police may be
allowed to modify the rule so long as none of the accused's rights, as specified
under Miranda, are violated. But in dealing with a riot, the police are undoubtedly too occupied with the situation on the streets to be concerned with
interrogating arrested persons who were probably apprehended in the process
of committing the crime for which they are charged. Therefore, the Miranda
problem in the riot context is not as significant as it first might appear.
Gideon, however, does present a more serious problem for local officials.' 4
That the Supreme Court considers the right to counsel to be absolute in criminal
cases was demonstrated by its statement that
• . .reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor
to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided
for him. This seems to be an obvious truth.... The right of one charged
with crime to counsel may not be deemed 4 55
fundamental and essential to
fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.
The fact that the police themselves agree that the safeguards of Gideon and
Miranda apply even under riot conditions is exhibited by a letter from the Los
Angeles Police Department which reads in part:
The safeguards of Gideon, Miranda, and Escobedo are applied under
riot conditions. Interrogation of arrestees who do not have
counsel is
45 6
scheduled according to the availability of public defenders.
449 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
450 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
451 United States ex rel. Seymour v. Fischer, 280 F.2d 208, 210 (D. Neb. 1922).
452 The accused, before he can be subjected to police interrogation, must be advised that
he has the right to remain silent, it must be made clear to him that the police will respect
that right, he must be informed that anything he says will be used against him, he must be
advised of his right to counsel, and must be told that free counsel will be provided him if he is
unable to retain counsel on his own. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).
453 Id. at 467.
454 An accused indigent has an absolute right to counsel paid for by the state. Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
455 Id. at 344.
456 Letter from Capt. .T. F. Janes, Commander, Public Affairs Division, Los Angeles Police
Department, to James P. Gillece, Jr., January 2, 1968, on file with the NOTaE D Asa LAwYER.
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The problem with these safeguards, then, is not theoretical, but practical.
Due to the large number of arrests during a riot"s r and the fact that most of

those arrested are poor and without retained counsel,"'8 it is quite difficult to
supply them with the required legal advice. In Detroit, most of the persons
arrested faced arraignment without the benefit of counsel, although attorneys
from the bar association were often present as observers."59 Many local attorneys
freely volunteered their services - a necessary measure since the costs of providing appointed counsel to each arrestee would have been prohibitive."
But
the arrangements were still woefully inadequate in that attorneys were assigned to
courtrooms rather than to individual defendants. These attorneys represented
all defendants tried in the courtroom to which they were assignedY' "While
on [sic] attorney was conducting an examination, others were interviewing defendants and preparing their cases. In those instances where defense counsel
needed more time to prepare, the court granted adjournment."4 "2 It is difficult
to imagine how an adequate defense could be prepared under such conditions,
and thus it seems that "Gideon's Trumpet" blew a sour note in riot-tom Detroit.
One possible solution to this difficult problem is for the local prosecutor
to aggressively recruit a large number of volunteer attorneys from the local bar
association so that all arrested parties could be adequately represented. Such
a plan cannot be too highly recommended and must be finalized long before
the city bums.
C. Detention of Rioters
One of the most effective, most widely used, and most objectionable methods
of riot control is the incarceration of large numbers of rioters and their leaders
until the disorder is suppressed. 63 Most law enforcement officials strongly support such a process?. The desired result - keeping the arrested rioters and
riot leaders off the streets for the duration of the disturbance - can be accomplished by any one of three methods: (1) bail may be denied to those arrested,
(2) an excessively high bail may be set so that the poor would be unable to
meet it, (3) the military, when involved, may construe their powers in a riot
to include the right to detain dangerous persons without bail.
457

E.g., 7,223 in Detroit, Cahalan, supra note 410, at 430; 3,356 in Watts, Los ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 1965 ANNUAL REPoRT 21 (1966); and 400 in Cincinnati, Remarks
of Melvin G. Rueger, supra note 435, at 287.
458 Only 30% of those arrested in Detroit had retained counsel, Cahalan, supra note 410,
at 433.
459 Id. at 432.
460 Id. at 432-33.
461 Id. at 433.
462 Id.
463 It should be pointed out that the possible long range effect of such tactics might be
to foster community resentment and thereby increase the chance of future and more severe
disturbances. The National Commission on Civil Disorder reported that the most intensely
held grievance of ghetto dwellers was police practices and another listed grievance was discriminatory law enforcement RIOT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 143-44.
464 See Remarks of Brendan T. Byrne, supra note 435 at 283: "Almost everyone agrees
on the necessity for high bail during the riot . . .. " Remarks of Melvin G. Rueger, supra
note 435, at 287: "The courts generally set high bonds on persons charged. This, of course,
kept a large number in custody, thus preventing them from returning to the scene."
POLICE
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1. Denial of Bail
The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."46
But the amendment does not, and has not been recognized as, granting an
absolute right to bail. The Supreme Court in Carlson v. Landon46 said: "Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable. We think, clearly, here that the Eighth Amendment does not require that
bail be allowed under the circumstances.... 4 67 The Eighth Circuit followed
that reasoning in Mastrian v. Hedman 6 s
Neither the Eighth Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that everyone charged with a state offense must be given his
liberty on bail pending trial. While it is inherent in our American concept
of liberty that a right to bail shall generally exist, this has never been held
to mean that a state must make every criminal offense subject to such a
right or that the right provided as to offenses made subject to bail must
be so administered that every accused will always be able to secure his
liberty pending trial. Traditionally and acceptedly, there are offenses of
a nature as to which a state properly may refuse to make provision for a
right to bail. 469
If bail then can legally be denied in certain cases, the question becomes
one of whether it can be denied to arrested rioters. Most public officials agree
that it is desirable to hold rioters in custody for the duration of the disturbance
under the belief that, if released, they would return to the ghetto and resume
their participation in the disorder."' There is some legal precedent for the denial
of bail in cases where the danger to the community would be increased by the
accused's release. "If, for example, the safety of the community would be
jeopardized, it would be irresponsible judicial action to grant bail." '' Thus, if
the safety of the community does justify a denial of bail and since the eighth
amendment precludes excessive bail, one can only conclude, as did Justice
Douglas, that it would be unconstitutional to set a bail so high that the defendant could not possibly afford it, but it would be permissible to deny him the
right to bail altogether. 7
Although such may be the current status of the law, its logical absurdity
465
466
467
468

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
342 U.S. 524 (1952).
Id. at 545-46.
326 F.2d 708 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964).

469

Id. at 710.

470 E.g., the prosecutor for Wayne County, Michigan, which includes Detroit, said of the
situation existing in that city during the riot:
If each of those arrested had been released on his personal recognizance, there
was danger of contempt replacing respect and sober regard for the machinery of
law enforcement which might impel him to new acts of lawlessness. What service
would it have been to the prisoner or to the community to release one caught
flagrante delicto looting when the Governor of the State informed the President of
the United States that he was not sure that he could maintain law and order in
the streets of Detroit? Cahalan, The Detroit Riot, 3 THE PROSECUTOR 430, 432
(1967).
471 Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662, 666 (1962) (footnote omitted).
472 See Rehman v. California, 85 S. Ct. 8, 9 (1964).
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was well demonstrated by Justice Burton in a well-reasoned dissent in Carlson
v. Landon.'
That Amendment clearly prohibits federal bail that is excessive in amount
when seen in the light of all traditionally relevant circumstances. Likewise, it must prohibit unreasonable denial of bail. The Amendment cannot well mean that, on the one hand, it prohibits the requirement of bail
so excessive in amount as to be unattainable, yet, on the other hand, under
like circumstances, it does not prohibit the denial of bail, which comes to
the same thing. The same circumstances are relevant to both procedures.4 74
The very concept of holding a person, rioter, or ordinary arrestee in jail
because he may commit some crime in the future runs contrary to notions long
cherished in our legal system - that future crimes are to be deterred by
the threat of future punishment and not by prior incarceration, and that imprisonment should not be imposed on a person without a judicial determination
of his guilt."7 5 Therefore, such a practice may well constitute a denial of due
process of law. 7"
Justice Jackson, sitting as a circuit judge in Williamson v. United States,7 '
attacked the concept of preventive detention, even in the interest of the national
security, by allowing bail to certain convicted communists pending their appeal.
If I assume that defendants are disposed to commit every opportune disloyal act helpful to Communist countries, it is still difficult to reconcile
with traditional American law the jailing of persons by the courts because
of anticipated but as yet uncommitted crimes. Imprisonment to protect
society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so unprecedented
in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that
I am loath to resort to it, even as a discretionary judicial technique to
supplement conviction of such offenses as those of which defendants stand
convicted. 478 (Footnote omitted.)
However, this whole question of denying bail to those arrested during a
riot is actually of little practical significance. Only nine states do not provide
in their constitutions for a right to bail in all non-capital cases,)47" and, since the
Judiciary Act of 1789,480 bail has been a matter of right in federal non-capital
cases. '8 Therefore, prosecutors will usually resort to another technique to hold
the arrestees in custody during the riot.
2. Setting of High Bail
Often during a riot, officials of the community have sought to have high
473

342 U.S. 524 (1952).

474 Id. at 569 (dissenting opinion).
475 Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARv. L. Rnv. 1489, 1509 (1966).
476 Id. at 1498.
477 184 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1950).
478 Id. at 282-83.
479 Note, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA. L. Rav.
693, 696 n.11 (1958).
480 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 91.
481 FED. R. Came. P. § 46(a) (1) provides: "A person arrested for an offense not punishable by death shall be admitted to bail."
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bails set by the courts in the hope that the indigent rioters will be unable to
post the bond. In Detroit the county prosecutor publicly announced that he
would ask that a bond of $10,000 be imposed on each person arrested for looting, and he received court reaction favorable to his request." 2 That such a
practice was extensively used during the disorder in Detroit was demonstrated
in the report of a speech made by John Feikens, president of the Detroit Bar
Association, which stated:
Even though the holocaust caused by the rioting, and despite the understandable near-hysteria in the city that cried out against the prisoners, it
had to be remembered that each was entitled to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty. Mr. Feikens noted that this principle "bent severely"
as judges imposed heavy bail, their motivation being to clear the streets
of looters and rioters. No one arrested in
4 3 the early days of the disturbance
was allowed released on personal bond.
Bail has a traditional, legitimate purpose - to assure that the accused will
appear for trial - and it can be used for no other end. This was conclusively
settled by the Supreme Court in Stack v. Boyle4 " where it declared:
. . . [T]he modem practice of requiring a bail bond or the deposit of a
sum of money subject to forfeiture serves as additional assurance of the
presence of an accused [at trial]. Bail set at a figure higher than an amount
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is "excessive" under the Eighth
Amendment....
Since the function of bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of
assuring the presence of that defendant. 48 5
The Constitution does forbid the setting of excessive bail, and under Stack, the
test for determining whether a particular bail is excessive is by measuring it
against the amount of bail reasonably calculated to achieve the purpose for
which the bail is used. The only constitutionally acceptable purpose is to assure
the accused's presence at trial. When bail is used for any other purpose, including the preventive detention of rioters, it runs contrary to the eighth amendment."'
3. Military Detention
It has often been alleged and upheld by the courts that the military, in
482
483

See Cahalan, supra note 470, at 431; cf. Note, supra note 475, at 1489.
1 BNA Cram. L. RPTR. 2286 (Aug. 16, 1967).

484

342 U.S. 1 (1951).

485 Id. at 5.
486 United States Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina, commenting on the misuse of
bail, has said ". . . where the right to bail does exist, it cannot be denied or abridged by the
setting of excessive bail. This alone should preclude the use of high bail to effectuate preventive detention." Ervin, The Legislative Role in Bail Reform, 35 Gao. WAsH. L. Rav. 429,
444 (1967). See also Note, supra note 479, which says:
It is fundamental that the state has no right to punish a person until his guilt
has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. And there is no support in the
law for the proposition that a person may be imprisoned because of the speculative
possibility that he may commit a crime. Judges and prosecutors, therefore, should
carefully refrain from employing bail to accomplish these illegal ends. Few cases
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suppressing domestic violence, may arrest and detain the rioters and their
leaders and hold them without bail until the disorder is terminated. 487 The
rationale underlying this practice has been simply explained by one authority
on martial law:
Whenever there is a riot or insurrection, there are pretty certain to
be ringleaders; once these are apprehended, the back of the disturbance
is likely to be broken. Accordingly, commanders ordered into -the field to
suppress domestic disorders have almost invariably centered their attention
on the heads of the offending movement, have arrested them, and have
kept them in custody until such time as the disorders subsided and/or the
persons detained could be turned over to the civil authorities for trial. In
many instances, no trial ever took place; the8 detention was conceived to
be entirely preventive and not at all punitive.1
The existing case law does support such action by the military. In State
ex rel. Roberts v. Swope. 9 it was held that the state executive has discretion
to order the seizure of persons who stand in the way of troops engaged in restoring order and to authorize their detention until the disorder is terminated.49 '
The Colorado Supreme Court upheld such action in In re Moyer49L because the
arrest was lawful and the detention was necessary to suppress the insurrection.49
In Moyer v.Peabody,4 9 which arose out of the same situation, the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld the governor's action in having the National
Guard arrest and detain a union president until the labor troubles were over
on the rationale that under such riotous conditions ".... the ordinary rights of
individuals must yield to what he [governor] deems the necessities of the moment.
Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial
process. 494
It may well be that when the military is called in, it operates as a super
police force "... . for the restoration of public order; and.., under this theory
the arrest and detention, under the circumstances stated, can be justified and
must be upheld." '9 5 Wiener has pointed out that ". . . even in jurisdictions
that never embraced any of the martial law excesses, the principle that the mili'
tary may temporarily detain ringleaders in riot situations has been sustained."496
However, there have been no recent decisions on the matter, and it is most
doubtful that military detention would be upheld in light of the more modem
Supreme Court decisions. 497
of excessive bail ever reach the appellate courts; self-restraint and personal ethics
are the only real controls over improper use of bail. Id. at 705 (footnotes omitted).
487 F. WIENER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAw 76 (1940).
488 Id. at 66.
489 38 N.M.53, 28 P.2d 4 (1933).
490 Id. at 57-58, 28 P.2d at 6-7. See also In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57 P. 706 (1899),
appeal dismissed, 178 U.S. 611 (1900); In re McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 143 P. 947 (1914).
491 35 Colo. 159, 85 P. 190 (1904); cf. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
492 In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 159, 170, 85 P. 190, 194, (1904).
493 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
494

Id. at 85.

495 In re McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 462, 143 P. 947, 949-50 (1914).
496 Wiener, Helping to Cool the Long Hot Summers, 53 A.B.A.J. 713, 716 (1967).
497 Helman, Inciting to Riot, 72 CASE & COMMENT 26, 27 (Nov.-Dec. 1967).
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D. Search and Seizure During a Riot
1. The Requirement of a Warrant
The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affinmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.49
Traditionally, the wording of the amendment has been construed as requiring
a warrant in the absence of extreme circumstances. 99 This construction of the
amendment reached its high point in Trupiano v. United States0 0 which held
that the police were required to obtain a warrant before conducting a search
whenever it was possible to do so. 01 However, this approach was later specifically
rejected by the Court in United States v. Rabinowitz:. 2
To the extent that Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, requires a
search warrant solely upon the basis of the practicability of procuring it
rather than upon the reasonableness of the search after a lawful arrest,
that case is overruled. The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to
procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable. That
criterion in turn depends upon the facts and circumstances- the total
atmosphere of the case.5 0 3 (Emphasis added.)
In later decisions, however, the Court has severely undermined the Rabinowitz
approach to such an extent that it may have reverted to the Trupiano standard.
In one of the most recent decisions on the point, Camara v. Municipal Court,"°4
which overruled Frank v. Maryland,"5 Justice White, speaking for the Court,
said:
Nevertheless, one governing principle, justified by history and by current
experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully
defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search
warrant. 506

The Camara court went on to favorably cite from Johnson v. United States,"'r
a pre-Rabinowitz case that struck down a search without a warrant on the
ground that the police reasonably could have obtained a warrant where they
498

499
500
501
502
503
504
505

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948).
334 U.S. 699 (1948).
Id. at 705.
339 U.S. 56 (1950).
Id. at 66.
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
359 U.S. 360 (1959)

(allowing administrative searches without a warrant).

506 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). See also Chapman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
507 333 U.S. 10 (1948), cited in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 529 (1967).
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smelled burning opium coming from the defendant's hotel room. 0 a The part
of the Johnson opinion cited favorably by the Camara court reads: "When the
right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be
decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement
509
agent.
Some commentators have also interpreted recent decisions of the Supreme
Court as indicating that the Court is coming back to Trupiano:
It is apparent that the Supreme Court has in the past regarded the
approach later taken in Rabinowitz as a backward step in constitutional
history and the development of human freedom and there are clear indications that it seems to think so at the present time. An examination of
the opinions in McDonald v. United States [335 U.S. 451 (1948)], Johnson
v. United States [333 U.S. 10 (1948)], and Taylor v. United States [286
U.S. 1 (1932)] demonstrates clearly that these cases turned upon the
availability of, and opportunity to procure, a search warrant. They are
still good law today. The very recent case of Chapman v.United States [365
U.S. 610 (1961)] is clear evidence of the present Court's intention to
revert to the spirit of the Trupiano rule, if not to its exact letter1O (Footnotes omitted.)
Thus, barring a emergency situation,51' the police must obtain a search warrant
from a magistrate before they may conduct a search of private property.
2. The Area Search
During the civil disorders in Plainfield, New Jersey in 1967, when forty-six
semi-automatic rifles were stolen from a nearby firearms plant, large numbers
of state policemen and National Guardsmen descended on the Negro section
of Plainfield and, without warrants, conducted a house-to-house search for the
stolen weapons. 5" Such activities are not unusual during riots 1 3 since the
police officers often wish to search large segments of the rebellious district for
weapons, loot, or the ingredients for Molotov cocktails. Because the recent
disturbances in this country have occurred in major urban areas with their
teeming tenements, massive public housing projects, and other multiple family
dwellings, a serious problem confronts the police when they attempt to obtain
a warrant to conduct a search in the area. The fourth amendment requires
that the warrant state with particularity the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 14 Searches of an area pursuant to15a warrant that
5
fails to meet this specificity requirement are necessarily illegal.
508 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
509 Id. at 14, cited in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 529 (1967).
510 E.g., Day & Berkman, Search and Seizure and the Exclusionary Rule: A Re-Examination in the Wake of Mapp v. Ohio, 13 W. RPs. L. REv. 56, 88 (1961).
511 See text accompanying notes 524-39 infra.
512 GOVERNOR'S SELECT COMMISSION ON CmviL DisoRDER, STATE OF Nnw JERSEY, REPORT
FOR ACTION 150-52 (1968); Note, Riot Control and the Fourth Amendment, 81 HAxv. L.
REv. 625 (1968).
513 Note, supra note 512.
514 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See text accompanying note 498 supra for the language of this
amendment.
515 See Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 739 (1961) (concurring opinion of
Justice Black).
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The specification of the place to be searched must be sufficiently
detailed to make clear the search area in which there is probable cause
to believe a crime has been committed; a general or roving search warrant
is invalid. Thus a warrant describing an entire building as the place to
be searched is invalid where probable cause has been shown only for
searching one room or apartment. 16 (Footnotes omitted.)
In the Camara decision, the Supreme Court stated that it would continue to
forbid any type of sweeping or area search, despite the public interest that may
be involved.
. .. [I]n a criminal investigation, the police may undertake to recover specific stolen or contraband goods. But that public interest would hardly
justify a sweeping search of an entire city conducted in the hope that these
goods might be found. Consequently, a search for these goods, even with
a warrant, is "reasonabl&' only when there is "probable caus&' to believe
that they will be uncovered in a particular dwelling.sr 7
With regard to searches of apartments, tenements, or other multiple family
dwellings, the courts have been uniform in holding that probable cause must
be shown for each unit to be searched and that a warrant may not be issued
for the entire building unless probable cause is separately shown for each individual unit therein."'
Federal courts have consistently held that the Fourth Amendment's
requirement that a specific "place" be described when applied to dwellings
refers to a single living unit (the residence of one person or one family).
Thus, a warrant which describes an entire building when cause is shown
for searching only one apartment is void.5 19
That the courts will not tolerate the use of area searches as was done in
Plainfield was demonstrated by the Fourth Circuit in Lankford v. Gelston s2 °
which enjoined the Baltimore Police Department from indiscriminately searching Negro homes while looking for two brothers who killed one city policeman
and wounded another. 21 The court concluded that federal courts, although
516 Day & Berkman, supra note 510, at 78. See also Note, supra note 512, at 628.
517 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
518 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sunrise Prods. Co. v. Epstein, 33 F.2d 982 (E.D.N.Y.
1929); People v. Estrada 234 Cal. App. 2d 136, 44 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1965); People v. Johnson,
49 Misc. 2d 244, 267 N.Y.S.2d 301 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County, 1966); Crossland v. State,
206 P.2d 649 (Okla. Ct. Grim. App. 1958); State v. Costakos, 226 A.2d 695 (R.I. 1967).
519 United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324, 326 (7th Cir. 1955).
520 364 F. 2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
521 From December 24, 1964, to January 12, 1965, the Baltimore police conducted 300
such searches of Negro homes looking for the suspects. Id. at 199 n.3. The method used
in the search was appalling:
Four officers carrying shotguns or submachine guns and wearing bulletproof
vests would go to the front door and knock. They would be accompanied or followed by supervising officers, a sergeant or lieutenant. Other men would surround the
house, training their weapons on windows and doors. "As soon as an occupant
opened the door, the first man would enter the house to look for any immediate
danger, and the supervising officer would then talk to the person who had answered
the door. Few stated any objection to the entry; some were quite willing to have
the premises searched for the Veneys, while others acquiesced because of the show
of force." Id. at 199.
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reluctant to intervene in local law enforcement activities, will nevertheless grant
22
It
equitable relief to stop invasions of constitutional rights by local officials.
is especially significant to note that, in deciding to grant the injunction, the Lankford court considered the psychological effects that such police tactics would
have on the ghetto residents.
Courts cannot shut their eyes to events that have been widely publicized throughout the nation and the world. Lack of respect for the police
is conceded to be one of the factors generating violent outbursts in Negro
communities. The invasions so graphically depicted in this case "could"
happen in prosperous suburban neighborhoods, but the innocent victims
know only that wholesale raids do not happen elsewhere and did happen
to them. Understandably they feel that such illegal treatment is reserved
for those elements who the police believe cannot or will not challenge them.
It is of the highest importance to community morale that the courts shall
give firm and effective reassurance, especially to those who feel
23 that they
have been harassed by reason of their color or their poverty.
Thus, those charged with riot prevention and riot control should be most reluctant, for both practical and legal reasons, to resort to the sweeping area searches
that were used in Plainfield and condemned in Baltimore.
3. Searches in an Emergency Situation
The primary exception to the warrant requirement applicable in riot conditions52 is the traditional consideration that justifies searches without a warrant
in an emergency situation. 25 This exception was recognized by Justice Brennan,
speaking for the court in Warden v. Hayden,526 where he said: "The Fourth
Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.""s
This emergency exception applies ".... when a police officer obtains certain
knowledge of a grave and pending peril inside a dwelling, which permits of no
delay... .""' Such a case was demonstrated in People v. Gilbert52 where police
in pursuit of fleeing suspects, who had already mortally wounded one policeman, were allowed to break into the apartment of one of the suspects since he
was armed and dangerous. However, it must be pointed out that, in applying
522 Id. at 201.
523 Id. at 203-04.
524 There are four major exceptions to the warrant requirement: (1) consent, (2) search
incident to an arrest, (3) search based on probable cause that a felony has been committed
(This exception is, of course, based on the Rabinowitz approach which later Court decisions
have virtually made meaningless, see notes 504-10 supra and accompanying text; and has
been specifically rejected for dwellings, see cases cited at Day & Berkman, supra note 510, at
87 n.193), (4) search in an emergency. Day & Berkman, supra note 510, at 80. Since the
emergency situation seems primarily applicable to riot conditions, that is where this discussion
will center.
525 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (dictum).
526 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
527 Id. at 298-99. It might be noted that the emergency situation includes the right to
follow and search a fleeing suspect to avoid the destruction of the evidence, a situation probably
not relevant to riot conditions. See Day & Berkman, supra note 510, at 80.
528 DeBerry & Mueller, Pending Peril and the Right to Search Dwellings, 58 W. VA. L.
Rav. 219, 235 (1956).
529 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965), vacated on different grounds,
388 U.S. 263 (1967).
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this exception, the courts have been very strict in requiring the actual existence
of a grave emergency. 30
As to be expected, this exception does have significant application under
riot conditions since "... if a policeman sees a sniper or a firebomber in a window of a building he may immediately enter the building to search for both
the sniper or bomber and his weapons." ' ' The necessity and utility of this exception to law enforcement officers engaged in suppressing a riot are quite
obvious.
There has been a long-standing tradition in the law, starting with Semayne's
Case..2 in 1603 and now generally codified, 3 3 that a police officer in performing a
lawful search of a dwelling must first announce to the occupants his authority
and purpose before he may forcibly enter the premises. The federal statute is
typical of the law on this point.
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a
house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search
warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the
execution of the warrant. 8 4 (Emphasis added.)
But this announcement requirement, like the warrant requirement, has recognized an exception in the case of an emergency situation, although this exception has never been codified. 5 If there is imminent danger to the officers or
to a third person that would be increased by an announcement of authority
and purpose, the officers are excused from making the announcement and are
entitled to make immediate forcible entry.53 6 But if there is no impending peril
to the officers or to others, a forcible entry without a prior announcement of
authority and purpose and without a refusal of admittance cannot be sanctioned. 7 Examples of the type of emergencies that justify forcible entry are
set out in Wayne v. United States:5""
Breaking into a home by force is not illegal if it is reasonable under
the circumstances.. . . A myriad of circumstances would fall within the
terms, "exigent circumstances" referred to in Miller v. United States [357
U.S. 301 (1958)] . . . , the sound of gunfire in a house, threats from
inside to shoot through the door at police, reasonable
grounds to believe
39
an injured or seriously ill person is being held with-in.
530 See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948); Ellison v. State,
383 P.2d 716, 720 (Alas. 1963); State v. Rogers, 270 Ohio 2d 105, 198 N.E.2d 796 (C.P.
Miami County 1963).
531 Note, supra note 512, at 626-27 (footnote omitted).
532 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603).
533 See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 308 n.8 (1958); Blakey, The Rule of
Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v. California, 112 U.

PA. L.
534
535
536
537
538
539

Rnv. 499, 508 (1964).
18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1964).
See Blakey, supra note 533, at 508.
E.g., People v. Hammond, 54 Cal. 2d 846, 357 P.2d 289, 9 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1960).
E.g., United States v. Barrow, 212 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963).
Id. at 212.
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Thus, when the police reasonably believe that a sniper or firebomber, or other
rioter intent on inflicting serious bodily harm on the police or on others, is
within a dwelling place, the officers may forcibly enter and arrest said person
and conduct a search for his weapons even though they do not possess a warrant.
IV. Civil Liability for Riot Damage
At the outset of this Note, it was recognized that the recent disturbing
increase in large-scale riots is essentially a socio-economic phenomenon, the
intricate causes of which are beyond the scope of legal analysis. Nevertheless,
the basic premise of this Note is that when a riot is imminent or in progress,
the problem becomes one of immediate and efficient implementation of the
state's police power to maintain or re-establish public order. In practice this
means principally the promise of criminal sanctions against those who would
riot and the imposition of such sanctions against those who have rioted. The
emphasis of this Note to this point has been upon the numerous and difficult
legal problems that surround the effective use of criminal sanctions to prevent
and control riots.

But there is another aspect of large-scale rioting that has yet to be considered- the aftermath. Every year, long after the seething summer nights
have passed, more and more American cities carry the scars of untold property
damage, and more and more Americans carry scars on their own bodies.""
However, the real cost of mob violence has a way of escaping most Americans
because they tend to view the property damage, injuries, and loss of life in terms
of gross figures, failing to recognize that many, if not most, of the scars of mob
violence represent personal tragedies to their victims. In recognition of this fact,
the emphasis of this Note turns from the criminal sanctions available to society
at large for its protection from riots to a consideration of some of the civil
remedies available to riot victims against those responsible for their damages."'
540
541

See note I supra and accompanying text.
The focus here will be on the liability of those individuals and groups responsible for

the riot damage. There are two other possible sources of recovery for the riot victim which
initially appear to be much more appropriate for the satisfaction of large damage claims,
namely, insurance coverage and liability of the governmental unit.
Under present conditions, however, the chances that a riot victim will have insurance
to cover his injuries are becoming increasingly slight. The huge losses that have been suffered by insurance companies as a result of the recent riots have caused the companies to
refuse to sell or renew policies to owners of property particularly susceptible to riot damage.
The result is an insurance crisis in the urban core of most large American cities. The
President's National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas has recently published its report "Meeting the Insurance Crisis of Our Cities," which provides a detailed
analysis of the problems and proposes various solutions, including the use of urban area plans
and insurance pools, with state and federal backing. The five-part program of the Panel has
received approval in the recently published RIOT CoMMISON REPORT, supra note 2, at
360-62. See generally Comment, Insurance Protection Against Civil Demonstrations, 7 B.C.
IND. & Com. L. REv. 706 (1966); Note, Riot Insurance, 77 YALE L.J. 541 (1968).
Municipal and county liability for riot damage is also fraught with numerous problems.
Some fifteen or twenty states presently have statutes that impose some degree of liability on
cities or counties. Almost all, however, are severely limited in some way such as a restriction
on the amount of damages recoverable, or a requirement of a showing of negligence on the
part of the municipality; others cover only property damage or only personal injuries. In
the absence of any such statute, the traditional doctrine of governmental immunity remains
a substantial barrier to municipal liability despite recent judicial inroads in some jurisdictions.
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A. Liability of Persons Who Participatein Mob Violence
It has been said that "[s]trictly speaking, there exists no civil action for
riot, rout, or unlawful assembly, but only an action for damages as a result
'
of the trespasses or assaults committed pursuant to the mob enterprise."542
This
absence of a separate legal remedy is reflected in the sparsity of authority that
attributes any legal significance at all to the fact that the tortfeasor was a member
of a mob. 4 One of the few civil cases that even adverts to "mob action" is
54 in which
Stevens v. Sheriff
the plaintiff sued a number of persons alleging
that they assaulted him and destroyed personal property belonging to him. The
trial court had instructed the jury that the plaintiff could recover only if he
proved his allegation that the defendants constituted a mob. The Supreme
Court of Kansas reversed saying:
The allegation of the petition that the defendants acted as a mob was an
immaterial one. It could have been obliterated without destroying or
changing the legal effect of the petition ....
.... It was apparently used either as a mere epithet or to imply such
a concert of action among the defendants as to constitute them joint
wrong-doers, and to render each one liable for the acts of any or all of
the others. In the latter case it was only repetition, for the specific averment
was also made that the defendants
5 45 acted in concert, and in pursuance and
furtherance of a common design.
A defendant who inflicts intentional injuries upon the person or property of
another can claim no defense not otherwise available to him simply because
he committed the acts during the course of a riot. Therefore, as against the
actual perpetrator of an intentional civil injury, the traditional forms of tort
liability are adequate to give a riot victim a cause of action.
Realistically, however, the personal injuries and property damage inflicted
during the course of a riot result from various degrees of participation by
numerous individuals. The plaintiff may be struck by one member of a mob
while several others hold him, various items of his property may be destroyed
by some members while still others may be shouting threats or giving encouragement to the actors, and finally there may be numerous other persons standing
at varying distances from the spectacle experiencing emotions ranging from
delight to indignation. The degree to which each of these persons is subject,
But even absent these limitations, it is doubtful whether local governments could bear the
financial burden of liability for riot damage. See generally Note, Riot Insurance, 77 YALE
L.J. 541 (1968); Sengstock, Mob Action: Who Shall Pay the Price?, 44 J. URBAN L. 407
(1967).
542 46 AM. JUR. Riots and Unlawful Assembly § 18 (1943).
543 An annotation located at 27 A.L.R. 549 (1923), entitled "Civil Liability of Member
of a Mob," is apparently the only annotation in the entire ALR series of volumes that treats
this topic. Significantly, the annotation is only two and one half pages long and discusses
only seven cases, the most recent being a 1922 case. The four volumes of supplemental decisions to the first ALR series, the last volume of which was published in 1967, cite only two
additional cases. 2 A.L.R. BLUE Boox oF SUPPLEMENTAL DECISIONs 67 (1952); 3 A.L.R.
BLUE Boox op SUPPLEMENTAL DEcisIONs 72 (1958).
544 71 Kan. 434, 80 P. 936 (1905).
545 Id. at 435-36, 80 P. at 937. See also Dickson v. Yates, 194 Iowa 910, 188 N.W. 948
(1922).
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or should be subject, to tort liability gives rise to a difficult entanglement of
legal theory and factual distinction.
From the viewpoint of the injured plaintiff, what is sought is a device for
holding as many of the rioters as possible vicariously liable for the injuries
actually inflicted by a few. The usual approach taken by the plaintiffs in these
cases is the application of a theory of civil conspiracy. 4 Originally, the writ

of civil conspiracy was used against individuals who combined to abuse legal
procedure and thus was the forerunner of the modem action for malicious prosecution.547 Today, however, the civil action for conspiracy has broadened to
include any combination of two or more persons to accomplish by concerted
action an unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful
means. 4 It is a rather unusual form of tort remedy in the sense that it is not
generally regarded as a substantive tort; in fact, it "cannot be made the subject
of a civil action unless something has been done which, absent the conspiracy,
would give a right of action." 4 ' The utility of the civil action for conspiracy
is that it extends traditional forms of tort liability "beyond the active wrongdoer to those who have merely planned, assisted or encouraged his acts."55
[T]he major significance of the conspiracy lies in the fact that it renders
each participant in the wrongful act responsible as a joint tortfeasor for
all damages ensuing from the wrong, irrespective of whether or not he was
a direct actor and regardless of the degree of his activity.551
The theory of civil conspiracy as a "tort" has met with criticism on the
ground that it is a totally unnecessary addition to the law of torts.552 Its only
significant purpose of widening the sphere of available tortfeasors can usually
be accomplished just as well by direct factual allegations to the effect that the
546 Calcutt v. Gerig, 271 F. 220 (6th Cir. 1921); Weber v. Paul, 241 Iowa 121, 40 N.W.2d
8 (1949); Dickson v.Yates, 194 Iowa 910, 188 N.W.948 (1922).
547 W. PRossER, LAw oF TORTS § 43, at 260 (3d ed. 1964).
548 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 465 (1921); Neff v. World
Publishing Co., 349 F.2d 235, 257 (8th Cir. 1965). For a comprehensive state-arranged list
of cases substantially adopting this definition, as well as other definitions, see 15A O.J.S.
Conspiracy § 1, n.1 (1967).
549 Middlesex Concrete Prods. & Excavating Corp. v. Carteret Indus. Ass'n, 37 N.J. 507,
516, 181 A.2d 774, 779 (1962). A distinction must be drawn between civil conspiracy and
criminal conspiracy. The latter is a substantive criminal act in itself and the conspirators
may be guilty even if the conspiracy is thwarted, so long as there was some overt act towards
its accomplishment. United States v. Tutino, 269 F.2d 488, 491 (2d Cir. 1959). Likewise,
if a criminal conspiracy succeeds, the conspirators may be guilty of the offense of conspiracy
as well as the substantive crime. United States v. Palladino, 203 F. Supp. 35, 38 (D. Mass.
1962).
550 W. PROssER, supra note 547, § 43, at 260.

551 Mox, Inc. v. Woods, 202 Cal. 675, 677-78, 262 P. 302, 303 (1927). This proposition
is cited with favor in De Vries v. Brumback, 53 Cal. 2d 643, 349 P.2d 532, 536, 2 Cal. Rptr.
764, 768 (1960); see Royster v. Baker, 365 S.W.2d 496, 499 (Mo. 1963).
552 Hughes, The Tort of Conspiracy, 15 MODEPN L. Ray. 209 (1952). The author's
criticism is qualified by his suggestion that the remedy would not have to be dismissed as
superfluous if it were confined to acts that if done by one person would not give rise to
civil liability.. Relevant here is Dean Prosser's observation that some courts have recognized
"that there are certain types of conduct, such as boycotts, in which the element of combination adds such a power of coercion, undue influence or restraint of trade, that it makes
unlawful acts which one man alone might legitimately do." (Footnote omitted.) W. PRossma,
supra note 547, § 43, at 260. See, e.g., Snipes v. West Flagler Kennel Club, Inc., 105 So. 2d
164 (Fla. 1958).
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defendants acted as joint tortfeasors. Even without the theory of civil conspiracy,
it is a well recognized principle of tort law that all who command, direct,
advise, encourage, or otherwise aid and abet the commission of a tort are jointly
and severally liable with the active tortfeasor.555 Thus, it appears that an
allegation that the various defendants formed a conspiracy may be no more
necessary for a cause of action against them than was the allegation of the
5
plaintiff in Stevens v. Sheriff
' that the defendants constituted a "mob." In
that case, the plaintiff's specific averment that the defendants "acted in concert,
and in pursuance and furtherance of a common design,"'5 5 was sufficient to
state a cause of action against all of them in joint tortfeasors.
Whatever legal theory an injured riot victim adopts in hopes of enlarging
the class of possible defendants, whether it be by direct allegations that the
defendants acted in concert or by alleging a conspiracy, the real difficulty still
remains: the factual determination of who is a joint tortfeasor. The rhetoric
of joint liability - such phrases as "concerted action," "combination," "participation," "common design," and even "encouragement" and "assistance" offers little practical aid in determining where the line between liability and
non-liability should be drawn with regard to the "members" of a mob or a
conspiracy. While several states have passed statutes that apparently eliminate
any need for alleging a conspiracy as such in order to hold "... . each and every
person engaged or in any manner participating in the mob or riot" 55 6 liable for
all riot damage, they shed no light on the conduct necessary to make a person
present at the riot scene a "participant" in the riot for purposes of complete
vicarious liability. In recognition of the problem, the courts have attempted to
sharpen the dividing line between liability and non-liability by holding that a
participant in a mob or conspiracy need not be an original party,15 7 nor need
he be present at the actual infliction of the injury or damage, 5 8 nor is it necessary that he have knowledge of the details of the conspiracy so long as he has
knowledge of the common design.559 This common design is often stressed as
the essential element of a conspiracy,"' but this phrase too is blurred by numerous attempted clarifications. No formal or simultaneous agreement is necessary
to establish a conspiracy..1 and in fact it may even be implied from the circum553 See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.
1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 694 (1951); Oman v. United States, 179 F.2d 738 (10th Cir. 1949);
Hutto v. Kremer, 222 Miss. 374, 76 So. 2d 204 (1954); Kuhn v. Bader, 89 Ohio App. 203,
101 N.E.2d 322 (1951); W. PROSSER, supra note 547, § 43, at 259.
554 71 Kan. 434, 80 P. 936 (1905).
555 Id. at 435-36, 80 P. at 937. See text at notes 544 & 545 supra.
556 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 48-5 (1952). For similar language, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
16, § 11823 (1956) and S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-109 (1962).
557 Calcutt v. Gerig, 271 F. 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1921).
558 Id. See also De Vries v. Brumback, 53 Cal. 2d 643, 349 P.2d 532, 2 Cal. Rptr. 764
(1960).
559 Hux v. Butler, 220 F. Supp. 35, 41 (W.D. Tenn. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 339
F.2d 696 (6th Cir. 1964); Bedard v. La Bier, 20 Misc. 2d 614, 616-17, 194 N.Y.S.2d 216,
220 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
560 Neff v. World Publishing Co., 349 F.2d 235, 257 (8th Cir. 1965); Rettinger v. Pierpont, 145 Neb. 161, 195, 15 N.W.2d 393, 411 (1944). Also see cases cited in note 559
supra.
561 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939); Otto Milk Co.
v. United Dairy Farmers Cooperative Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 381, 385 (W.D. Pa. 1966); John
Wright & Associates, Inc. v. Ullrich, 203 F. Supp. 744, 750 (D. Minn. 1962), aff'd, 328
F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1964).
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stances. In the case of Calcutt v. Gerig, n2 the court stated the generally accepted view:
While perhaps there is no proof in this record, of any preliminary
meeting of these plaintiffs in error, or of a definite plan or agreement
entered into by them to injure plaintiff in his person or property or deprive him of his lawful rights as an American citizen, yet such proof is
not essential to the establishing of a conspiracy, and indeed would be
wholly impossible in the great majority of cases of this character for the
evident reason that conspirators do not, as a rule, invite the public into their
confidence or advise the contemplated victim or victims in reference to
such preliminary matters. ... It is sufficient if the proof shows such a
concert of action in the commission of the unlawful act or such other facts
and circumstances from which the natural inference arises that the unlawful
overt act was in furtherance of a common design,
intention, and purpose
6
of the alleged conspirators to commit the same. 3
On the other hand, the courts recognize the need for keeping the civil
remedies of conspiracy and joint liability within reasonable - and constitutional - limits. Thus, while an agreement may be inferred from the circumstances, "[m]ere association does not constitute a conspiracy."58 4 _Lkewise,
mere suspicion or knowledge of another's independent acts, or even acquiescence
in or approval of them, without some form of cooperation or agreement to
cooperate, is not sufficient to constitute one a joint tortfeasor or a party to a
5
conspiracy. 65
Despite these judicial attempts to clarify the nature of liability for conspiracy
or concert of action, the results are far from satisfying. A workable criterion for
determining the liability or non-liability of any given "member" of a riot or
conspiracy must depend, as in so many other areas of law, upon the facts of
the individual case. An examination of the factual situations involved in the
relatively few cases that have dealt with the liability of members of a mob,"'
whether such liability is based on conspiracy or directly upon a finding of concerted action, reveals a similarity which is disturbingly absent in the large-scale
riots that cities have been experiencing recently. The typical situation presented
by the cases is a relatively small group of angry citizens who converge on the
plaintiff's house to force him to leave town 7 or to cancel a judgment he had
recovered from one of them," ' or who are intent on destroying his stock of
liquor and cigars,"" preventing him from putting on his traveling minstrel

562 271 F. 220 (6th Cir. 1921).
563 Id. at 222.
564 Hoffman v. Herdman's Ltd., 41 F.R.D. 275, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) and cases cited
therein at n.3.

565

Harris v. Capitol Records Distrib. Corp., 64 Cal. 2d 454, 413 P.2d 139, 145, 50 Cal.

Rptr. 539, 545 (1966); Aaron v. Dausch, 313 Ill.
App. 524, 535, 40 N.E.2d 805, 810 (1942);
American Security Benevolent Ass'n, Inc. v. District Ct. of Black Hawk County, 147 N.W.2d
55, 63 (Iowa 1966).
566 See note 543 supra.
567 Saunders v. Gilbert, 156 N.C. 463, 72 S.E. 610 (1911).
568 Weber v. Paul, 241 Iowa 121, 40 N.W.2d 8 (1949).
569 Stevens v. Sheriff, 71 Kan. 434, 80 P. 936 (1905).
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show,5"" or tarring and feathering him for unpatriotic conduct during a war.""
In all of these cases, two factors are present: first, the size of the mob is not overwhelming and second, it is possible to speak of a common design to inflict
injury upon a definite individual or group of individuals for preconceived, and
to a certain extent rational, reasons. The effect was to give the respective courts
patterns of conduct that could be reasonably evaluated in the light of the admittedly vague standards of "concert of action," "participation," and "activity
in furtherance of a common design."
But the recent mob violence seems to be a different kind of social phenomenon. It is characterized by irrationality and hysteria rather than by common design or purpose. It is rarely directed against any particular individual,
but rather against society itself; and, for most of the participants, it is a matter
of being caught up in a human juggernaut rather than acting in furtherance
of a common plan. The old standards may still prove to be useful in finding
joint liability for those whose actual conduct or encouragement contributes
immediately to the particular injury and also in exonerating those whose participation is limited to physical presence along with mere knowledge, acquiescence,
or approval. But unlike in the earlier cases, there exist today numerous individuals whose boisterous allegiance to the ultimate group goals of social and
economic betterment inspires the more militant members of the group to acts
of destruction. As yet, there is no indication in the courts of any trend to extend
the scope of joint liability to include this intermediate group of "rioters," even
in those jurisdictions that have adopted statutes purporting to make any person
in any way participating in a riot jointly liable for all resulting damage." 2 This
notable lack of any movement to expand the liability of riot participants may
simply reflect recognition on the part of plaintiffs and their lawyers that it is
quite futile to attempt to satisfy judgments against rioters, regardless of the number
that are joined as defendants. On the other hand, it is fair to speculate that
if riot damage continues its upward spiral, while the availability of riot insurance
7
to property that is more susceptible to mob violence continues to decrease,1
greater attention may be given to holding as many rioters as possible jointly
liable for the damage they collectively cause.
B. Liability of Persons Who Incite Mob Violence
In light of what has been said regarding the civil liability of participants
in a riot, the need to devote separate attention to the civil liability of those whose
words and actions have the effect of inciting a riot57 may not be clear. To be
sure, the general principle of tort liability that one who counsels, incites, encourages or otherwise aids and abets a third party in the commission of an
intentional tort is treated as a principal is adequate to hold the inciter of a
570 Calcutt v. Gerig, 271 F. 220 (6th Cir. 1921).
571 Walker v. Kellar, 226 S.W. 796 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
572 See note 556 supra and accompanying text.
573 See note 541 supra.
574 This broad phrase was purposely chosen to include both intentional incitement to
riot and speech which, under the circumstances, merely has the tendency to incite a riot and
in fact does. Each type of speech will be considered separately.
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riot jointly liable for all the resulting riot damage.57 5 Likewise, incitement alone
is sufficient to make a person a member of a conspiracy and thereby render him
civilly liable for the wrongs committed by the more active conspirators.5 76 However, there are enough significant differences between the person whose words
incite others to riot and the actual participant in a riot to warrant separate
treatment of the problems involved in the civil liability of the inciter. First of
all, there is a chronological difference in that, although his civil liability cannot
arise until an injury has occurred, the inciter's role has been completed and
he may not even be present during the riot itself.57 Secondly, his responsibility
may be fixed more readily than that of other individual participants because
his conduct is, to a variable extent, isolated both in time and kind, with the
result that he is less likely to remain anonymous. Finally, and most importantly,
the use of language that has the effect of inciting a riot, especially if incitement
was not the intention of the speaker, raises significant first amendment problems
that do not exist with respect to the riotous activity itself.

8

1. Intentional Incitement
As is the situation with regard to the civil liability of rioters, there are
few reported cases that find civil liability for riot damage on the part of those
who intentionally incite a riot 7 - probably in recognition of the fact that
payment of a judgment by the inciter of a riot is generally as unlikely as by
the rioters themselves. The tort case against the party who intends to incite
a riot, however, seems to be as strong as that against the active participants in
the riot. One court has stated:
It would seem almost unnecessary to say that persons responsible for mob
violence cannot escape liability for the necessary and natural consequences
thereof. It would be just as reasonable to say that a man might start a
fire, and then by retiring to some distant spot avoid responsibility for the
destruction wrought by the conflagration he initiated. 5 0
575 See note 533 supra and accompanying text.
576 Calcutt v. Gerig, 271 F. 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1921).
577 In criminal actions involving a riot, the courts are careful to note that the crimes of
inciting a riot and participating in a riot are separate and distinct offenses.
Inciting to riot is not a constituent element of riot; they are separate and distinct
offenses. * * * One may incite a riot and not be present or participate in it, or
one may be present at a riot, and by giving support to riotous acts be guilty of
riot, yet not be guilty of inciting to riot. State v. Cole, 249 N.C. 733, 740-41, 107
S.E.2d 732, 738, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 867 (1959), quoting from Commonwealth v. Safis, 122 Pa. Super. 333, 340, 186 A. 177, 180 (1936).
578 Although a riot may be both a form of assembly and a form of expression, the first
amendment only protects "the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. amend. I (emphasis added).
579 The standard definition of the crime of incitement to riot is
such a course of conduct, by the use of words, signs or language, or any other
means by which one can be urged on to action, as would naturally lead, or urge
other men to engage in or enter upon conduct which, if completed, would make
a riot.
Commonwealth v. Hayes, 205 Pa. Super. 338, 341, 209 A.2d 38, 39 (1965); accord, State v.
Cole, 249 N.C. 733, 107 S.E.2d 732, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 867 (1959); 77 C.J.S. Riot §
1 (1952). Although no case has been found that has considered the question, there is no
apparent reason why this description of criminal incitement to riot could not be applied to
tortious incitement to riot, with the added stipulation that the riot must actually occur and
the plaintiff suffer injury as a result.
580 Calcutt v. Gerig, 271 F. 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1921).
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It is generally recognized that the fact that injury or damage is actually
inflicted by a third person who himself commits a tortious or criminal act does
not relieve the instigator of equal liability for the tort. If the instigator "intends
to cause a third person to do a particular act in a particular manner, he is subject
to liability for any harm to others caused by that act, although the third person's
act is negligent or even criminal." ' ' This principle is widely accepted and
applied in almost all areas of intentional tort liability: a person who encourages
or incites another to commit assault and battery on a third person,"" to libel or
slander him,5" 3 or to falsely imprison him 4 is jointly liable with the perpetrator
for all the resultant damages. Clearly, therefore, on the basis of ordinary principles of tort liability, a person who intentionally incites a riot which results in
injury to an innocent party should bear joint liability with the rioters.
One possible barrier to the civil liability of one who intentionally incites
a riot is the fact that his utterances may be protected by the first amendment
guarantee of freedom of speech. However, this contention hardly seems to be
a plausible one in view of the numerous cases upholding criminal convictions
of those whose speech constituted a clear and present danger of inciting riotous
or seditious conduct," 5 even though the threatened violence did not materialize.
The contention becomes even weaker in a tort action when an actual riot has
resulted from the inciter's speech and the plaintiff has suffered injury during
this intended riot. Likewise, first amendment rights are not sufficient to protect the speaker from civil remedies when he has used speech to inflict intentional harm on the plaintiff. The typical example, of course, is civil liability
for libel and slander 8 6 where the injury caused to the plaintiff is the direct
result of the speech alone. It is inconceivable that speech, operating in conjunction with an intended separate tortious invasion of the plaintiff's interests,
could give the speaker first amendment protection.58 One court has put the
inevitable conclusion this way: "Nobody doubts that, when the leader of a
mob already ripe for riot gives the word to start, his utterance is not protected
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 303, comment c, at 94 (1965).
582 Thompson v. Johnson, 180 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1950); Hargis v. Horrine, 230 Ark.
502, 323 S.W.2d 917 (1959); Duke v. Feldman, 245 Md. 454, 226 A.2d 345 (1967); Pike
v. Eubank, 197 Va. 692, 90 S.E.2d 821 (1956).
583 Kilian v. Stackpole Sons, 98 F. Supp. 500 (M.D. Pa. 1951); Greer v. Skyway Broadcasting Co., 256 N.C. 382, 124 S.E.2d 98 (1962); Bebout v. Pense, 35 S.D. 14, 150 N.W.
289 (1914).
584 Palmentere v. Campbell, 344 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1965); Miller v. Stinnett, 112 App.
D.C. 329, 257 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1958); Knupp v. Esslinger, 363 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. App.
1962).
585 See notes 52-60 supra and accompanying text.
586 The Supreme Court has said that "...
it must be emphasized that malicious libel
enjoys no constitutional protection in any context." Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers
of America, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 63 (1966). See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130, rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967).
587 The tendency is exactly the opposite-to give greater protection to "pure speech"
than to "speech-in-action":
We emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets
and highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by
pure speech. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
See also NAACP v. Overstreet, 221 Ga. 16, 142 S.E.2d 816, cert. granted, 382 U.S. 937
(1965), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 384 U.S. 118, rehearing denied, 384 U.S.
981 (1966).
581
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by the [First] Amendment." " But whether the inciter merely gives the word
to start or whether he also assists in the ripening process, he should bear the
consequences of his tortious conduct without protection from the first amendment.
2. Words or Conduct Unintentionally Resulting in Mob Violence
Where any group of people in a common situation views its lot as one
of social and economic subordination, as in the case of racial minorities, or as
one of authoritarian oppression, as in the case of certain elements of the younger
generation, it may take far less than direct and intentional incitement to impel
the group to violent rebellion. The power of suggestion,8S or even the mere
act of calling the group together for the purpose of "discussion" may be entirely
sufficient to spark an explosion. What then is the liability of the individual who,
while avoiding actual incitement, reminds a "mob already ripe for riot" of their
common miseries, or who calls for a "peaceful" demonstration at a time and
place, and under circumstances that would indicate to a reasonable man that
it is substantially certain that mob violence will ensue and innocent persons will
be injured? In terms of criminal liability, the question has apparently been
resolved in favor of the agitator on fi'st amendment grounds; 9 0 civil liability
is another question. There are at least three grounds upon which the civil
liability of the riot agitator or demonstration organizer could be based: 1.)
ordinary principles of negligence, 2.) violation of state law, and 3.) a kind of
strict liability for setting in motion forces that erupt into mob violence. Each
will be treated separately in terms of its basic elements, followed by a consideration of the possible limitations imposed on all three by the first amendment.
With reference only to general principles of tort liability for negligence,
an individual who addresses a crowd with words that are not intentionally designed to incite it to violence, but that should appear to a reasonable man
destined to have that effect, may be exposing himself to civil liability for resulting injuries. This may also be true with regard to the individual who assembles
the crowd initially, even for peaceful and legal purposes, where it is entirely
likely that, given the time, place, and all the circumstances, violence is likely
to erupt. The basis for these conclusions lies in the principle that an actor
whose conduct creates a known or knowable unreasonable risk of harm to another by the acts of third persons will not be relieved of liability because of those
intervening acts.59 ' For the purpose of determining whether the actor should
588

United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 207 (2d Cir. 1950),

aff'd, 341 U.S. 494

(1951).

589 Consider, for example, the following words of H. Rapp Brown, spoken at Cambridge,
Maryland, on the night of July 25, 1967, before a group assembled in the street:
You see that school over there . . . . Y'all should have burned that school a
long time ago. You should have burned it to the ground. Ain't no need in the
world, in 1967, to see a school like that sitting over there. You should have burned
it down and then go take over the honkey's school.
Soon after those words were spoken violence erupted and during the night the fifty-year-old,
all-Negro Pine Street Elementary School, to which Brown was referring, "was indeed burned

to the ground." Gottschalk, Just How Free Should Free Speech Be? Wall Street Journal,

October 19, 1967, at 16, col. 4 (Eastern ed.).
590 See notes 105-08 suprz and accompanying text.
591 Barclay Kitchen, Inc., v. California Bank, 208 Cal. 2d 347, 25 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Dist.
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recognize that his conduct involves a foreseeable risk of violence by third persons, he is required to know ". . . the qualities and habits of human beings...
and the qualities, characteristics, and capacities of . . . forces in so far as they
are matters of common knowledge at the time and in the community."' 2 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts makes it clear that this applies not only to the
ordinary qualities and habits of the majority of human beings, but also
. . . if the known or knowable peculiarities of even a small percentage of

human beings, or of a particular individual or class of individuals, are such
as to lead the actor to realize the chance of eccentric and improper action,
he is required to take this chance into account if serious harm to a legally
important interest is likely to result from such eccentric action . .. .93
Thus, an individual's conduct may be held to create an unreasonable risk of
harm where he brings into contact with third persons ".... a person whom the
actor knows or should know to be peculiarly likely to commit intentional misconduct, under circumstances which afford a peculiar opportunity or tempta'
tion for such misconduct."594
The application of these principles in a riot
context indicates that an agitator who merely tells an already angry crowd
what it wants to hear or a person who organizes a "peaceful" demonstration
under obviously volatile circumstances may be held accountable for the always
present militant minority who can be expected to use the assembly as an occasion for violence. It is no defense for the agitator that the foreseeable acts of
the rioters are criminal acts, 95 that the precise manner of the damage done or
the identity of the actual victims was not foreseeable,596 or that the police were
negligent in failing to control and disperse the mob or in failing to adequately
protect the injured persons. 9 The only defense apparently available is that
the risk created by the agitator's conduct was not an unreasonable one, as where
the activity was of "such preeminent social utility as to justify the serious character of risk involved therein."'5 9 What this means in terms of first amendment
Ct. App. 1962); Torrack v.Corpamerica, Inc., 51 Del. 254, 144 A.2d 703 (Super.Ct. 1958);
Johnson v. Clement F. Sculley Constr. Co., 255 Minn. 41, 95 N.W.2d 409 (1959); RnSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 302-302B (1965).
592 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 290(a) (1965).
593 Id. § 290, comment c, at 48.
594 Id. § 302B, comment e(D), at 91. See Shafer v. Keeley Ice Cream Co., 65 Utah
46, 234 P. 300, 38 A.L.R. 1523 (1925).
595 Barclay Kitchen, Inc. v. California Bank, 208 Cal. 2d 347, 25 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1962); Torrack v. Corpamerica, Inc., 51 Del. 254, 144 A.2d 703 (Super. Ct.
1958); W. PRossER, supra note 547, § 51, at 313-14.
596 "The defendant need not foresee the precise injury or the exact manner in which
it occurs .... It is sufficient if the result is within the ambit of risk created by defendant."
Barclay Kitchen, Inc. v. California Bank, 208 Cal. 2d 347, 25 Cal. Rptr. 383, 388 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1962). "It is sufficient [to establish defendant's liability] that he should have foreseen that his negligence 'would probably result in injury of some kind to someone....! "
Brown v. National Oil Co., 233 S.C. 345, 105 S.E.2d 81, 84 (1958); accord, Mathews v.
Porter, 239 S.C. 620, 124 S.E.2d 321, 324 (1962).
597 SEE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 290, comment n,at 53 (1965) which provides in part:
[An actor] .. . is not, with a few exceptions, entitled to expect that a risk which
is involved in his conduct will be prevented from taking effect in harm to others
by the positive action of a third person. And this is true even though the third
person is not only able to prevent the harm but under a duty to do so.
598 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 290, comment c,at 48 (1965).
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rights will be extensively considered in a later section of this Note." 9
A second possible ground for finding tort liability on the part of an agitator
or individual who causes the formation of a peaceful demonstration that erupts
into violence is based on the violation of a statute. As a general rule, the courts
look upon the standard of conduct embodied in a statute as a standard required
of a reasonable man, so that a violation of the statute may expose the violator
to civil as well as criminal liability. 00 It is probably safe to say that all courts
recognize, however, that not every violation of a statute constitutes actionable
negligence; the violation must be a proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages '
and must also be an unexcused violation. 0 2 In determining whether the violation of the statute constitutes negligence, the courts will usually look into the
purposes of the statute to determine whether the injured party was a member
of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted and whether the injury
caused by the defendant's act was the type of injury sought to be avoided by
the legislation. 05 However, once the statute is found to comprehend both the
plaintiff and his injury, the courts divide sharply as to the operative effect to
be given to the defendant's violation. The majority view is that the statutory
violation amounts to negligence per se and is therefore binding on a jury,' 4
while a significant minority hold that it is only evidence of negligence that the
jury is free to reject 5 Whichever approach is followed, the effect is clear with
respect to the individual whose conduct is found to be an unintentional but
proximate cause of a riotous disturbance: if he has failed to comply with any
constitutional statutes or ordinances 0 6 aimed at preserving the public order,
such as those requiring the securing of a parade permit and the notification of
police officials of a planned march, 0 7 the violation could be viewed as at least
some evidence of negligence in a damage action arising out of any violence that
may be attributed in part to the statutory violation. This is not to say, how-

599 See notes 612-74 infra and accompanying text.
600 Some of the courts adopt the legislative standard only out of deference and respect
for the legislature. See, e.g., Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 116 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1959); Rudes
v. Gottschalk, 159 Tex. 552, 324 S.W.2d 201 (1959). Other courts take the view that the
legislative standard is binding upon them. See, e.g., Lynghaug v. Payte, 247 Minn. 186, 76
N.W.2d 660 (1956); Scott v. Smith, 73 Nev. 158, 311 P.2d 731 (1957), overruled on other
grounds in Maxwell v. Amaral, 79 Nev. 323, 383 P.2d 365 (1963).
601 Kaplan v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 404 Pa. 147, 171 A.2d 166 (1961); Smith v.
Virginia Transit Co., 206 Va. 951, 147 S.E.2d 110 (1966).
602 RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 288 A (1965); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
§ 35, at 198-202 (3d ed. 1964); see New York Central RR. v. Glad, 242 Ind. 450, 179 N.E.2d
571 (1962).
603 Elder v. Fisher, 217 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. 1966); Kalkopf v. Donald Sales & Mfg. Co.,
33 Wis. 2d 247, 147 N.W.2d 277 (1967); W. PROSSER, supra note 602, § 35, at 193-98.
604 W. PROSSER, supra note 602, § 35, at 202. See, e.g., Foster v. Harding, 426 P.2d 355
(Okla. 1967); Alex v. Armstrong, 215 Tenn. 276, 385 S.W.2d 110 (1964); Bock Constr.
Co. v. Dallas Power & Light Co., 415 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
605 W. PROssER, supra note 602, § 35, at 202; see, e.g., Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md.
242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965); Peterson v. Skiles, 173 Neb. 470, 113 N.W.2d (1962).
606 Some courts that hold that violation of a statute is negligence per se take the view
that violation of an ordinance or traffic law is only evidence of negligence. But the prevailing
view is that a violation of an ordinance is not given a different effect from that accorded a
violation of a statute. See W. PRossER, supra note 602, § 35, at 203 & n.81.
607 For a discussion of these statutes or ordinances and their constitutionality, see notes
114-21 supra and accompanying text.
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ever, that statutory compliance automatically rules out the presence of ordinary
negligence.""
A third possible theory for civil liability of the agitator or organizer of a
peaceful demonstration that nonetheless results in violence is a kind of strict
liability based on the fact that the purpose of the demonstration was unlawful
or even the very fact that it has resulted in actual violence. The leading recent
case on both these points is the recent Georgia decision in NAACP v. Overstreet ° The plaintiff-owner of a grocery store had been accused of beating
and discharging a fourteen-year-old Negro employee for alleged stealing. The
officers of the local chapter of the NAACP responded by organizing a group
to picket the plaintiff's store for the purpose of publicizing a boycott of his
business. Despite the "peaceful" purpose that the picketing was intended to
accomplish, violence soon erupted; a large hostile crowd gathered, the plaintiff's
employees and customers were abused and threatened, bricks and rocks were
thrown through windows, at one point a shot was fired, and the plaintiffs
business suffered serious economic losses. He sued the individual officers, the
local NAACP chapters, and the national NAACP organization for damages
and recovered a judgment of $85,793, including $50,000 in punitive damages.
The basis of the court's decision was twofold: First, since the legality of civil
rights picketing depends on the presence of a genuine civil rights issue, the
purpose here was unlawful because the picketing was to punish the plaintiff for
his alleged assault and battery. Second, since the picketing was not peaceful,
it thereby became unlawful. On this latter point, the fact that the acts of violence may have been committed by members of the crowd attracted by the
picketers rather than the picketers themselves was held to be of no consequence
because the jury was justified in finding that "the presence of the pickets brought
about ... violence ... .""'0 The soundness of the case has been severely criticized, especially on first amendment grounds,""' a matter to be considered below
in a broader context, and there are as yet no cases that follow its bold initiative
in establishing an almost strict liability for violence caused by the very act of
carrying on a civil rights demonstration. Whatever its soundness, however, for
the present the case must be reckoned with as a sword of Damocles suspended
over the head of any individual who would organize even a peaceful demonstration.
The foregoing discussion of some of the possible grounds for holding one
whose conduct unintentionally causes a riot civilly liable for the resulting damage has been purposely framed solely in terms of traditional concepts of common-law tort liability and state-created legal rights. It is apparent, however,
608 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288 0 '(1965): "Compliance with a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence where
a reasonable man would take additional precautions."
609 221 Ga. 16, 142 S.E.2d 816, cert. granted, 382 U.S. 937 (1965), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 384 U.S. 118, rehearing denied, 384 U.S. 981 (1966). The holding
in this case may be restricted to its facts, see notes 667-74 infra and accompanying text.
610 142 S.E.2d at 825.
611 NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118 (1966) (dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas),
noted in 13 How. L.J. 193 (1967) and 27 OHIo ST. L.J. 361 (1966); Comment, Civil
Suits and Civil Rights: Recovery of Police Expenses, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 238, 260-63 (1966).
The decision, however, has been approved in one commentary. 37 Miss. L.J. 481 (1966).
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that the ultimate success of any of these theories of liability depends upon its
compatibility with the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and
assembly as defined by the United States Supreme Court. The position of the
Court with respect to its jealous guardianship of first amendment rights is indicated by the language in New York Times Company v. Sullivan1" regarding
civil liability for libel:
In deciding the question now, we are compelled by neither precedent nor
policy to give any more weight to the epithet "libel" than we 'have to
Like insurrection, contempt, adother "niere labels" of state law ....
vocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of
legal business, and the various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic
immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment. 613 (Footnotes omitted.)
The Court, however, has made it clear that it views its duty as going beyond
the mere elaboration of constitutional principles. When construction of first
amendment rights is at issue, the scope of review extends to an independent
examination of the whole record to assure that the principles are constitutionally
applied as well 1 In short, it can be expected that any state court decision
that finds a person civilly liable when his words or actions unintentionally result
in mob violence will be subject to final scrutiny by the Supreme Court, however sound the decision may be in terms of state law principles.
It may be argued that the Supreme Court would be without jurisdiction
to review such civil liability cases because the state action required by the fourteenth amendment is lacking 15 The Court, however, has soundly rejected the
argument that merely because the law suit is between private parties, state
action is necessarily absent. The Court's position is that the enforcement of
any right by the state's judicial machinery can supply the necessary state action
to bring the fourteenth amendment into operation and thereby provide the basis
for federal jurisdiction. 6
A related argument also designed to avoid federal jurisdiction is that since
a civil suit involves only private persons and a private quarrel, any constitutional
questions presented are incidental and too insignificant to warrant Supreme
612 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
613 Id. at 269. For a similar view, expressed with regard to traditional agency concepts,
see Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in NAACP v. Overstrieet, 384 U.S. 118, 124 (1966).
614 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964); see Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
615 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. '(Emphasis added.)
This necessity for state action as a prerequisite of federal power to protect the individual
from violation of his constitutional rights has recently been seriously questioned by a majority
of the Supreme Court in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). For an evaluation
of this position in Guest, in terms of its historical soundness, see Avins, Federal Power to
Punish Individual Crimes Under the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Understanding,
43 No=aa DAME LAWYER 317 (1968).
616 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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Court review. However, in New York Times Company v. Sullivan 17 the Court
recognized that many of the criminal-law safeguards, such as the requirement
of an indictment, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and double jeopardy protection, are not available in a civil action - a fact that results in ". . a form
of regulation that creates hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater than
those that attend reliance upon the criminal law."61 Accordingly, the Court
concluded that since the defendant's alleged libel was constitutionally beyond
the reach of the state's criminal libel statute, it must likewise be beyond the
reach of its civil law of libel. ' Although the Court in Sullivan was dealing with
a libel action, its reasoning would apply with equal strength to the case of an
individual whose conduct unintentionally sparks a riot; the mere fact that the
suit is a civil rather than a criminal action will not discourage review by the
Court of first amendment issues affecting the liability of the defendant.
Granting, then, that the limiting effect of first amendment rights would
apply with similar force in the area of civil liability, it is necessary to confront
the crucial issue: Is it an infringement of an individual's first amendment rights
of free speech and peaceful assembly to hold him civilly liable for damages
caused by mob violence where his acts were the unintentional though foreseeable
cause of the violence? As of this writing, the Supreme Court has not been confronted by this issue, nor apparently has any other court of record. However,
the first amendment rights of free speech and peaceful assembly have generated
a body of law that should readily permit the distillation of principles and the
construction of analogies.
In its role as final arbiter of the balance between first amendment rights
and a state's duty to protect domestic tranquillity, 20 the Supreme Court has
adopted the basic approach that complete freedom of speech is the rule, while
instances of unprotected speech, for which the speaker may be subjected to
potential criminal or civil liability, are exceptions. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire6 2 the Court stated:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words -those which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace. 622 (Footnotes omitted.)
The rationale of the Court in holding that these specified forms of speech are
not protected by the first amendment is that they
617 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
618 Id. at 278, quoting from Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
619 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964).
620 In the heat of the debate over the degree of preeminence to be accorded first amendment rights, there is a tendency to forget that the Preamble to the Constitution recites that
it was established to secure the "domestic Tranquility" as well as the "Blessings of Liberty.'"
621 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
622 Id. at 571-72. When Chapliusky was decided in 1942, it was true that libelous
utterances raised no "Constitutional problem." However, since the Court's adoption in New
York Times Company v. Sullivan of a standard of liability for libel of public officials based
on malice, libel has become a fertile source of constitutional controversy. See notes 644-60
infra and accompanying text.

[Vol. 43:913]

SURVEY

are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
623 them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
The approach of the Court thus seems to be that these categories of speech
are unprotected because they are bad in and of themselves, without regard to

the specific intention of the speaker or any harmful consequences that may
result.62 The states may accordingly prohibit or punish their very utterance.62 5
If speech having a tendency to incite a riot could be included with these
other categories of unprotected speech, the speaker could be subjected to criminal liability without showing that he intended to incite a riot or that one actually
occurred or was even imminent under the circumstances. It could then be
argued that, by analogy, there is no constitutional necessity for intentionalincitement in order to establish civil liability so long as the utterances constituted

incitement in fact and caused injury to the plaintiff. The language in Chaplinsky to the effect that "fighting" words include utterances that "tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace"6 6 would seem to support the conclusion
that the category of fighting words may be broad enough to include incitement
to riot. However, even before Chaplinsky, the Court had already given a clear

indication that it would not look upon incitement to riot as a category of speech
in itself prohibited. In Cantwell v. Connecticut2 the Court stated:
No one would have the hardihood to suggest that the principle of freedom
of speech sanctions incitement to riot ....
When clear and present danger
of riot, disorder, interference with traffic on the public streets, or other
immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of

the State to prevent or punish is obvious. 628

While the first part of the above quoted material indicates that speech constituting
incitement to riot is not constitutionally protected, the remainder makes it clear

that the non-protection arises not from the speech itself, but from its probable
effect under the specific circumstances.

The loss of constitutional protection

does not result because the utterances are necessarily "no essential part of any
exposition of ideas" or of little "social value as a step to the truth,"6 29 but
because they actually created an imminent threat of a substantial breach of
the public peace.
Whether, in addition to the clear and present danger of disorder, it must

be shown that the speaker actually intended to incite a riot was not directly
considered by the Court. However, the following statement in the Cauntwell
opinion may be enlightening.
One may ...

be guilty of [breach of the peace] if he commits acts or makes

623 Id. at 572.
624 See 0. PRITCHETr, CIVIL LmERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 65 (1954).
625 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). See Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957); Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
626 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
627 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
628 Id. at 308.
629 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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statements likely to provoke violence and disturbance of good order, even
though no such eventuality be intended. Decisions to this effect are many,
but examination discloses that, in practically all, the provocative language
which was held to amount to a breach of the peace consisted of profane,
indecent, or abusive remarks directed to the person of the hearer.630
(Emphasis added.)
The Court seems to be implying that no intent is required only if the language
constituting the breach of the peace consists of fighting words- speech that is
in and of itself unprotected. But if the speech is capable of conveying truth or
exposing an idea, there may be a requirement for an intent to incite the violence.
Eleven years later in Feiner v. New York,"-' the Court upheld the defendant's conviction for violating a statute prohibiting speech or conduct which
occasions, or by which the actor intends to incite, a breach of the peace. Quoting
from Cantwell, the Court relied essentially on the power of the state to respond
to an immediate threat to the public peace with prevention or punishment."3 2
But, in addition, the Court relied on the finding of the state courts that Feiner's
conduct under the circumstances amounted to intentional incitement of a breach
of the peace. 3 ' It seems, therefore, that the Court has taken the position that
the state has the power to prevent or punish a speaker whose words are tending
to provoke a breach of the peace, provided the "speaker passes the bounds of
argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot. .. ."" (Emphasis
added.) Since one of the recognized functions of speech is to invite dispute,
it cannot be prohibited or punished when it merely "induces a condition of
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people
to anger." 3 5
Thus, the Court relied on the absence of any actual incitement to violence
in Cox v. Louisiana s6 where the defendant had been convicted for disturbing
the peace under a statute that prohibited ". . . congregating with others 'with
intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circumstances such that a
breach of the peace may be occasioned ....
' ""'
(Emphasis added.) The
conviction was reversed ". . . as the statute is unconstitutional in that it sweeps
630

631
632

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940).

340 U.S. 315 (1951).
Id. at 320.

633 Id. at 319-20. In People v. Feiner, 300 N.Y. 391, 91 N.E.2d 316 (1950), the New
York Court of Appeals said that
[d]efendant, at the very least, knew of the condition [of the crowd] and was heedless
of the potential evil consequences. More, as found by the trial court, he deliberately continued in a vein calculated to precipitate those consequences. Id. at 400,
91 N.E. 320. For another portion of this opinion indicating the New York courts found Feiner
guilty of intentionally provoking a breach of the peace, see the Supreme Court's opinion in
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 319 n.2 (1951).
634 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951). In this regard, consider the following statement of the court in Allen v. District of Columbia, 187 A.2d 888 (D.C. App. 1961).
The appellant's conduct, and not the crowd's reaction to it, must be the starting
point, for "the measure of the speaker is not the conduct of his audience." . . .
Audience reaction, and the immediacy of disorder, become significant elements of
proof only after the speaker "passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and
undertakes incitement to riot." Id. at 889.
635 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).

636
637

379 U.S. 536 (1965).
Id. at 551.
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within its broad scope activities that are constitutionally protected free speech
and assembly." 8 ' It seems that each case must still be examined on its own
facts to determine whether the speaker was undertaking incitement or merely
inducing unrest.
Viewing this position of the Court that some intention to incite a riot is
necessary to sustain a conviction together with the Court's statement in Sullivan
that what a state may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal
statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law, the inference can be drawn
that an intention to incite is a necessary element of civil liability for riot damage, regardless of the degree of foreseeability of the violence." 9 However, this
analogy between civil liability and criminal liability with regard to the inhibiting
effect of the first amendment is far from perfect.
First, in all of those cases' 4" in which the Court indicated a need for intent
to incite violence as a prerequisite to the state's right to punish the speech, no
violence in fact occurred. Where there is no violence and no intent to incite
violence, the imposition of criminal sanctions upon speech that does not of itself
fall into one of the prohibited categories such as obscenity or fighting words
has all the appearances and connotations of a prior restraint.6 41 On the other
hand, in any civil action for damages, violence has necessarily occurred and
injuries have been suffered. The speaker is not, therefore, being silenced or
punished for his speech in itself or even for any threatened violence, but rather
he is only being held accountable for injuries in fact resulting from his speech.
To hold a speaker liable for such injuries, even though unintentional, may be
no more of an unreasonable limitation on the right of free speech than to
designate certain categories as unprotected per se and punishable by the state
regardless of the intention of the person who uttered them.
The second factor that points up the difficulty in drawing an easy analogy
between criminal and civil liability in this area of free speech is that while the
criminal action is based on a violation of legitimate state interests, a civil action
is based on an invasion of the personal rights of the plaintiff. In effect, the
preeminence of first amendment rights in a civil action is determined by a balancing process between competing individual rights where in fact the "substan638

Id. at 552.

639 Proving the subjective intent of an individual is often extremely difficult. It is therefore
possible that the Court would consider a degree of foreseeability equivalent to substantial
certainty sufficient to indicate an intention to incite violence. On the other hand, because
of the vagueness of "substantial certainty," the Court may not be willing to accept such
indirect proof of intent where first amendment rights are at stake.
640 E.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315

(1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). See also Allen v. District of Columbia, 187 A.2d 888 (D.C. App. 1963).
641 The term "prior restraint" or "previous restraint" has long been one of the watchwords
used by the Supreme Court in its role as interpreter and guardian of first amendment rights.
Its meaning of the expression is evident from the following statement of Blackstone quoted
in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), concerning one of the first amendment rights
- freedom of the press:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from
censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted
right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy
the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal,
he must take the consequences of his own temerity. Id. at 713-14.
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tive evil . . .rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest""64
And so, while the Supreme Court should exercise the same degree of watchfulness against invasions of free speech and assembly in civil as well as in criminal
actions, it by no means follows that the same standard of intentional abuse
should apply.
On its face, the legal analogy that seems most appropriate to the solution
of the conflict between the demonstration organizer's rights of free speech and
the rights of the riot victim who has suffered personal injury or property loss
is the standard used by the Court to solve the conflict of similar competing
personal rights involved in civil libel suits. In Sullivan' the task of the Court
was ".... to determine for the first time the extent to which the constitutional
protections for speech and press limit a State's power to award damages in a
644
libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct."
Stressing the fact that it was a public official who was the object of the alleged
libel, the Court held that the first amendment requires a rule that
S.. prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice" -that is, with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.645

By requiring actual malice as a necessary element of a successful libel action, the
Court seemed to adopt a standard similar to the one applied in constitutionally
permissible convictions for incitement to riot and related crimes - the necessity
for deliberate or malicious abuse of first amendment rights. However, the Court
failed to give any indication whether "actual malice" was to be the only acceptable constitutional standard in all libel suits or only those involving public
officials. 46 Subsequent decisions of the state and lower federal courts, 6 47 and
even of the Supreme Court itself,648 left doubts as to whether the Sullivan standard
would be broadly applied in all libel actions.
642
643
644
645
646

Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 256.
Id. at 279-80.
We have no occasion here to determine how far down into the lower ranks of
government employees the "public official" designation would extend for purposes
of this rule, or otherwise to specify categories of persons who would or would not
be included .... Nor need we here determine the boundaries of the "official conduct" concept. Id. at 283 n.23.
647 For an extensive list of these cases, see Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
134 n.1 (1967).
648 In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the Court applied the Sullivan standard in reversing the conviction of the appellant for his allegedly libelous attacks on the
integrity and honesty of eight local judges. The Court found "no difficulty" in extending this
standard even though the state court had found that the attacks were not directed at any
official conduct of the judges. Id. at 76.
In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), the Court found that a former supervisor
of a public recreation area was a "public official" and that his libel judgment against a
newspaper columnist would have to be reversed for failure to apply the Sullivan standard.
The Court, however, added an interesting footnote hinting that society's strong and pervasive
interest in preventing and redressing attacks on reputation might preclude application of the
Sullivan standard where the libeled person is not a public official:
It is suggested that this test might apply to a night watchman accused of
stealing state secrets. But a conclusion that the New York Times malice standards
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But it was not until Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts" 9 that the Court
was squarely presented with the issue of whether or not actual malice or its
alternate, reckless disregard of the truth, is a constitutionally required element
of a civil libel action brought by a person who was a public figure but not a
public official. The Court was being asked to balance the interest of the
individual in his reputation against freedom of the press, as it was asked to do
in Sullivan, but with some critical differences: gone was the significant interest
of the public in scrutinizing the official conduct of its own servant; 5 0 gone also
was the danger that a recovery by the plaintiff would be viewed as a "vindication of governmental policy." '51 The issue, stated most narrowly, was whether
the absence of these elements from the publishers' side would unbalance the
scales of justice in favor of the individual's rights so as to require a less vigorous
standard of actionable libel than actual malice. Although the Court affirmed
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $460,000, it could not resolve this issue;
there was no majority opinion. Nonetheless, the plurality opinion6 52 of Justice
Harlan, joined by Justices Clark, Fortas, and Stewart, represents a definite
retreat from an across-the-board application of the actual malice standard of
Sullivan. The thesis of the opinion was that "the rigorous federal requirements
of New York Times are not the only appropriate accommodation of the conflicting interests at stake."65 In deciding upon an appropriate standard, the
opinion said:
apply could not be reached merely because a statement defamatory of some person
in government employ catches the public's interest; that conclusion would virtually
disregard society's interest in protecting reputation. The employee's position must
be one which would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it,
entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular charges
in controversy. Id. at 86 n.13.
Finally in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), the Court found the Sullivan standard applicable to a damage suit brought by a private individual whose personal life had
been exposed to the public view by a magazine review that had falsely stated that a certain
play was based on events involving him. Significantly, however, the suit was brought under
a state invasion of privacy statute and was not a libel suit. In fact, the false account portrayed the plaintiff in a favorable light. The Court expressly cautioned against reading the
case as an extension of the Sullivan standard to all libel actions:
We find applicable here the standard of knowing or reckless falsehood, not
through blind application of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, relating solely to
libel actions by public officials, but only upon consideration of the factors which
arise in the particular context of the application of the New York statute in cases
involving private individuals. This is neither a libel action by a private individual
nor a statutory action by a public official. Therefore, although the First Amendment principles pronounced in New York Times guide our conclusion, we reach
that conclusion only by applying these principles in this discrete context. Id. at 390-91.
649
388 U.S. 130, rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967). The case was argued with
Associated Press v. Walker and the opinion is written for both cases. Walker sued the Associated Press for alleged libel arising out of a dispatch which stated that he, a politically
prominent figure but not a public official, had encouraged and led a violent mob against
federal marshals on the University of Mississippi campus. The jury found this account to
be false and awarded him a damage verdict which the Supreme -Court reversed unanimously,
five justices applying the Sullivan standard and four applying the gross negligence standard
of Justice Harlan.
650 See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
651 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154 (1967).
652 The opinion represents an elaboration of the views expressed by Justice Harlan in
his opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,
402-11 (1967). See note 648 supra.
653 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
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We are prompted, therefore, to seek guidance from the rules of liability
which prevail in our society with respect to compensation of persons injured by the improper performance of a legitimate activity by another.
Under these rules, a departure from the kind of care society may expect
from a reasonable man performing such activity leaves the actor open
to a judicial shifting of loss.6 54
Justice Harlan concluded that
... a "public figure' who is not a public official may ... recover damages
for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to

reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and
reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.65 5 (Emphasis

added.)
Central to the opinion was the belief that application of the Sullivan
standard to all defamation suits brought by public figures would give first amendment rights a much greater weight than is necessary to maintain their ordained
primacy. As preferred rights, 56 they must be allotted sufficient "breathing
' 5
space' G
r so that they may be enjoyed without fearful reliance on a narrow and
indefinite boundary between protected and unprotected utterances. But to
hold that the breathing space should extend all the way to intentional or even
reckless abuse is to needlessly stifle the breathing space that other valuable individual rights need in order to survive. A far more reasonable approach would
be to protect false defamatory utterances so long as they are made innocently
or negligently but to withdraw protection when they are made in a grossly
negligent manner. In short, Harlan's opinion in Butts displays an implicit faith
in the proposition that the concept of the reasonably prudent man has a place
in the world of first amendment rights.65 s
In many respects, the constitutional issue to which Harlan's opinion is
addressed resembles the issue that would face the Court in a civil action against
an individual whose conduct has unintentionally, but foreseeably caused personal injury or property damage through mob violence. Both situations involve
654 Id. at 154.
655 Id. at 155.
656 "When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of
the people to enjoy [first amendment rights] . . . we remain mindful of the fact that the
latter occupy a preferred position." Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (footnote
omitted).
657 This phrase, first used by the Court in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963),
caught the fancy of the Court and has received heavy play in the recent cases dealing with
freedom of the press. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388, 407 (1967); Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 148 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
272 (1964).
658 This terminology is borrowed from Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, in 1967 THE SUPREME COURT REV. 267, 301, 303 (Kurland
ed.). This article is an excellent consideration and evaluation of the positions taken by the
Justices in the three cases. The author states his suspicion that ". . . properly viewed, there
is in the world of the First Amendment no place for 'the reasonable [sic] prudent man.'"
Id. at 303. This suspicion is based on the author's conclusion that since in both Butts and
Walker five Justices applied the Sullivan standard, this standard has been applied across the
board to civil actions involving public figures. He views the apparent victory of the Harlan
standard in Butts as a fluke, occasioned when 'Chief Justice Warren concurred in the result
reached by Harlan, but did so by applying the "reckless disregard of the truth" standard of
Sullivan. Id. at 307.
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essentially the same conflict between first amendment rights and legitimate state
enforced rights. Both situations also entail the balancing of first amendment
interests not against the state's own broad interest in preserving public order,
but rather against compensation for actual injuries inflicted on other individuals.
And finally, the feeling expressed in Harlan's opinion that the fact that an
activity is a ".... legitimate, protected and indeed cherished activity does not
mean, however, that one may in all respects carry on that activity exempt from
sanctions designed to safeguard the legitimate interests of others," 5 ' applies as
well to freedom of speech and assembly as to freedom of the press. Whether
the Court would find Harlan's theory persuasive in a case involving grossly
negligent activity or speech resulting in mob violence is, of course, highly speculative. But two things are clear: 1)Although Justice Harlan's opinion in Butts
adopting the gross negligence standard was not a majority opinion, the case
resulted in the affirmance of a $460,000 judgment even though everyone, including Butts' own counsel, 6 ' agreed that the Saturday Evening Post was not
guilty of actual malice under the Sullivan standard. 2) There is a valid analogy
between unintentional libel and unintentional causation of a riot.
The four opinions in Butts represent the Court's most recent consideration
of the problem of balancing first amendment rights against other individual
rights in the context of civil liability. Of the four, the Harlan opinion takes
the most liberties with the traditional sanctity of such rights, a position that
clearly stops short, however, of saying that mere negligence in the exercise of
such rights destroys their preferred status. The conclusion seems inevitable, therefore, that the first amendment would ordinarily provide full protection from
civil liability for an individual who calls a demonstration or who addresses (as
opposed to "incites") an assemblage in the streets even if it is reasonably fore06
seeable that violence will erupt. The lesson of Edwards v. South Carolina
'
62
and Cox v. Louisiana is that an initially peaceful protest march during daylight hours at the site of a public building66 is an exercise of first amendment
rights "in their most pristine and classic form," ' ' even though there is the
ever-present danger of violence. To hold that the organizers of such demonstrations or the persons who address them must suffer the risk of extensive tort
liability would surely drain all the oxygen from the breathing space that the
rights of free speech and assembly need to survive.
On the other hand, it would seem that there should be some limits imposed
on the exercise of these first amendment rights. Suppose, for example, a protest march is arranged to take place on a steaming July night in the midst of
an urban ghetto where the atmosphere is already highly charged by recent violent outbreaks. Add the fact that the organizers have deliberately called it on
659
660
661
662

Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150 (1967).
Id. at 156 n.20.
372 U.S. 229 (1963).
379 U.S. 536 (1965).

663 But see Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), where the Court, in upholding
convictions, distinguished conduct in violation of a state malicious trespass statute from the
non-trespassory conduct involved in Edwards and Cox.
664 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
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such short notice as to make adequate police supervision impossible. 665 In this
situation, violence is not only foreseeable; it is substantially certain. This situation seems to be tailor-made for the application of the "grossly negligent"
standard espoused by Harlan's opinion in Butts.
The second ground that was previously considered as a possible basis for the
tort liability of one whose conduct or words unintentionally result in mob violence
was the violation of a statute designed to protect the public safety. If, even
under the Harlan standard, negligence alone is not sufficient to deprive the exercise of a first amendment right of its protected status, it is initially hard to
conceive of a statutory violation, whether it be considered evidence of negligence
or even negligence per se, serving as a constitutionally acceptable basis of civil
liability. At the same time, however, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of criminal convictions arising out of such violations.666 By arguing
from analogy, it may be possible to sustain a conclusion that when such a statute
is violated and the violation results in injuries within the contemplation of the
statute, there would be no constitutional barrier to a civil action against the
violator, a result achievable without reliance on the gross negligence standard
of Harlan's opinion in Butts. This position is somewhat weakened by the
absence of traditional criminal law safeguards from the civil proceeding and
by the threat of a substantial and indeterminate judgment. The Harlan standard
might prove to be the best route after all if the statutory violation could be
coupled with enough other factors so that the totality of evidence would establish
gross negligence.
The final ground considered above with respect to the tort liability of one
who organizes a demonstration that unintentionally erupts in violence was a
kind of strict liability found in NAACP v. Overstreet667 However, if negligence
is not sufficient to deprive one of first amendment protection, a fortiori, any kind
of strict liability standard would seem to be equally impotent. But before such
a conclusion need be drawn, analysis of the Overstreet case may reveal that its
value as precedent in the area of civil liability for group action is limited by its
own facts.
665 In this regard, consider the following statement of Chicago's former Superintendent
of Police, 0. W. Wilson:
During the Summer of '66 there were several civil rights groups which conducted marches into areas of Chicago where a majority of the residents were not
sympathetic with the view of the marchers. I believe that it was the aim of these
marchers to subject themselves to violence. If the marches were conducted without
incident, nothing would be gained. The violence which occurs is in fact their
bargaining wedge. If violence occurs, they can make demands upon the city administration and in return for the granting of those demands agree to end the
marches and thereby the violence. Otherwise they have no bargaining power. For
this reason, those in charge of the marches do not really want adequate police
protection and control, although they say they do.
At first, the leaders of the marches agreed to notify the police sufficiently
in advance of the march so that the police might mobilize an adequate force to
control the onlookers, hecklers, and other trouble makers. Only twice, however,
were we notified.
Wilson, Civil Disturbances and the Rule of Law, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 155, 159 (1967).
666 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (conviction of defendants upheld for
violation of state statute requiring parade permits).
667 221 Ga. 16, 142 S.E.2d 816, cert. granted, 382 U.S. 937 (1965), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 384 U.S. 118, rehearing denied, 384 U.S. 981 (1966).
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It is significant that the violence in Overstreet resulted during picketing of a
single identified business establishment rather than during a public demonstration. Although the Supreme Court has held that, since picketing is a form of
expression, a state cannot constitutionally impose a blanket prohibition on all
picketing, it added the proviso that, because picketing was also a form of action,
the states could regulate and even forbid it where it posed an imminent threat
to the public peace or threatened lives and property.6 In Hughes v. Superior
Court.69 the traditional criteria for state regulation of picketing received the
Court's approval: "Picketing is not beyond the control of the State if the manner
in which picketing is conducted or the purpose which it seeks to effectuate gives
grounds for its disallowance." 70 Overstreet rests principally on this power of
the states to control picketing when it is used for an illegal purpose, which in
this case was the malevolent infliction of harm on the legitimate business interests
of the plaintiff.
Where, as alleged here, the sole purpose of the picketing of plaintiff's
place of business was to injure and damage his business, as punishment
of him for the alleged beating of a negro boy who worked for him, the
picketing is unlawful and not protected
under the free speech provisions
6 71
of the Federal and State Constitutions.
Only after grounding the decision on this constitutionally firm foundation
did the court imply that the defendants would be liable even if the violent acts
72
were solely the deeds of the sympathetic crowd attracted by the picketing.
It would be a mistake, therefore, to read this implication of absolute liability for
the resulting violence as a separate and self-sufficient grounds for liability in the
absence of an illegal purpose. Where a defendant's conduct constitutes a
malicious and unexcused interference with the plaintiff's legitimate business
interests, as was found in Overstreet, the resulting liability is absolute in the
same sense that liability flowing from any other intentional tort is absolute.
Therefore, the prominence of the intentional "business tort" basis for liability
makes it an inapplicable precedent for any type of strict liability for violence
resulting from the conduct or organization of a public demonstration, except
perhaps when the very purpose of the demonstration is to arouse mob violence.
So long as the purpose of a public demonstration is an essentially peaceful one,
668
669
670
671

Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940).
339 U.S. 460 (1950).
Id. at 465-66.
NAACP v. Overstreet, 221 Ga. 16, 142 S.E.2d 816, 824, cert. granted, 382 U.S. 937

(1965), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 384 U.S. 118, rehearing denied, 384 U.S.

981 (1966). The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that this was not a case of legitimate
civil rights picketing:
First, there is no allegation that the plaintiff practised racial discrimination
nor any facts alleged from which such conclusion could be drawn. . . . The sole
reason alleged for the picketing was the alleged assault and battery upon the 14
year old negro boy who worked for the plaintiff. It is not alleged that plaintiff was
charged with beating the boy because he was a negro. 142 S.E.2d at 823.
672 142 S.E.2d at 825.
673 The essence of a so-called "business tort" is an intentional interference with legitimate
business interests of another with a purely malevolent motive. Thus, the tort does not
arise where the individual is acting in his own business interests or other legitimate interests.
See W. PRossER, LAw oF ToRTs § 124, at 978 (3d ed. 1964).
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such as the publicizing of grievances and the petitioning for their redress, the
purpose itself comes within the protection of the first amendment.6 74
C. Liability of Organizations for Incitement by Their Agents
1. The Nature of the Vicarious Liability
It is apparent that the problems involved in obtaining a judgment against
an individual whose conduct unintentionally causes a riot are more complex than
those involved in prosecuting a successful damage action against the actual
rioters. What is more disturbing, however, is that the likelihood of the extra
effort paying off in terms of recovery on the judgment is probably only slightly
better in most situations. The greatest advantage that may be gained by succeeding in a cause of action against the individual who occasions a riot is the
possibility of enforcing the judgment against an organization that he may be
representing. In order for this endeavor to be successful, it must be shown that
the individual's activities were sponsored by, or carried on under, the authority
of the organization; that is, an agency relationship must be established.
The Overstreet case 7 5 represents a recent and apparently successful example
of a national political organization being held liable for the actions of its local
officers. The plaintiff joined the national NAACP, a New York corporation,
as a party defendant in his damage action, alleging that one of the individual
defendants, an officer of the local (Savannah) branch of the NAACP, was
.'.
. acting in and for the services [of the national NAACP corporation] as
its agent, employee, and servant, within the scope of said agency, employment
and service.' "66 In answering the crucial question ". . . whether there is
evidence that the defendants Law or Jaudon were acting as agents of said
[organizational] defendants . . . "" the Georgia Supreme Court followed a
two step process. It first reviewed various facts about the relationship between
the national and the local chapters, from which it concluded that there existed
a close affiliation between the two bodies.7 ' Then, in view of this affiliation,
the court took the simple but effective approach that
[i]f Law originally acted without authority and assumed to act for
them without authority, they had the option to repudiate or ratify the act,
674 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963).
675 See text at notes 609-11 supra for a summary of the facts of Overstreet.
676 NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118, 120 (1966)
(dissenting opinion of Justice
Douglas).
677 NAACP v. Overstreet, 221 Ga. 16, 142 S.E.2d 816, 825-26, cert. granted, 382 U.S.
937 (1965), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 384 U.S. 118 (1966).
678 The court substantiated its finding of affiliation as follows:
The Savannah Branch used the corporate name, N.A.A.C.P., and held itself
out as representing the national corporation. The national corporation gave orders
and counsel to its local representatives at annual conventions; the locals were
affiliated with the national organization and under its corporate charter, were
units thereof; one paying dues to the local N.A.A.C.P. also became a member of the
national N.A.A.C.P.; members of the local were members of the national N.A.A.C.P.
and a portion of the dues went to the N.A.A.C.P. corporation. These facts evidence
that the locals are within the framework of the national organization and are used
in furtherance of the latter's business and interest. 142 S.E.2d at 826.
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but they were required to do one or the other. And where, as here, they
never repudiated the act, they are deemed to have affirmed it.' 9
The deftness with which this fatal one-two punch was administered caught
not only the NAACP off guard, but apparently also a majority of the United
States Supreme Court. The Court granted certiorari on the specific question
of whether the national organization had been deprived of "due process of law
under the fourteenth amendment by being held liable in damages for acts performed without its knowledge and by persons beyond its control,"'6 ° but, for unexplained reasons, the writ was then dismissed as improvidently granted."8 '
Four Justices dissented in an opinion written by Justice Douglas that took the
position that such a manipulation of agency concepts and terms poses as definite
a threat to the first amendment rights of freedom of association as forced disclosure of political associations.8 2 and guilt by association. 8 After stating that
"agency" and "affiliation" are mere labels without "talismanic significance,"
the dissenting opinion concluded that the first amendment forbids the imposition
of liability on a national political association because of the misconduct of a
local branch without proof that the national organization specifically authorized
or ratified the conduct for which liability is sought to be imposed. "A general
finding of 'agency' or 'affiliation' is not enough."6
Not only did the corporate
NAACP here not authorize the picketing of the plaintiff's store, but it was not
even aware of this action until it received secondhand the service of process
made on the individual defendants.
The proposal by Justice Douglas that a national principal be liable for a
local agent only when the "conduct for which liability is sought to be imposed"
is specifically authorized or ratified would be a just and effective standard in
situations like that presented in Overstreet where the "demonstration" itself was
illegal, that is, was conducted for an illegal purpose. But what about the situations in which a demonstration, legal in purpose, erupts into violence through
the gross negligence of those authorized by the organization to conduct it? As
discussed earlier,8 ' if the gross negligence standard of individual liability proposed by the Harlan opinion in Butts were applied to find the agents personally
liable, could the organization escape liability because it specifically authorized
679 Id.
680 382 U.S. 937 (1965).
681 384 U.S. 118, rehearing denied, 384 U.S. 981 (1966).
682 DeGregory v. Attorney General of N.H., 383 U.S. 825 (1966); Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 543-46 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958).
683 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 245-46 (1957). See also Elfbrandt
v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
684 NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118, 125 (1966) (dissenting opinion) (footnote
omitted). Justice Douglas felt that the affiliation standard approved in Overstreet in reference
to a political organization is the same kind of standard that once burdened labor unions with
liability for all the violence of their scattered affiliates. Id. at 124; see the Danbury Hatters'
Cases, Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
Congress came to the unions' rescue with section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 106 (1964), which requires a finding of "clear proof of actual participation in, or actual
authorization of, . . . or . . . ratification of" the local union activities before the national
organization can be held liable. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
685 See text accompanying notes 649-58 supra.
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a peaceful demonstration and not "the conduct for which liability is sought to
be imposed"? If "specifically authorized conduct" is read in its strictest sense,
liability should not be imposed on the organization in this situation. Such a
result would have the anomalous effect of creating a higher degree of first
amendment protection for the organization itself when its agent, though acting
within the scope of his authority, has been guilty of gross misconduct - a result
certainly at odds with the basic agency doctrine of respondeat superior. Perhaps such an exception can be justified on the theory that while gross negligence
might be the point at which the first amendment rights of the individual are
outweighed by the property or personal rights of another individual, there is
no comparable balancing point at which such property or personal rights of an
individual outweigh the first amendment rights of an association of individuals.
On the other hand, this view seems not only unnecessary but equally as
unjust, in the opposite direction, as the affiliation theory used by the state court
in Overstreet. If the organization has authorized the demonstration and placed
its agents in charge of its conduct, it has the ability to exert control over the
qualifications and reputation of its agents and thus maintain some control over
the circumstances. To absolve it of liability in this situation would be to encourage irresponsibility in the choice and control of persons whose every word
and act carries the potentiality of dynamite. Furthermore, if actual intent to
cause violence were the standard of organizational liability, the practical task
of proving intent by producing some kind .of resolution or similar evidence would
create an impossible burden of proof and bestow veritable tort immunity on the
most militant of organizations.
Whether the Douglas standard raises more problems than it solves and what
refinements it ought to undergo are not pressing questions under the present
state of the law. Regardless of its apparent constitutional inadequacies, the
decision of the Georgia Supreme Court in Overstreet stands by judicial default:
a political organization is liable for the misconduct of persons affiliated with it
but acting beyond its control and knowledge.
2. Unincorporated Organizations
It may happen that the organization sought to be held liable for riot damage
is not a corporate entity as was the NAACP in Overstreet, but rather an unincorporated nonprofit association." 6 In this situation, not only are the problems
of finding substantive liability more complicated, but there are additional problems of enforcing the liability once it is found. Initially, it should be emphasized
that the same constitutional limitations on the agency relationship should be
applied to unincorporated associations as to incorporated ones. Whether a
group of individuals united for a common legal purpose is recognized by a

686 The ordinary
cution of a common
forms. See Hecht v.
distinguished from a
is for the purpose of

definition of an "association" is a body of persons united for the proseenterprise without a corporate charter but using corporate methods and
Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 157 (1924). A "non-profit" association is to be
business association such as a partnership where the common enterprise
making a profit.
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state as a corporate body would not seem to bear on the value or extent of the
constitutional protection accorded it.68 7
The general rule with respect to liability is that an unincorporated association is held to the same standard of care as any other group and is liable for
the tortious conduct of its servants or agents committed during the prosecution
of the association's business.68 Some courts have insisted upon the additional
requirement that an agent, especially one who is not a servant, must be under
the actual control of the association at the time of his tortious conduct.689 At
least one jurisdiction has distinguished between unintentional and intentional
acts of the agent, saying that while the former are governed by the general agency
rules of scope of employment,"' the latter must be specifically authorized or
ratified before the association can be held liable.69 '
If an unincorporated association is liable for the authorized acts of its agents,
logic suggests that it should be subject to suit and required to satisfy a judgment
against it. However, the vague legal status of associations both at common law
and under the many different state statutory schemes of today often does not
admit of logical conclusions.692 The common-law rule, and thus the rule today
in the absence of statute, is that in actions at law69 an association cannot sue
or be sued in its own name because it is not a legal person distinct from its
members;69 rather the action must be brought by or against all the members
jointly. 95 The obvious impracticality of such a rule led to widespread statutory
modification of the rule so that now procedural statutes in most states provide
for class action suits 96 or suits brought in the association name.'9 " In New York,
suit against an association may be brought against an officer of the association;698
while in Iowa a class action is essential, but the association may be joined as a
687 Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Overstreet makes no attempt to distinguish the
corporate from the non-corporate, political organization with respect to the agency standard
he believes to be constitutionally required. 384 U.S. 118 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
688 Feldman v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 137 F.2d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 1943);
Ketcher v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 115 F. Supp. 802, 811 (E.D. Ark. 1953); Weese
v. Stoddard, 63 N.M. 20, 312 P.2d 545, 547 (1956).
689 'Cox v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 126 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1942); Mercury Cab
Owners' Ass'n v. Jones, 79 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 1955), aff'd, 95 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1956); Jopes
v. Salt Lake County, 9 Utah 2d 297, 343 P.2d 728 (1559).
690 Torres v. Lacey, 5 Misc. 2d 11, 159 N.Y.S.2d 411, modified on other grounds, 3 App.
Div. 2d 998, 163 N.Y.S.2d 451, reargument denied, 4 App. Div. 2d 831, 166 N.Y.S.2d 303
(1957).
691 Kirby v. Dubinski, 39 Misc. 2d 1064, 242 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1963).
692 See H. OLECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATIONS §
225-26, at 465-73 (2d ed. 1965). For an excellent general analysis of the procedural problems relating to unincorporated associations, see Brunson, Some Problems Presented by Unincorporated Associations in Civil Procedure,7 S.C.L.Q. 394 (1955).

693 At early common law, there could be no suit by or against an association as an entity.
But the class action suit was allowed much earlier in equity than at law and in fact became
the model for the class action suit at law in the case of associations. See Brunson, supra note
692, at 395-99.

694 Morris v. Willis, 338 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. 1960); Teubert v. Wisconsin Interscholastic
Athletic Ass'n, 8 Wis. 2d 373, 99 N.W.2d 100 (1959); Brunson, supra note 692, at 396-97.
695 Brunson, supra note 692, at 398 and cases cited there at note 15.
696 E.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.21 (Page 1954); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 260.12
(1957). See also FED. R. Cry. P. 23.
697 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 3-118 (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 540.151 (Supp. 1967).
See also FED. R. Cwr. P. 17(b).
698 N.Y. GEN. ASS'NS LAW § 12 (McKinney 1942), § 13 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
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party. 699 Numerous other variations have existed and still do: permitting an
association to be sued but not to sue in its common name,"' or allowing suits of an
equitable nature against it in its common name only if it is a business association but not if it is a nonprofit association.7 1 The general rule is that these
statutory procedures are not considered to be exclusive remedies, so that in a
jurisdiction permitting suit against an association as an entity, a class action
may also be brought or even a joinder of all the members as at common law.71
Many times the procedural device permitting a specified form of suit or
specified joinder of plaintiffs or defendants will, as a practical matter, determine
and limit the sources from which a judgment can be recovered. For example,
in states where an association is not suable as an entity, it has been held that the
assets of the association cannot be reached since the members are jointly liable
as individuals."0 3 Conversely, where statutes exist making an association a suable
entity, the courts have held that their effect,7 1 or even their purpose," 0 is to
make the assets of the association available to satisfy adverse judgments. The
courts in Ohio have taken the position that where a plaintiff sues an association under an entity statute, he is limited to recovery from the assets of the
association, even though initially he could have brought a class action suit and
recovered against the individual members. 0
In those situations where a plaintiff chooses or is required to use a class
action device against an association, the procedural nile may unsettle the substantive liability in certain situations by causing some courts to hold that only
those association members who actually participated in the activity that caused
the injury can be held liable. 0 Other jurisdictions have disagreed with this
view, especially in the labor area, and have found all the members can be
liable on a civil conspiracy theory. 0
In addition to these problems of proper parties and enforcement of judgments in litigation involving voluntary nonprofit associations, there are often
699 Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Ass'n, 258 Iowa 285, 138 N.W.2d 914 (1965).
700 PA. R. Civ. P. 2152, 2153. See generally Brunson, supra note 692, at 401-10.
701 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:64-6 (1952). See generally Brunson, supra note 692, at 40110.
702 Lyons v. American Legion Post No. 650 Realty Co., 172 Ohio St. 331, 175 N.E.2d
733 (1961); H. OLECK, supra note 692, § 225, at 467.
703 Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 233 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 353
U.S. 138 (1957); Florio v. State, 119 So. 2d 305, 80 A.L.R.2d 1117 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
704 United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922);
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 78, comment c, at 352 (1942) provides:
In states in which suit can be maintained against an unincorporated association in its business name, judgment can be rendered which is valid against the
assets of the association .... Whether the judgment is effective to bind personally
the members of the association over whom the court has jurisdiction depends upon
whether the judgment is directed against the members or merely against the
assets of the organization.
705 Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963).
706 E.g., Miazga v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 2 Ohio St. 2d 49, 205 N.E.2d
884 (1965); Lyons v. American Legion Post No. 650 Realty Co., 172 Ohio St. 331, 175
N.E.2d 733 (1961).
707 Barry v. Covich, 332 Mass. 338, 124 N.E.2d 921 (1955); Lyons v. American Legion
Post No. 650 Realty Co., 172 Ohio St. 331, 175 N.E.2d 733 (1961); see Martin v. Curran,
303 N.Y. 276, 101 N.E.2d 683 (1951).
708 Ketcher v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 115 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Ark. 1953);
Hall v. Walters, 226 S.C. 430, 85 S.E.2d 729, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 953 (1955).
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problems of jurisdiction, venue, and process - matters equally subject to the
vagaries of state law."' In the context of this topic on civil liability of organizations for riot damage, it is not possible to cover in detail all the procedural
problems that could arise when the organization sought to be held is unincorporated. Rather it is hoped that this brief discussion will serve to emphasize
that not all problems of organizational liability involve unsettled constitutional
issues. Much of the complexity in the area is essentially procedural; the solutions
in any particular case must be sought in the appropriate statutory and decisional
law of the forum jurisdiction.
3. Charitable Immunity
Whether the organization sought to be held liable for riot damage is incorporated or not, there is one other doctrine of local law that bears some mention, namely, the once vigorous doctrine of charitable immunity. 1 ° The time
was when practically all the states accorded charitable organizations some degree
of immunity from tort liability for the acts of their servants.""' Today in more
than half of the states the doctrine has been repudiated," 2 and in the rest of the
states, it is being increasingly subjected to inroads and exceptions. 1"3 Where
the doctrine still survives in one form or another, however, it could conceivably
be pleaded as a defense by organizations whose agents and servants are responsible for mob violence.
The availability of this defense depends first of all upon the ability of the
organization to bring itself within the legal status of a "charitable" organization.
One of the standard descriptions of a charitable organization is that " ...it has
no capital stock and no provision for making dividends or profits, but derives
its funds mainly from public and private charity, and holds them in trust to be
expended for charitable and benevolent purposes."' 14 Charitable purposes, in
turn, are said to include the relief of poverty, the advancement of education
or religion, the promotion of health, governmental or municipal purposes, and

709 See generally Brunson, supra note 692, at 411-19.
710 The doctrine applies or does not apply regardless of whether the charitable organization is incorporated or not. Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147, 78 N.E. 855 (1906).
711 In an exhaustive analysis of the doctrine in President and Directors of Georgetown
College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942), Justice Rutledge recognized that
although it had already been "devoured in 'exceptions,'" charitable immunity was still the
rule in almost all the states. Id. at 817.
712 Dean Prosser in the 1964 edition of his treatise on tort law lists nineteen states that
have repudiated charitable immunity; they are Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS
§ 127, at 1023-24 (3d ed. 1964). As of March 1968, the following states may be added
to the list: Idaho (Bell v. Presbytery of Boise, 421 P.2d 745 (Idaho 1966)); Illinois (Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965));
Nebraska (Meyers v. Drozda, 180 Neb. 183, 141 N.W.2d 852 (1966)) (nonprofit charitable
hospitals); Nevada (Nv. Rav. STAT. § 41.480 (1965)); Pennsylvania (Flagiello v. Penn.
Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965)); Washington (Friend v. Cove Methodist Church,
Inc., 65 Wash. 2d 174, 396 P.2d 546 (1964)); West Virginia (Adkins v. St. Francis Hosp.,
149 W. Va. 705, 143 S.E.2d 154 (1965)).
713 See text at notes 720-26 infra.
714 Town of Cody v. Buffalo Bill Memorial Ass'n, 64 Wyo. 468, 492, 196 P.2d 369, 377

(1948).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Symposium, 1968]

other purposes the accomplishment of which is beneficial to the community."25
The courts are in substantial agreement regarding these definitions as well as
the abstract standards to be applied in determining the charitable status of
organizations. For example, it is generally held that an organization's charter
or articles of incorporation are only prima facie evidence of its charitable nature,
so that evidence as to its actual operation may be introduced to establish otherwise.716 Likewise, there is substantial agreement that the fact that the organization is a nonprofit one is not conclusive for its charitable status,"'7 nor is the fact
that it may receive some form of compensation for its services conclusive against
charitable status.'
But, despite the consensus on the general characteristics of charitable organizations, the cases clearly reveal that different courts often achieve opposite
results in applying the standards to similar organizations. 9 It would therefore
be futile to attempt to propose a single test for determining whether an organization responsible for riot damage would or would not qualify for charitable immunity. This is especially true because the organizations that could conceivably
be responsible for mob violence do not fall into a well defined category; the
numerous civil rights organizations differ greatly from each other as to purposes
and activities and, as a group, they differ greatly from various other political
groups, and even more so from student organizations and clubs.
Simply qualifying as a charity, however, under whatever standards the court
may apply or whatever evaluation of the facts the court may make, does not
mean that the organization can automatically claim charitable immunity under
all circumstances. Almost all the states that still recognize some form of charitable
immunity will protect the charity only when the claim against it arises out of
an actual charitable activity.720 Following this view, numerous courts have held
that when the charitable organization engages in primarily commercial activities
such as running a bingo game,72' a parking lot, 22 or an office building, 23 it
cannot claim charitable immunity from injuries arising from these activities,
even though the profits are to be used ultimately for charitable purposes. Likewise, it can be argued that an organization that otherwise qualifies as a charity
should not be able to claim immunity with respect to activities such as demon715

Boyd v. Frost Nat'l Bank, 145 Tex. 206, 196 S.W.2d 497, 502 (1946).

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)

OF TRUSTS

§§ 368-74 (1959).

See also

716 Krpan v. Otis Elevator Co., 226 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Barrett v. Brooks
Hosp., 338 Mass. 754, 157 N.E.2d 638 (1959); Hodgson v. William Beaumont Hosp., 373
Mich. 184, 128 N.W.2d 542 (1964). But see Oak Park Club v. Lindheimer, 369 Ill. 462, 17
N.E.2d 32 (1938) (certificate of incorporation is controlling for tax purposes).
717 Krpan v. Otis Elevator Co., 226 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Bush v. Aiken Elec.
Cooperative, Inc., 226 S.C. 442, 85 S.E.2d 716 (1955).
718 See Duncan v. Steeper, 17 Wis. 2d 226, 116 N.W.2d 154, 157 (1962), and authorities
cited therein.
719 E.g., compare Appeal of Subers, 173 Pa. Super. 558, 98 A.2d 639 (1953) with Neptune
Fire Engine & Hose Co. v. Board of Educ., 166 Ky. 1, 178 S.W. 1138 (1915), overruled on
other grounds in Greene v. Stevenson, 295 Ky. 832, 175 S.W.2d 519 (1943).
720 E.g., Blatt v. Geo. H. Nettleton Home for Aged Women, 365 Mo. 30, 275 S.W.2d
344 (1955); Eiserhardt v. State Agricultural & Mechanical Soc'y, 235 S.C. 305, 111 S.E. 2d
568 (1959).
721 Blankenship v. Alter, 171 Ohio St. 65, 167 N.E.2d 922 (1960).
722 Eiserhardt v. State Agricultural & Mechanical Soc'y, 235 S.C. 305, 111 S.E.2d 568
(1959).
723 Gamble v. Vanderbilt Univ., 138 Tenn. 616, 200 S.W. 510 (1918).
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strations, marches, and picketing, even though they may indirectly further admittedly charitable purposes and goals. Such activities may not be commercial
enterprises in the same sense as a bingo game or a publishing house, but they
are equally as non-charitable and even more likely to adversely affect the interests
of third persons.
There are other limitations often imposed on charitable immunity that may
affect the availability of the defense to an organization responsible for mob
violence. For example, several jurisdictions that hold charitable organizations
immune from the tortious conduct of their servants will nonetheless find the
organization liable where it has been negligent in hiring or retaining an employee. 2 Where this exception is recognized, it seems evident that an organization may lose its charitable immunity for entrusting the conduct of a demonstration to an agent who it knows is likely to incite violence. Other courts limit
immunity to cases where the person suing is a beneficiary of the charitable
activities of the organization, but allow others to recover. 2 s In these states,
the organization responsible for the violent demonstration would have to establish that the injured person was a beneficiary of the demonstration in order
for the organization to qualify for immunity. It is difficult to imagine such a
finding unless perhaps the injured person may have requested or approved of
or participated in the demonstration. Finally, some states, especially those basing
immunity on a trust fund theory, hold that the organization is freed from liability
only to the extent that its trust funds may not be made subject to judgment;
but where it has other funds available, usually
in the form of liability insurance,
7 26
it may be held liable up to the policy limits.

There is no doubt that the law of charitable immunity today is undergoing
rapid changes - all tending toward an eventual elimination of the doctrine
altogether or at least a confinement of it to its narrowest limits. Whether an
organization that would otherwise be liable for mob violence could escape that
liability by claiming charitable immunity is a question apparently not yet considered by any court. 27 But if such a case should arise, it is predictable that the
pronounced trend away from charitable immunity will motivate most courts
that still recognize the doctrine to seize upon one of the available exceptions
724 Southern Methodist Univ. v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d 749 (1943); Hill v.
Lehigh Memorial Hosp., 204 Va. 501, 132 S.E.2d 411 (1963).
725 Viosca v. Touro Infirmary, 170 So. 2d 222 (La. App. Ct. 1964); Peacock v. Burlington
County Historical Soc'y, 95 N.J. Super. 205, 230 A.2d 513 (1967).
726 Michard v. Myron Stratton Home, 144 Colo. 251, 355 P.2d 1078 (1960); YMCA
v. Bailey, 112 Ga. App. 684, 146 S.E.2d 324 (1965); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 158
(Supp. 1967).
727 It may perhaps be worthy of noting that in the Overstreet case, discussed at length
above, there is no indication that a charitable immunity defense was raised at all by the
NAACP, although the doctrine is still recognized in Georgia and although the organization
could possibly qualify as charitable for purposes of tort immunity. See Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118, 120 (1966) where he recognized

that the NAACP is "a nonprofit corporation . . . for the purpose of promoting equality of
treatment for Negro citizens," citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 451-52 (1958).
In short, it was at least arguable that the NAACP in Overstreet could have pleaded itself
as a charitable corporation. Why it was not attempted is, of course, speculation, but it is
possible that the NAACP attorneys recognized that even if they could establish the organization as a charitable one, they would still have the problem of showing that the picketing
was a charitable activity, almost certainly an impossibility in view of the violence that erupted
and the fact that the picketing itself was found to be illegal.
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as grounds for denying charitable immunity to an organization otherwise responsible for mob violence.
Conclusion
The entire area of law applicable to a riot situation is currently a topic of
vital concern for this nation. There are strong indications that the long, hot
summers of civil unrest in the cities will continue, at least, in the immediate
future. For this reason, the solution of the legal problems that were considered
in this Note will continue to plague the courts and other law enforcement agencies
in the years to come. Since the root causes of the recent urban ghetto riots are
basically social and economic inequalities, the legal system alone cannot effect
a total remedy for the riot problem. However, until the causes of riots are eliminated from our society, it remains the burden of the legal system to restore and
maintain law and order. It is to this latter objective that this Note is directed.
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